“Most corporations are not tracking e-discovery spending…” In what may be the most notable finding of this ESG report, 60% of survey respondents claim that they did not track annual eDiscovery spending in 2010.  The authors correctly note that the eDiscovery process, “which can be highly unpredictable due to its project-by-project nature to begin with, has historically been outsourced to service providers charging at variable rates and often billed back to companies via their law firms.”  Despite the significant challenges of tracking eDiscovery spending, it’s nevertheless irresponsible for organizations to keep their heads in the sand regarding such a significant operational expense.

As the old saw goes, “you can’t manage what you can’t measure,” so it’s almost inconceivable to think that so many organizations aren’t tracking such a significant expense category.  For organizations who want to create a repeatable business process, as opposed to the fire-drill chaos that is typically associated with eDiscovery, it’s vitally important to accurately capture core eDiscovery metrics.  For starters, it’s useful to understand basic collection parameters, such as of the typical numbers of key custodians, average data volumes per custodian, data expansion rates, de-duplication statistics, etc.  Once these metrics are in place, it then becomes possible to manage the process and reduce costs.

Katey went on to expound in an exclusive quote for EDD 2.0:

“E-discovery can be managed as a strategic business process with an understanding of costs, performance and outcomes. When there’s no basis for reporting or comparison, it’s pin the tail on the donkey.  Corporate litigants won’t ever know they’re getting their money’s worth if they don’t even know what they’re spending.”

“E-Discovery accuracy/efficiency isn’t being measured, in large part.” Similar to the failure to measure eDiscovery costs, a full two thirds of GCs (67%) aren’t tracking the “efficiency and/or accuracy of e-discovery document review.” Until corporate counsel can link expectations of competency/efficiency with oversight and performance metrics, outside law firms will likely avoid having their feet held to the fire.  This passive stance makes transparency and process improvement difficult at best.  Additionally, this model of having expectations for efficiency, with low or no accountability, doesn’t bode well for the quick adoption of enabling technologies like predictive coding, since the driver has to inherently be the need/desire for increased efficiency (which axiomatically equals lower law firm review bills).

“Corporate information governance and litigation readiness (especially defensible deletion) are a priority, but not yet a reality.” From an internal prioritization perspective, more than two thirds (69%) of respondents identified their desire to expire/delete data more consistently, “thereby limiting unnecessary data retention for future litigation requests.”  Savvy enterprises correctly recognized the “multi-prong threat of unregulated data retention: the large amounts of irrelevant data ultimately produced for legal review, the greater difficulty of hanging onto potentially litigious documents past their required retention periods.”

This finding is very encouraging, and it ties into the upward momentum the industry is seeing regarding information governance generally – particularly linking the reactive (right) side of the EDRM with the logically connected and proactive (left) side of the EDRM.  As a good first step it’s critical to see organizations now associating good information governance hygiene with lower costs and better eDiscovery response times.  The ESG finding also triangulates with results from the recent Information Retention and eDiscovery Survey, which found that companies having good information governance hygiene were often able to respond much faster and more successfully to an eDiscovery/investigation requests, often suffering fewer negative consequences.

The only downside to the positive information governance trend, as reported by the survey, was that,

“while there are great benefits to defensible deletion, internal initiatives for implementing it too often are stymied by difficulty in obtaining cross functional consensus and authorization, particularly as it touches so many other critical processes like regulatory compliance and legal hold.”

“Legal hold processes are still very manual.” Another similar question revealed that many companies are attempting to get their information governance house in order, but are still in the very early stages.  When asked about their  current legal hold notification and tracking process, a whopping 69% of organizations said that they are using a “manual process performed by internal staff using e-mail and spreadsheets, etc.”  And, another 6% said they either had no formal process or tracking mechanism.

Given the risks attendant to flaws in the preservation process this area is ripe for improvement.  The good news is that 54% of survey respondents are intending to improve their legal hold process, with 25% planning improvement within the next 12 months.  This is a healthy acknowledgement that there is risk, and with a modicum of investment (time, personnel, procedures, and technology) the legal hold area can be brought up to current best practices.

The ESG survey is a welcome temperature gauge into the state of corporate legal departments.  It notes, in conclusion, “with the staggering growth, diversity and dispersion of data, the pain e-discovery is currently causing large and serial litigants are only a symptom of the larger problem of unwieldy and under-developed information management affecting all businesses.”  With data insights from the ESG survey, it’s becoming clear that foundational information governance elements (like deploying auditable legal hold procedures, tracking eDiscovery spending, updating data maps, etc.) are desperately needed by the many organizations that want to turn eDiscovery into a repeatable business process.  The good news is that many of these organization have improvements in mind for the next 12 months, and the challenge will be to make sure these proactive projects maintain the same level of organizational urgency that it often present for more reactive tasks.

The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

To join the conversation and receive automatic updates when new information is posted to this blog, please subscribe to e-discovery 2.0.

Given the size of our writing team, it’s worth taking this opportunity to say a few words about what you (the reader) can expect from our blog. Our team meets on a monthly basis to discuss topics of interest. In doing so, we hope to speak with one voice on broad range of issues:

• Kurt Leafstand and Venkat Rangan will write about the latest technology trends and their impact on electronic discovery;

• Brandon, Dean, and Matt will cover case law and best practices from both a corporate and law firm perspective; and,

• I will continue to write about the business of electronic discovery, and its development as an industry.

All of us aim to inform in a style that’s engaging and easy to read. We hope you enjoy reading our posts as much as we do writing them.

Leaving the WABAC machine and moving into present times, we’ve starting to see some variance from traditional pricing models that primarily focus on data “into” the processing machine. More and more companies (such as Kroll Ontrack) are moving to models that price on data “out” of the process. Since that’s a bit nebulous, an example might illustrate:

Traditionally, in a somewhat simplified fashion, an electronic discovery project would be priced by the amount of data in the initial corpus (say 100 gigabytes) and processing would be priced at $500 a gigabyte (for round numbers purposes). Leaving out the sometimes significant caveat that the 100 gigabytes would likely increase due to expansion of compressed files, this would mean that the bulk of the project expenses would be $50,000 ($500 x 100), plus relatively nominal costs for monthly hosting and user access rights.

At the end of the day, after elimination of system files, deduplication and application of search terms (reducing the initial corpus by say 70% collectively) there would be 30 gigabytes remaining for hosting and possible production, both of which are most often priced separately.

Given rampant commoditization there’s an arms race underway among certain service providers where they’re now changing the above model to give away initial processing as a loss leader – pricing only on the data that comes out the end of the processing/search step. In this approach the above workflow would largely stay the same, but the vendor would charge a higher rate for what ultimately is hosted on the back-end. If this back-end fee was $2,000 per resulting gigabyte and the same 30 gigabytes was seen out the back end, then the customer would pay $60,000 for the project. But, if the deduplication, searching, culling, etc. was more effective (at say 80%) then the resulting 20 gigabytes would only cost $40,000.

The question then, as Clint Eastwood would put it, is: “Do you feel lucky?” This pricing model forces attorneys and litigation support managers to guesstimate what culling, search, and de-duplication rates they’ll likely get on the data corpus. Guess right and they save the end client money, guess wrong and they’re way over budget.

The dynamics of this purchasing decision are a bit atypical because the buyer (usually counsel) doesn’t pay the bills, so the decision can often be more vexing than most. When a direct consumer gambles on pricing things will ideally balance out over time, with money being saved in some instances and some being overspent in others. But, when the buyer doesn’t pay the bills the motivation is less clear.

Thoughts run to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to determine which pricing model is ultimately more compelling: (a) price certainty/adherence to budget, or (b) cost variability and the opportunity to save money. While it’s never good to understate the upside of saving money (Esteem), I think ultimately there’s a more fundamental need (Safety) to stay within budget and avoid the painful (sometimes client imperiling) call to discuss how a given e-discovery project has gone way over budget.

This calculation is made further vexing because it not only pits the purchasing party against unknown data culling/searching rates, but it also puts the vendor in an ethical bind where they make less money if they’re supremely effective at data reduction, whereas if they’re either intentionally or accidentally beneficiaries of relatively little data reduction then they stand to make a ton of upside.

It’s like you went to Vegas to gamble your kid’s college fund and on top of the already questionable house odds you knew that the dealer stood to profit by your losses. So, as for myself, no, I don’t feel lucky.

Aside from those overarching themes I was struck by how polarizing the discussion was around one recent case in particular.  While many notable commentators have already made this the most talked about cases of the year, Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 910801 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2009) continues to stimulate discussion.   Adams v. Dell is a patent infringement case where the plaintiff, alleged that one of the defendants (ASUS) destroyed critical pieces of evidence and should be sanctioned accordingly.

The underlying facts and timelines are fairly complex, but in summary the dispute centered around the alleged infringement of several patents developed to resolve defects in floppy disks during in the late 80′s.  What makes this decision so vexing is that it starts out as a preservation case, but quickly confuses that concept with data retention and information management practices/policies.

So, starting with the preservation angle…  Both sides fortunately agreed about the definition for the duty to preserve evidence, which in the 10^th circuit begins when a party “knows or should know [it] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.”  The triggering of the preservation duty was not surprisingly much more complicated and ASUS (the responding party) claimed that its duty to preserve wasn’t triggered until early 2005, when they received a letter warning it of potential litigation because of the alleged patent infringement.  But, the Magistrate held that “counsel’s letter is not the inviolable benchmark” and the duty to preserve was triggered much earlier (in the 1999-2000 time frame) because similar litigation was rampant in the industry, highlighted by a late 1999 suit where Toshiba paid billions of dollars in a class action settlement related to similar floppy disk issues.

Leaving the murky preservation issue by the wayside for a bit, the Magistrate then moved into ASUS’ claims that FRCP 37(e) provided a safe harbor for its alleged destruction.

“ASUS claims it can find a safe harbor against sanctions because of the recently adopted rule that sanctions may not be generally imposed for ‘failing to provide electronically stored information lost’ if a party can show the loss was ‘a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.’”

Nice try, but strike two for ASUS…

“ASUS provided an extensive declaration from an experienced consultant in e-discovery. While he stated the reasons for and history of ASUS’ ‘distributed information architecture,’ he did not state any opinion as to the reasonableness or good-faith in the system’s operation. And while he says ‘ASUSTeK’s data architecture relies predominantly on storage on individual user’s workstations,’ his 31-page declaration does not show he is familiar with the precise practices pointed out in the declarations of employees. Those employees’ declarations describe the practice of ASUS’ email system to overwrite old data regardless of its significance; ASUS’ reliance on employees for all email and data archiving; and the process of replacement of computers, which also relies on employees to transfer data from their old to their new computers. Neither the expert nor ASUS speak of archiving ‘policies;’ they speak of archiving ‘practices.’

The court’s distinction between “policies” and “practices” seems like a convenient (perhaps “Deus ex machina”) way to discount ASUS’ data retention activities and prevent the use of the FRCP 37(e) safe harbor.  Since in most instances, “bona fide, consistent and reasonable” document retention “policies” have been found to be presumptively valid by everyone ranging from Sedona (Guideline 3) to Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp. and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005).  It’s not clear how he draws the important “practices” distinction and why said practices are exponentially different from presumptively valid “policies.”

It’s precisely this line of thinking that confuses the alleged failure of the duty to preserve (discussed at the outset of the opinion) with the duty to retain information.  The court seems to think it’s an “unreasonable” practice to have custodians responsible for compliance with data retention and this deficiency made the safe harbor unavailable.

“ASUS has explained that it has no centralized storage of electronic documents, email or otherwise, and relies on individual employees to archive email (which will be deleted if left on the server) and electronic documents (which reside only on individual workstations).”

Not only is this custodian-based retention practice, in and of itself, reasonable; it’s probably the most common form of data retention practices seen at corporations today.  While a number of vendors have promised intelligent retention systems that work without any significant human intervention, for the most part those solutions are still in their infancy.  Additionally, there are significant technical challenges to have an application manage *all* ESI (Electronically Stored Information) that exist for a given custodian (including desktop files, instant messaging, text messaging, social media, etc.) As such, most companies must inherently rely upon their custodians to both retain and preserve data pursuant to company policies.  The court not only seems to miss this point, but also attempts to impose an obligation that corporations must prevent the “loss of data” above and beyond specific preservation obligations.

“ASUS’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs. ASUS alone bears responsibility for the absence of evidence it would be expected to possess. While Adams has not shown ASUS mounted a destructive effort aimed at evidence affecting Adams or at evidence of ASUS’ wrongful use of intellectual property, it is clear that ASUS’ lack of a retention policy and irresponsible data retention practices are responsible for the loss of significant data.”

Although the exact rationale was unclear, the court held that ASUS violated their duty to preserve and that the loss of evidence could not be excused as a “routine, good faith operation of electronic information systems.” While the court ruled that sanctions were appropriate, it reserved final sanctions pending the close of discovery.   Depending on what those ultimate sanctions look like, it seems pretty likely that this decision will be subject to appellate review.  Until then, it’s probably too soon to treat this questionable holding as gospel.  Wary corporations however should continue to bolster the “reasonableness” of their information management/retention/destruction policies and practices so that in hindsight a court won’t be able to take away the FRCP electronic discovery 37(e) safe harbor by casting those “practices” as being unreasonable.