Issuing a Timely and Comprehensive Litigation Hold

Case: E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Kolon Industries (E.D. Va. July 21, 2011)

Summary: The court issued a stiff rebuke against defendant Kolon Industries for failing to issue a timely and proper litigation hold.  That rebuke came in the form of an instruction to the jury that Kolon executives and employees destroyed key evidence after the company’s preservation duty was triggered.  The jury responded by returning a stunning $919 million verdict for DuPont.

The spoliation at issue occurred when several Kolon executives and employees deleted thousands emails and other records relevant to DuPont’s trade secret claims.  The court laid the blame for this destruction on the company’s attorneys and executives, reasoning they could have prevented the spoliation through an effective litigation hold process.  At issue were three hold notices circulated to the key players and data sources.  The notices were all deficient in some manner.  They were either too limited in their distribution, ineffective since they were prepared in English for Korean-speaking employees, or too late to prevent or otherwise ameliorate the spoliation.

The Lessons for 2012: The DuPont case underscores the importance of issuing a timely and comprehensive litigation hold notice.  As DuPont teaches, organizations should identify what key players and data sources may have relevant information.  A comprehensive notice should then be prepared to communicate the precise hold instructions in an intelligible fashion.  Finally, the hold should be circulated immediately to prevent data loss.

Organizations should also consider deploying the latest technologies to help effectuate this process.  This includes an eDiscovery platform that enables automated legal hold acknowledgements.  Such technology will allow custodians to be promptly and properly apprised of litigation and thereby retain information that might otherwise have been discarded.

Another Must-Read Case: Haraburda v. Arcelor Mittal U.S.A., Inc. (D. Ind. June 28, 2011)

Suspending Document Retention Policies

Case: Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011)

Summary: The defendant bank defeated a sanctions motion because it modified aspects of its email retention policy once it was aware litigation was reasonably foreseeable.  The bank implemented a retention policy that kept emails for 90 days, after which the emails were overwritten and destroyed.  The bank also promulgated a course of action whereby the retention policy would be promptly suspended on the occurrence of litigation or other triggering event.  This way, the bank could establish the reasonableness of its policy in litigation.  Because the bank followed that procedure in good faith, it was protected from court sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(e) “safe harbor.”

The Lesson for 2012: As Viramontes shows, an organization can be prepared for eDiscovery disputes by timely suspending aspects of its document retention policies.  By modifying retention policies when so required, an organization can develop a defensible retention procedure and be protected from court sanctions under Rule 37(e).

Coupling those procedures with archiving software will only enhance an organization’s eDiscovery preparations.  Effective archiving software will have a litigation hold mechanism, which enables an organization to suspend automated retention rules.  This will better ensure that data subject to a preservation duty is actually retained.

Another Must-Read Case: Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

Managing the Document Collection Process

Case: Northington v. H & M International (N.D.Ill. Jan. 12, 2011)

Summary: The court issued an adverse inference jury instruction against a company that destroyed relevant emails and other data.  The spoliation occurred in large part because legal and IT were not involved in the collection process.  For example, counsel was not actively engaged in the critical steps of preservation, identification or collection of electronically stored information (ESI).  Nor was IT brought into the picture until 15 months after the preservation duty was triggered. By that time, rank and file employees – some of whom were accused by the plaintiff of harassment – stepped into this vacuum and conducted the collection process without meaningful oversight.  Predictably, key documents were never found and the court had little choice but to promise to inform the jury that the company destroyed evidence.

The Lesson for 2012: An organization does not have to suffer the same fate as the company in the Northington case.  It can take charge of its data during litigation through cooperative governance between legal and IT.  After issuing a timely and effective litigation hold, legal should typically involve IT in the collection process.  Legal should rely on IT to help identify all data sources – servers, systems and custodians – that likely contain relevant information.  IT will also be instrumental in preserving and collecting that data for subsequent review and analysis by legal.  By working together in a top-down fashion, organizations can better ensure that their eDiscovery process is defensible and not fatally flawed.

Another Must-Read Case: Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc. (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011)

Using Proportionality to Dictate the Scope of Permissible Discovery

Case: DCG Systems v. Checkpoint Technologies (N.D. Ca. Nov. 2, 2011)

The court adopted the new Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases recently promulgated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The model order incorporates principles of proportionality to reduce the production of email in patent litigation.  In adopting the order, the court explained that email productions should be scaled back since email is infrequently introduced as evidence at trial.  As a result, email production requests will be restricted to five search terms and may only span a defined set of five custodians.  Furthermore, email discovery in DCG Systems will wait until after the parties complete discovery on the “core documentation” concerning the patent, the accused product and prior art.

The Lesson for 2012: Courts seem to be slowly moving toward a system that incorporates proportionality as the touchstone for eDiscovery.  This is occurring beyond the field of patent litigation, as evidenced by other recent cases.  Even the State of Utah has gotten in on the act, revising its version of Rule 26 to require that all discovery meet the standards of proportionality.  While there are undoubtedly deviations from this trend (e.g., Pippins v. KPMG (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011)), the clear lesson is that discovery should comply with the cost cutting mandate of Federal Rule 1.

Another Must-Read Case: Omni Laboratories Inc. v. Eden Energy Ltd [2011] EWHC 2169 (TCC) (29 July 2011)

Leveraging eDiscovery Technologies for Search and Review

Case: Oracle America v. Google (N.D. Ca. Oct. 20, 2011)

The court ordered Google to produce an email that it previously withheld on attorney client privilege grounds.  While the email’s focus on business negotiations vitiated Google’s claim of privilege, that claim was also undermined by Google’s production of eight earlier drafts of the email.  The drafts were produced because they did not contain addressees or the heading “attorney client privilege,” which the sender later inserted into the final email draft.  Because those details were absent from the earlier drafts, Google’s “electronic scanning mechanisms did not catch those drafts before production.”

The Lesson for 2012: Organizations need to leverage next generation, robust technology to support the document production process in discovery.  Tools such as email analytical software, which can isolate drafts and offer to remove them from production, are needed to address complex production issues.  Other technological capabilities, such as Near Duplicate Identification, can also help identify draft materials and marry them up with finals that have been marked as privileged.  Last but not least, technology assisted review has the potential of enabling one lawyer to efficiently complete the work that previously took thousands of hours.  Finding the budget and doing the research to obtain the right tools for the enterprise should be a priority for organizations in 2012.

Another Must-Read Case: J-M Manufacturing v. McDermott, Will & Emery (CA Super. Jun. 2, 2011)

Conclusion

There were any number of other significant cases from 2011 that could have made this list.  We invite you to share your favorites in the comments section or contact us directly with your feedback.

For more on the cases discussed above, watch this video:

Nelson: You were recently quoted in a Law Technology News (LTN) article written by Evan Koblentz as saying, “I don’t see a need to amend the rules” because these rules haven’t been around long enough to see what happens.  Isn’t almost five years long enough?

Judge Hedges: No.  For the simple reason that both attorneys and judges continue to need education on the 2006 amendments and, more particularly, they need to understand the technologies that create and store electronic information.  The amendments establish a framework within which attorneys and judges make daily decisions on discovery.  I have not seen any objective evidence that the framework is somehow failing and needs further amendment.

Nelson: You also said the “big problem” is that people don’t talk enough.  What did you mean?  Hasn’t the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation made a difference?

Judge Hedges: The centerpiece of the 2006 amendments (at least in my view) is Rule 26(f).  I think it is fair to say that the legal community’s response to 26(f) has been, to say the least, varied. Civil actions with large volumes of ESI that may be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) cry out for extensive 26(f) meet-and-confer discussions that may take a number of meetings and require the presence of party representatives from, for example, IT.  There is an element of trust required between adversary counsel (with the concurrence of the parties they represent) that may be difficult to establish – but some cooperation is necessary to make 26(f) work.  Overlay that reality with our adversary system and the duty of attorneys to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients and you can understand why cooperation isn’t always a top priority for some attorneys.

However, “transparency” in discussing ESI is essential, along with advocacy and the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality. That’s where the Sedona Conference Proclamation can make a big difference. Has the Proclamation done that? It’s too early to reach a conclusion on that question, but the Proclamation is often cited and, as education progresses in eDiscovery, I am confident that the Proclamation will be recognized as a means to realize the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of litigation, as articulated under Rule 1.

Nelson: You also mentioned that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee might be running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.  Can you explain?

Judge Hedges: There is a distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” rules.  The Rules Enabling Act governs the adoption of the former.  Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an example of a substantive rule that was proposed by the Judicial Conference.  However, since Rule 502 is a rule dealing with substantive privilege and waiver issues, it had to be enacted into law through an Act of Congress.  I am concerned that proposals to further amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may cross the line from procedural to substantive.  I am not prepared to suggest at this time, however, that anything I have seen has crossed the line.  Stay tuned.

Nelson: If you had to select one of the three options currently being considered (see page 264), which option would you select and why?

Judge Hedges: To start, I would not choose option 1, which presumes that the Rules can reach pre-litigation conduct consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.  My concern here is also that, in the area of electronic information, a too-specific rule risks “overnight” obsolescence, just as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, enacted in 1986, is considered by a number of commentators to be, at best, obsolescent.  Note also that I did not use the word “stored” when I mentioned electronic information, as courts have already required that so-called ephemeral information be preserved.  Nor would I choose option 2.  Absent seeing more than the brief description of the category on page 264, it seems to me that option 2 is likely to do nothing more than be a restatement of the existing law on when the duty to preserve is “triggered.”

So, by default, I am forced to choose option 3.  I presume a rule would say something like, “sanctions may not be imposed on a party for loss of ESI (or “EI”) if that party acted reasonably in making preservation decisions.”  There are a number of problems here. First, in a jurisdiction which allows the imposition of at least some sanction for negligence, all the rule would likely do is be interpreted to foreclose “serious” sanctions. Isn’t that correct? Or is the rule intended to supersede existing variances in the law of sanctions?  At that point, does the rule become “substantive”?   Second, how will “reasonableness” be defined?  Reasonableness supposes the existence of a duty – in this case, a duty to preserve.  For example, is there a duty to preserve ephemeral data that a party knows is relevant?  We come back full circle to where we began.

Remember, Rule 37(f) (now 37(e)) was intended to provide some level of protection against the imposition of sanctions, just as the categories are intended to.  Right?  And five years later 37(e) remains defined variously to be a “safe harbor” or a “lighthouse” by some lawyers such as Jonathan Redgrave or an “uncharted minefield” by others like me.

Nelson: What about heightened pleading standards after the Iqbal and Twombly decisions?  Do these decisions have any relevance to electronic discovery and the topic at hand?

Judge Hedges: Let me begin by saying that I am no fan of Twombly or Iqbal. The decisions, however well intended, have led to undue cost and delay all too often.  Not only is motion to dismiss practice costly for parties, but it imposes great burdens on the United States Courts and, as often as not, leads to at least one other round of motion practice as plaintiffs are given leave to re-plead.  All the while, parties have preservation obligations to fulfill and, in the hope of saving expense, discovery is often stayed until a motion is “finally” decided.  I would like to see objective evidence of the delay and cost of this motion practice (and I expect that the Administrative Office of the United States has statistical evidence already).  I would also like to see objective evidence from defendants distinguishing between the cost of motion practice and later discovery costs.

Putting all that aside, and if I had to accept one option, I would choose to allow some discovery that is integrated to the motion practice.  First, even without the filing of a responsive pleading, there should be a 26(f) meet-and-confer to discuss, if nothing else, the nature and scope of preservation and the possibility of securing a Rule 502(d) order. Second, while I have serious concerns about “pre-answer discovery” for a number of reasons, I would have the parties make 26(a)(1) disclosures while a motion to dismiss is pending or leave to re-plead has been granted in order to address the likely “asymmetry of information” between a plaintiff and a moving defendant.  Once the disclosures are made, I would allow the plaintiff to secure some information identified in the disclosures to allow re-pleading and perhaps obviate the need for continued motion practice.

All of this would, of course, require active judicial management.  And one would hope that Congress, which seems so interested in conserving resources, would recognize the vital role of the United States Courts in securing justice for everyone and give adequate funding to the Courts.

In my last post I announced that discussions are taking place that could change the way preservation and sanctions issues are handled within the federal court system.  The next round of discussions about possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is scheduled to take place on September 9th in Dallas, Texas as part of a “mini-conference” led by the Discovery Subcommittee – a committee appointed by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  This post discusses three different rule amendment approaches that attendees have been asked to consider in order to help them prepare for the mini-conference.  A complete list of attendees, preparation materials, and questions the group will consider are included in the Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum to the participants.

The debate about whether or not rule amendments are even required is far from over.  A 452-page document located on the U.S. Courts’ website chronicles many of the meetings, notes, and submissions driving the current discussion.  Page 265 of the document contains a memorandum prepared by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee earlier this year, stating that:

“the Subcommittee has reached no conclusion on whether rule amendments would be a productive way of dealing with preservation/sanctions concerns, much less what amendment proposals would be useful.”

Despite concerns that amending the current rules now would amount to jumping the gun, there is an undeniable desire for more clarity around when the duty to preserve electronically stored information (ESI) is triggered, what must be preserved, and when the duty expires.  This momentum has resulted in the crafting of draft proposals that are likely to help frame the discussion on September 9th. The “proposals” are really draft approaches that have been broken down into three general categories described in the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s memorandum, titled: “PRESERVATION/SANCTIONS ISSUES” (see page 263).  The Category 1 approach can best be described as providing a higher degree of specificity than the other approaches.  For example, the Category 1 approach provides a fairly detailed explanation of the duty to preserve evidence (Rule 26.1(a)) and details possible triggers (26.1(b)), the scope of the duty to preserve (26.1(c)), and sanctions (Rule 37).  Category 2 proposes a more general preservation rule, while Category 3 only addresses sanctions as a tool for influencing behavior.  The three categories are discussed in more detail below.

Category 1: Specific Rule

This draft includes many different exemplary lists, alternative approaches, and footnotes that highlight the fact that one of the key challenges with drafting a specific rule is trying to foresee all of the challenges that might lie in the road ahead.  For example, the draft rule provides a long list of events that could trigger the duty to preserve evidence, including everything from serving a pleading to taking “any other action” in anticipation of litigation.   The rule also provides a list of information types that are “presumptively excluded” from the preservation duty, such as deleted data on hard drives, temporary internet files, and physically damaged media.

The lists are helpful in that they provide guidance.  However, each list also includes a “catch-all” provision to address scenarios that might not be foreseeable.  The inclusion of catch-all provisions highlights the inherent challenge of providing more clarity and certainty without creating rules that are so inflexible that they are difficult to apply to unforeseen factual scenarios or technological developments.  Some might argue that trying to provide a laundry list of examples will make passage of new rules difficult because each item on the list will stir debate.  Others contend that the lists add little value because the catch-all provisions will still require litigators to pass the sniff test of “reasonableness.”

Despite the inherent challenges related to drafting rules with specificity, most practitioners would likely support the inclusion of lists or examples that provide at least some direction.  What is likely to be far more controversial with respect to Category 1 is the use of alternative language proposing fixed limits around custodians and litigation holds.  For example, one alternative would limit data preservation requirements to a fixed number of custodians and the duty to preserve evidence would similarly expire after a fixed number of years.  Bright line rules like these may be easier to understand, but they also tend to be controversial since they lack the flexibility necessary to fairly address every conceivable situation.

Category 2: General Rule

Like the Category 1 proposal, the Category 2 proposal uses lists and outlines several alternative approaches throughout the rule.  However, the Category 2 proposal fundamentally differs from Category 1 by outlining a more general approach.  For example, one of the alternatives essentially states that the duty to preserve evidence is triggered whenever a “reasonable person” would expect to be a party to an action.  Similarly, the ongoing duty to preserve information after the duty has been triggered would be evaluated based on what is described as a “reasonable period” under the circumstances.

The beauty of this more general approach lies in its simplicity and flexibility.  The idea is that evaluating conduct based on the “reasonableness” of a person’s actions is much easier than attempting to draft bright line legal guidelines that account for every possible factual scenario.  The flip side is that reasonable minds could differ and results could be inconsistent if there are no bright line rules.  What this means in the context of the federal rule discussion is that one judge might find a party’s conduct with respect to data preservation efforts reasonable, while another judge might issue sanctions based on the same set of facts.  In large part, it is this lack of certainty and guidance in the current rules that sparked the current debate in the first place.

Category 3: Sanctions-Based Rule

Unlike the first two categories, the Category 3 approach focuses only on sanctions and would act like more of a “back-end” rule.  In other words, the rule would not contain any specific directives about preservation, but it would provide direction in the areas of when and how sanctions might be applied.

Despite the draconian image a “sanctions” based rule might conjure up, the Category 3 rule may seem surprisingly lenient to some.  For example, absent extraordinary circumstances, the court would be prohibited from imposing any of the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b)(2) or from giving an adverse-inference instruction unless:

“the party’s failure to preserve discoverable information was willful or in bad faith and caused [substantial] prejudice in the litigation.”

The sanctions based approach would almost certainly have an impact on how parties handle upstream preservation related issues.  However, the key ingredients that will impact what kind of behavior this rule drives are the severity of the threatened sanction as well as the applicable standard.  For example, a party facing severe sanctions for conduct that is either negligent, willful or in bad faith is likely to take their preservation obligations seriously.  On the other hand, if the realm of possible sanctions is trivial, parties are less likely to take their preservation related obligations seriously.

Conclusion

The three rule approaches represent very early attempts at framing possible approaches to amending the FRCP.  If the Discovery Subcommittee chooses to recommend rule amendments following the September 9th mini-conference in Dallas, the proposed language is likely to be closer to final form and easier to assess than the current proposals.  I will continue to monitor the rule making discussion and provide commentary in future posts.  Stay tuned for my next post where former US Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges explains why he thinks the rule changes are unnecessary and why the current proposals might run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.

Initially, we started at ground zero with the notion that defensibility is in most instances equated with the “reasonableness” standard, which is pervasive across many areas of the EDRM spectrum… from preservation to production.  Instances include:

• Preservation — “[a]s soon as a potential claim is . . . identified, a party is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant to the future litigation.”
• FRE 502 (b) – the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if the (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure;
• General Privilege Waiver — In SEC v. Badian, 2009 WL 222783 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009)(link), “there is no basis … to conclude that there were precautions [to prevent the disclosure], let alone whether they were reasonable.”
• FRCP 37(e) — Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

While the foregoing isn’t exhaustive it does highlight the persistent nature of the reasonableness standard as practitioners seek a defensibility sanctuary.  The good news is that the law doesn’t require perfection and there are also a number of ways to obtain reasonable defensibility:

• Demonstrable acceptance by the opposition – here the notion is that collaboration with the opposition allows the parties to comfortably move ahead with their discovery process and even if it’s not objectively reasonable, the parties consent to the protocol will in most instances carry an imprimatur of reasonableness.
• Auditing / process transparency.  Similar to the first bullet, auditing the process and giving the opposition visibility into the process steps will often make it hard for them to lodge successful downstream challenges.
• Adherence to Local Rules (See 7th Circuit Pilot Program) or judicial order.  Another avenue than can provide some degree of safety is compliance with a discovery protocol mandated by local rules, although that compliance may ultimately be challenged.
• Statistical confidence intervals / sampling – the use of statistics as a way to bolster process defensibility is starting to come to maturity and in the future I think that detailed precision, recall and other statistical indicates will play a large role in e-discovery defensibility.

None of these steps can be guaranteed to really get you off the hook from a rapid opposing party calling foul, but using them in a “belt and suspenders” fashion will certainly help buttress any discovery process.

For more illumination on the topic please see the following video of my interview with John Loveland, who’s waxing poetically about discovery defensibility.