The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

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1. David, as the author of the definitive piece about inaccessibility under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (The Burden of Discovering Inaccessible Electronically Stored Information: Rules 26(b)(2)(B)& 45(d)(1)(D)), how many litigators do you think really understand and use these provisions?

I sense that litigators with a basic understanding of the new electronic discovery rules know that the inaccessibility rule exists and provides some protection for parties against unduly burdensome discovery.  Few seem to have noticed that Rule 45 contains an inaccessibility provision whose language is similar to the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) inaccessibility protection for parties, but whose protections as applied to subpoenaed nonparties are greater than the protections for parties.  Here are the three most basic and exciting (or excruciating, depending upon your side of the fence) impacts of the new inaccessibility rules:

(1) The inaccessibility rule has completely changed a nonparty’s leverage to narrow subpoenas seeking electronically stored information (ESI).  Subpoenaed nonparties now have protection against fishing expedition subpoenas that did not exist before — to narrow subpoenas, or to require the payment of costs and attorney fees in responding to broad subpoenas.

(2) Cost-shifting, for parties as well as nonparties, is now controlled by the inaccessibility rules.  Several federal courts have recently held that discovery cost-shifting is allowed only if these inaccessibility rules provide for cost-shifting under the circumstances.

(3)  The inaccessibility rules must be asserted and asserted timely if they are to provide protection.  For example, after counsel for nonparty Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight spent $6 million of our money responding to a subpoena in In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, 552 F. 3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009), counsel tried to recover the money on an inaccessibility cost-shifting argument.  To which the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said, in essence:  you might have had a good idea, and saved your client $6 million, had you raised the arguments before agreeing to produce the documents and spending all that money.  But you agreed to produce the ESI and cannot come back now and get any protection.  You should have studied the inaccessibility rule.

2. So, assuming we’re still early in the learning curve, do you think these FRCP provisions are really gaining traction either in practice or in the case law?

Judging by the number of reported decisions, the inaccessibility rules are receiving as much attention as the other new features of the federal electronic discovery rules.  Which, I suppose, is damnation by faint praise — a large percentage of the reported cases are about what should happen because lawyers didn’t understand or apply the rules properly. Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Medical Center, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51962 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 2008) is a good example.  There, defendant’s counsel produced ESI without any objection and without pre-identifying the ESI as inaccessible.  After production, counsel tried to get their opponents to share the cost of producing the allegedly inaccessible ESI.  The court correctly held that the ESI must be identified as inaccessible in advance of the production to give the seeking party the option to decide whether the discovery is really worth the candle, especially given the prospect that the cost of production might be shifted to the seeking party.

3. What are your thoughts on the new California state provisions regarding “inaccessible” ESI where they’re proposing a different treatment and slightly different burden?  And, will this approach ultimately weaken responding parties abilities to make “inaccessible” claims successfully?

I am not an expert on California law, but am keenly interested in what the states are doing with electronic discovery.  As of this writing (May 2009), it appears that California Assembly Bill No. 5 has not yet been enacted.  Yet, here are some thoughts about how the inaccessibility provisions of this bill, if enacted, would compare to the federal rules of inaccessibility.  The bottom line is that the California bill is remarkably similar to the federal rules on inaccessibility issues.

Under the federal rules, a party seeking protection for inaccessibility initiates the process by “simply” (so far, the courts have tolerated fairly sparse identifications as satisfying this requirement) identifying the sources of information claimed to be not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.  The subpoenaed nonparty seeking protecting can initiate by identifying the ESI sought as not reasonably accessible in an objection, motion to quash or motion for protective order.  In the federal system, either the seeking party or the protecting party or nonparty can move to test the issue (one by a motion to compel, the other by a motion for protective order).

The California bill is nearly identical to the federal process.  The bill provides that a person resisting a subpoena for ESI on inaccessibility grounds may “oppose” the subpoena.  If this means that such a person can either object or move to quash or move for a protective order, it appears to be the same as the federal rule.  The California bill specifies that a party resisting a production request on inaccessibility grounds initiates protection by identifying the types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that it asserts are not reasonably accessible.  This is similar to the federal rule, whose text requires identification of “sources”, but whose committee notes clarify that merely “types or categories of sources” of inaccessible, responsive ESI need be identified.  The California’s Legislative Counsel’s Digest indicates that the process for protecting inaccessible ESI, apparently for both parties and subpoenaed nonparties, can be initiated by moving for a protective order, or by opposing or objecting to the subpoena or request.

Even if there are any distinctions in the above processes, the two processes appear to merge thereafter.  In both systems, the motions to test inaccessibility must be preceded by a conference of counsel to attempt in good faith to resolve the issue, together with a certificate that such an attempt has been made.  In both, the person seeking protection has the burden of proving inaccessibility (this is even true in the federal system where the process is initiated by the seeker’s motion to compel).  In both systems, if the holding party proves inaccessibility, the burden shifts to the seeking party to show good cause for producing the ESI, despite its inaccessibility.

And in both, if good cause is shown, the court may still impose conditions upon production, including cost-shifting.  In both, the factors that the courts are to consider in determining good cause are similar — more accessible, less burdensome sources; cumulativeness of the discovery; whether the burden or expense of the discovery would outweigh the likely benefit of the discovery, considering such things as the importance of the issues, the amount in controversy and the resources of the parties.  One possible difference between the California bill and the federal rules on good cause is that the California bill requires the court to limit discovery if any of the listed factors exists, where the federal rules and committee notes seem to envision a pure balancing.

In sum, the California bill essentially adopts the federal approach.

Some confusion has arisen because California commentators have drawn a distinction between the California bill and a misinterpretation of the federal rules.  One commentator, for example, stated that “under the federal rules, if ESI is inaccessible, the responding party simply doesn’t need to produce such documents.”  This ignores the affirmative identification duty that I discussed above.

4. With the rapid advancements in ESI restoration technologies, which the Comments to the Rule anticipated, are backup tapes in your mind still “inaccessible”?

The rules make it clear that inaccessibility cannot be measured by technology category alone.  The test does not depend upon the type of technology involved, but upon the balancing of need, technology, importance, spoliation, relevance, alternative sources and potential benefit against overbreadth, burden and cost.  So, if backup tapes are the only source available for important, relevant information because more accessible relevant sources have been spoliated, backup tapes will not be deemed inaccessible.  Without spoliation, if relevant ESI is available on active sources, backup tapes may not be discoverable.

Perhaps the main reason that categories of technology cannot be deemed per se accessible or inaccessible is that the technology is changing so fast.  Many search tasks that were expensive and difficult five years ago are much more doable now.

5. Finally, what do you think the future holds for these FRCP sections?

The inaccessibility rules will continue to be the main battleground where the great debates about the value and cost of electronic discovery will be fought, since these rules are specifically tailored to balance all of the interests in that debate.

Some groups are claiming that electronic discovery is wasteful and expensive, and that the new rules exacerbate the problem.  Of course, the federal rules ought always to be analyzed for problems and need for improvement, but I haven’t heard informed, thoughtful, helpful suggestions for improvements to the federal rules in the recent debate.  Overall, I see the adoption of the federal rules as having helped reduce the cost of electronic discovery, not increased the cost.

Learn More On: Fcrp electronic discovery

My first caveat to the advice was context.  Since, while a lot of attorneys have attended CLEs or have read about e-discovery, it’s not the same in the real world.  As the old Spanish Proverb goes:

It’s not the same to talk of bulls as to be in the bullring.

Keeping in mind that reality may differ significantly from academics, here are some things to consider when the next e-discovery case comes up.   Please also keep in mind that these steps (like the EDRM workflow) aren’t linear and may in fact occur cyclically or in parallel:

1. Preserve, preserve, preserve

Nothing is more important than meeting the initial preservation obligation, which begins when litigation is “reasonably likely” – as opposed to just when the complaint is filed.  This first step in the long journey can easily be a trap for the unwary/unprepared.

The challenge once you’re past the trigger issue is to then identify the boundaries of the duty to preserve, i.e., what evidence must be preserved?   This inquiry is often initially comprised of identifying key players, date ranges and data types.

Another significant challenge in this step is to monitor and update the legal hold process.  And, given that litigation more often than not spans years, it’s easy to initially succeed at the preservation effort, but then later fail on execution.  The best way to minimize risk in this step is to move quickly from preservation to collection.  See Is Preservation in E-Discovery Overrated?

2. Work backwards

Once preservation (and ideally collection) is adequately covered, the next step is to start thinking about the end of the process and what success (or lack of failure) looks like.  The exposure and profile of the matter are important to consider when you embark upon an e-discovery project since it’s critical to scale discovery efforts appropriately.

One thing, in particular, that is very important to consider early in the process is the type of production format that will be preferred by reviewing counsel and the opposition.  TIFF-based image productions (which are historically well accepted) are often pitted against native file ESI reviews.  Either format may or may not be acceptable given the situation and the applicability of FRCP Rule 34.Learn More On Frcp Electronic Discovery.

3. Understand the technical landscape

Most attorneys, but for a rare few, aren’t capable of really comprehending technical nuances of the complex and interrelated IT systems found at most Fortune 2,500 enterprises.  Fortunately, they are quite adept at working with experts (either consulting or testifying) to help them get to the bottom of difficult to comprehend and explain issues.  The key is find the right technical people who understand IT systems and who can explain it to judges, juries, and attorneys alike, especially for some of the most common ESI repositories like: email servers, archival systems, shared network drives, instant messaging servers, archival repositories (e.g., tape libraries, real time back-up systems, etc.), records management systems, knowledge management systems, proprietary, but highly leveraged, internal applications, offsite repositories (e.g., hosted IT or email systems) and significant partner or subsidiary data stores.  In many instances it will make sense to leverage or create a map of the data universe so that nothing is missed and inaccessibility arguments can be cogently detailed.

4. Get your lingo straight

Assumptions, whether in e-discovery or not, are often dangerous.  In the complex undertaking where multiple parties are handling ESI it’s critical to make sure that everyone is on the same page especially since every company handles IT, records management, ILM and information security differently.  So, when working with these disparate constituents the outset of an engagement is the right time to make sure everyone is on the same page.  Therefore, standardize on a set of commonly used terms. Examples of potentially ambiguous topics include “imaging” ,“archive”, and “records.”

5. Don’t assume your client will really be helpful

I’ve been involved with hundreds of e-discovery engagements and I’ve found that almost universally the end client professes a profound willingness to help out.  And yet, actual “help” is relatively rare.  To qualify this, it may be prudent to ask several additional questions:

• Does the Client have the time to actually help?  Everyone at the client’s site has a day job that they’re tasked with above and beyond transient e-discovery needs.  So, while bandwidth generally is important, what’s more critical is the ability to comply with aggressive judicial deadlines.
• Are the people helping the ones you’d want to see on the stand?  It’s often not realistic to have internal folks (especially IT and Records Managers) stay isolated during the various pre-trial events – meet & confer conferences and potentially 30(b)(6) depositions so it’s important to evaluate how a given witness will fare when providing testimony.
• How likely is it that you client would throw you under the bus if things went wrong?  In my opinion, there is now more reason for outside counsel to manage the risks of an e-discovery project going awry.  See, Sullivan and Cromwell’s suit against EED.  Some will wisely bring in 3rd party consultants/experts to have a neutral, unbiased constituent in the process.

6. Build a budget and team (internal/external)

Everyone is probably now aware of how expensive e-discovery can be if managed improperly.  This makes it all that more imperative to work quickly to get a rough sense of the scope (which will lead to a budget) and the client’s willingness to absorb associated charges.  The most important step is to right-size the e-discovery effort with the risks inherent in the corresponding litigation/investigation.  Otherwise, there’s a high likelihood that e-discovery process will be over-engineered (too expensive) or under-scoped (cutting dangerous corners).

7. Figure out your risk profile

Similar to right-sizing the budget, it also makes sense to adopt a “horses for courses” approach to e-discovery since there is no singular way to handle a given matter.  For example, in one case you make take forensic images, restore backup tapes, capture instant messaging data, harness metadata, or decide to do an automated review with a with a “clawback” provision. In either case, the only mistake is to assume that an approach from another, dissimilar matter is warranted in the instant case.

8. Assume the opposition is better informed than you are

While this actually may not be the case, it’s a safer bet that assuming a level of naiveté that may not exist.  What is certain is that the Plaintiff’s bar is increasingly well informed and can be very aggressive.  They’ve seen the playbook that calls for baiting the opposition into a discovery misstep that can result in significant, case altering sanctions.  According to a recent survey, 63% of the polled attorneys said that e-discovery is being abused by counsel, so it’s important to be wary initially.

It’s also important to consider the potential reciprocity of a given matter and adjust your position accordingly.  In many instances it’s easy to consider your role only as a producing party, but with cross/counter claims it may be possible to simultaneously be propounding discovery and in the opposition’s shoes.

9. Prepare for an early case assessment

A recent industry survey found that effective early case assessment (ECA) approaches reduced overall litigation in half of the cases evaluated, and resulted in favorable outcomes for 76 percent of the cases.   The key to this methodology is to use the available next generation case analysis solutions earlier in the process, not just to review data for relevancy and privilege, but to:

• Identify the key players. This is critical in order to have a defensible legal hold process
• Evaluate the posture of the case to determine how it looks on the merits
• Diagnose potential outliers in the e-discovery process to facilitate meet and confer discussions and help create “inaccessibility” arguments
• Conduct a search term analysis for keyword negotiations during meet and confer discussions.  Objectively demonstrating the results of proposed search queries can go a long way in speeding up keyword negotiations

10. Don’t take search for granted

For many attorneys, e-discovery search is just like Lexis or Google.  Unfortunately, that isn’t the case.  Instead, it’s become highly complex and is now receiving significant judicial scrutiny.  In Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe Judge Grimm suggested that attorneys need to rethink how they’ve traditionally managed the search process:  “[F]or lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.”  It’s now important to devise (and share at early meet & confer conferences) a defensible search strategy that can withstand judicial scrutiny.

IBM launched the first salvo:

“The software will allow companies to move from scattered, point-solution approaches to a disciplined approach that controls electronic information, helps support Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) compliance,…”

Learn more about ediscovery software.

And, Autonomy quickly followed suit:

“The Autonomy pan-enterprise search platform automates the retrieval, processing, and management of all information throughout a global organization irrespective of languages, operating systems, and file types, avoiding non-FRCP compliant search techniques.”

I’m more than tolerant of both puffery and marketing-speak (though woe to those who forward such releases to Monica Bay), but this notion of “FRCP compliance” seems to take advantage of an already bombarded buying public, who have likely grown weary of FRCP articles, CLEs, and maybe even blogs posts.  Nevertheless, it seems useful to really tease out what the FRCP means and does not mean in relationship to e-discovery and enterprise search.

So, in an attempt to debunk this “compliance” myth, I thought I’d devote this blog post to demystifying some of the inaccurate notions about the frcp electronic discovery.

Federal First

Initially, it’s important to note that the Rules only apply to litigation within the United States Federal court system.  State court litigation, international lawsuits, arbitrations and administrative actions (just to name a few) aren’t under the aegis of the Rules.  While it’s true that certain state courts (Minnesota for example) have selectively adopted the new discovery provisions, most have not.  So, the first step is to check your venue.  Then, assuming the Rules do apply because your organization is in Federal litigation, the impact, while still not crystal clear, does take on more definition.

Relevancy Filters

As a starting place, the discovery process (as part of litigation) is fundamentally limited by Rule 26 to information (electronic and otherwise) that is “relevant” to the case at hand (i.e., “relevant to the claim or defense of any party”).  This distinction is critical because for the most part it prevents the responding party from having to cast a company wide net for all data, a task envisioned by many content management systems.   Certainly, the ability of certain litigation support software systems to access all user created data is valuable when searching for relevant data, but there are many ways to skin that cat.

No Express Retention or Preservation Duties

Legions of articles proclaim that the amended Rules create wholly new duties to retain information in general, as well as infusing new duties to preserve electronic data once litigation is anticipated.  Instead however, the new Rules expressly disavow creating truly new retention or preservation duties.  While it is undoubtedly a good practice to have a retention policy, given the welter of statutes and regulations that do create retention duties, the Rules do not mandate that a company create one ahead of litigation. Read more about electronic data discovery.

What is true, however, is that the new Rules have powerful implications for preservation once litigation is likely because of the requirements to understand, negotiate and produce relevant information early in the litigation process.  Under the new Rules, it is critical to be able to identify and retain potentially relevant data once litigation is filed (or is “reasonably likely”).  And yet, the burden of placing a legal “hold” on data, while often significant, certainly can be achieved without a formal document retention/deletion policy.  Again, the litigation “trigger” is key.

“Records” Aren’t the Focus

Continuing on this theme, but in a slightly different vector, there are differing opinions about the impact that the Rules have on “business records.”  This issue is nebulous since during litigation discovery, it is easy to confuse potentially relevant data corresponding to litigation with “business records,” which are often used in two different contexts.  Initially, there is the “business records” exception to the hearsay rule, which is quite specific and affects the admissibility of evidence in court.

The second, broader definition applies to organizations as they attempt to define a records management program to meet the numerous state, local and Federal mandates.  Commonly, as part of this complex initiative, companies will create records retention programs that specifically define official “records,” unofficial “records,” “non-records,” as well as specific retention periods for certain types of records.  Once the company’s records protocol is put into place there may be some downstream nexus with the Rules, but it won’t manifest itself until Federal court litigation arises, as described above.   The most common intersection occurs when a records retention policy prescribes a deletion event that contradicts the legal “hold” requirements for a record that is likely to be relevant to litigation.

In sum, the foregoing describes the role the FRCP plays in Federal court litigation.  It should be clear that the important, yet relatively narrow, use cases do not include any general compliance mandate in the absence of specific litigation.  I think it’s important to separate myth from reality when it comes to understanding how and when the revised Rules really do come into play.  Failure to do so can create an unpleasant scenario where your organization will either under- or over-prepare for these important litigation guidelines.