“Electronic discovery requires litigants to scour disparate data storage mediums and formats for potentially relevant documents. That undertaking involves dueling considerations: thoroughness and cost. This motion illustrated the perils of failing to strike the proper balance.”

In Harkabi v. Sandisk Corp., 08 Civ. 8203 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug, 23, 2010), aside from the stellar opening, Magistrate Pauley illustrates that the culpability standard for certain technology companies may actually be higher than for their low tech counterparts. The discovery dispute began after the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant Sandisk failed to produce their former laptops and corporate email. When the underlying action (for failure to pay the plaintiffs their “earn outs” after an acquisition) began to heat up the plaintiffs wisely sent Sandisk a preservation letter.

Sandisk, upon the receipt of the letter sent a “Do-Not-Destroy” memorandum as well as securing the laptops issued to plaintiffs. After some time, the laptops were imaged and the data was saved on a file server. Unfortunately, this is where things took a turn for the worse.

After plaintiffs” evaluation of Sandisk’s production, it was discovered that materials from their laptops had not been produced and neither had some of their emails. After a significant amount of wrangling and Sandisk”s “best efforts” they admitted that they couldn’t find the laptop data anywhere — finally conceding that the laptop images were lost sometime during the data transfer. Because Sandisk did not “engage this reality” they didn’t commence a search of backup tapes for some considerable time. So, although the court was confident that the omission would eventually be resolved, the event might have never been detected but for the plaintiff’s diligence and in the final analysis it still ended up costing plaintiff considerable sums ferreting out the issue.

With this as a backdrop the Magistrate began his analysis of the spoliation and delayed production issues. The plaintiffs proffered four arguments for why a culpable state of mind could be inferred:

1. A one month delay in counsel’s issuance of the legal hold memo. This argument was rejected by the court since the delay didn’t appear to cause any real harm.
2. Failure of Sandisk’s counsel to adequately supervise the legal hold process. Here, the court concluded that counsel was “notably absent at critical junctures” of the preservation process, including the copying of the laptop data.
3. Sandisk’s “expertise in electronic data storage.” Here the court appeared to hold Sandisk to a higher standard, noting that this finding “must mortify [Sandisk], a global business that champions itself a leader in electronic data storage.” The court further gilded the lily by stating that SanDisk”s “size and cutting edge technology raises an expectation of competence in maintaining its own electronic records.”
4. Sandisk”s delay in revealing that certain information had not been included in its native production. Here the court also found some lack for forthrightness during counsel’s representations about discovery completeness.

Not surprisingly, with adverse findings on three of the above arguments, the court found defendant was “at a minimum” negligent stating that the “cascade of errors” ultimately aggregated to a “significant discovery failure.”

With these findings in the record the court then went on to the sanctions analysis. Here, there wasn’t enough evidence supporting terminating sanctions, but an adverse inference instruction was appropriate since the plaintiffs had “lost access to relevant evidence.”

Turning to the delayed production, the court found that because it appeared that the emails would eventually be produced, the prejudice “is contained.” Thus, terminating sanctions were not warranted. Yet, because defendant’s misrepresentations obscured the deficiencies and “stopped discovery in its tracks” the court found that monetary sanctions in the amount of $150,000 were appropriate to compensate plaintiffs for their “‘David-and Goliath-like” struggle for electronic discovery.”

Many of these errors are fairly typical of the types of e discovery disputes seen today. However, this case does seem to highlight the raised bar for any company that should “know better” when it comes to electronic discovery issues. Here, Sandisk certainly isn’t an e-discovery company per se, but their expertise in ESI storage certainly made it difficult to claim ignorance. This raised bar was seen in spades when Guidance Software was recently accused of gross negligence and e-discovery bad faith during an employment dispute. In combination with the Sandisk case, it’s not surprising to see the standard of care elevated for folks who should really know better. So, for anyone in the e-discovery (or tangentially related) industry, it’s probably a good idea to become even more diligent when responding to electronic discovery requests.

Over the past few years, I have seen a transformation of the e-discovery software market. Previously, there were no specific people within corporations or government agencies dedicated to e discovery, and no formal budget was allocated to it. As a result, purchase decisions were typically made at the departmental level by legal or information security people who could “find the money” by borrowing from other projects. In stark contrast to that, today most major corporations have people specifically responsible for electronic discovery, and many of them have company-wide initiatives to lower costs by bringing e-discovery in-house. Companies are issuing more and more formal RFPs; performing proof-of-concepts as part of the evaluation process; and creating committees of both legal and IT to make purchase decisions.

Some vendors have sought to play up a “gap” between legal and IT teams when it comes to e-discovery. They manufacture survey information claiming that collaboration and communication between legal and IT is decreasing. Our experience has been exactly the opposite. At corporations like Coca Cola, Home Depot, and hundreds of others, we find close, collaborative relationships between legal teams and the IT professionals dedicated to help them. There’s now a new career path, sometimes called “legal IT” or “e-discovery manager”, for technically savvy IT folks who understand legal’s requirements. I was happy to see at LegalTech this year that legal professionals would often come by our booth with a colleague and say to us, “I brought my IT guy with me because I want him to see this”.

It is precisely because legal and IT are working so closely together that they want a single product to manage all their e-discovery activity. That’s what led us to add the Identification and Collection Module.

Why is offering a single product for everything from identification through production such a big deal? Clearwell’s approach offers two main advantages over alternative solutions. First, like earlier versions of Clearwell, the Identification and Collection Module is very easy to use – so much so that, with IT’s permission, legal could even manage the collection process itself. For example, existing products like Guidance Encase require users to write scripts to create filters for targeted collections; with Clearwell, everything is point-and-click through a simple web UI. That makes identification and collection accessible to non-technical users.

Second, because identification, collection, processing, early case assessment, review and production can now all be done using a single product, Clearwell is able to provide end-to-end reporting through the entire e-discovery life-cycle. For example, Autonomy’s disparate e-discovery products (Introspect, Aungate, etc.) require multiple log-ins, all have different UIs, and different data models. With Clearwell, all of these are the same, giving you complete control over your data – at significantly lower total cost of ownership.

You can sign up for a product demonstration or even evaluate the product for free. Take a look – and leave a comment to let us know what you think.

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Several people have pointed to poor marketing as the problem, and it’s true most customers are confused. Summation’s products all have different names (iBlaze, Discovery Cracker, CaseVault, CaseVantage), and it is unclear how they relate to one another. But the problem is more fundamental than just marketing. There has been no innovation from Summation for years; its products are difficult to use; and, they don’t integrate with each other. So, naturally, customers switch to more compelling solutions, revenue declines, management cuts costs, talented people leave, service levels deteriorate, more customers defect, and the cycle repeats.

As the management teams at Silicon Graphics, Siebel, or Yahoo! can tell you, once a technology company faces this death spiral, it’s very, very hard to turn things around. But that’s exactly what AccessData must do for its recent acquisition of Summation to work.

On the face of it, you would not expect AccessData to be capable of addressing Summation’s problems. As the #2 player in the forensics market to Guidance Software, it has no experience in legal review. Its customers are enterprises and government agencies, not law firms or litigation support service providers. Its headquarters is in Lindon (Utah), whereas Summation based is in San Francisco. But AccessData has a capable team, and must have some plan in mind. What is it likely to do? My guess is as follows:

• Claim “end-to-end” in the enterprise market: AccessData will likely bundle the iBlaze review platform with its own forensic collection products (FTK) and claim end-to-end coverage of the EDRM model. The products obviously don’t integrate with one another, or even have the same UI, but some customers may not realize how important that is until after they have purchased. This is the same strategy used by Autonomy, which also puts together disparate products (Aungate, Introspect, etc.) and markets them as an integrated package.

• Promote CaseVault and CaseVantage in the law firm market: These hosted review platforms are not widely used. AccessData will be hoping that with better marketing and sales execution, it can drive adoption of them by law firms and litigation support service providers. But most providers today seem pretty happy with Clearwell and/or kCura Relativity, so it’s unclear why they would switch away to CaseVault / CaseVantage.

• Cut costs: On the day the acquisition closed last month, AccessData fired most of Summation’s engineers. That’s understandable, given the shrinking revenue. But it only accelerates the death spiral. With no engineers, it’s impossible to innovate or improve the products.

• Sunset iBlaze product lines: This sounds radical since, according to Katey Wood at the451 Group, iBlaze accounts for 70% of Summation’s revenue. But AccessData may decide to focus its development efforts on CaseVault and CaseVantage, ceasing all investment in iBlaze. Effectively, this means it would “milk” the law firms using iBlaze, and pitch enterprises a product with no real roadmap for improvement. Given how far iBlaze has fallen behind, there is a strong argument that further investments are probably just throwing good money after bad.

It will take a few months before we can say for sure whether these, or other, changes will make any difference. If the experience of other companies is any guide, they may slow the decline for a while, but not reverse it. After all, there may be some people out there using Silicon Graphics computers to access their Siebel CRM systems or search the web on Yahoo, just like there will be some using Summation’s products for document review. But there are fewer and fewer every day.

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There has been progress towards answering this question, thanks mainly to the analyst community. George Socha and Tom Gelbmann’s EDRM framework has been immensely helpful in breaking down electronic discovery into its component steps. Other analysts, like Debra Logan at Gartner, were quick to embrace the framework, prompting every software provider to follow suit. As a result, there is today a common language that everyone uses to describe the e-discovery process.

The Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) breaks down the e-discovery process into a series of steps. Companies looking to buy e-discovery software to lower costs typically map different software products to each of these steps, to make sure that they cover the entire process.

But having a universally-agreed framework is only half the answer. To eliminate customer confusion, there also needs to be agreement on how different software products fit into the framework. This is especially important since there is no single, end-to-end solution for e-discovery which covers all aspects of EDRM. So customers are forced to think about how different software solutions fit together. And that is where things begin to fall apart.

Many software vendors feel it is advantageous to claim that they do everything, even though they do not. Customers are rightly suspicious of those claims, and so press vendors to provide more detailed information – hence the question, “when you say you do e-discovery, what exactly does that mean?”

In light of that, how can litigation support teams, corporate counsel, or legal IT people figure out which e-discovery solution best meets their needs? From observing this decision-making process hundreds of times, I have found 3 simple steps are incredibly helpful.

Step 1: Read the analyst reports

Two reports in particular make for required reading. One is Gartner’s MarketScope Report, which is available for free at certain sites; the other is the 451Group’s recent e-discovery report, which is summarized in a publicly available presentation. The helpful thing about the 451 Group’s report is that it tells you which software companies do which parts of the EDRM process. You do have to buy the report to get the full picture (it’s well worth it!), but the publicly available presentation will give you a flavor for their analyis, and I have drawn from that presentation in the figure below:

Analyst firms like the 451 Group map software vendors to the EDRM framework according to what they actually do, which is often different from what software vendors claim they do.

The 451 Group’s analysis highlights several important points. First, it shows that there is no single end-to-end solution. Even the products of giants like EMC (SourceOne), HP (IAP), and IBM (CommonStore) only solve one piece of the puzzle, information management. Second, it shows that customers have choices at each stage of the EDRM process. For example, to solve the problem of identification, collection, and preservation of electronic information, customers can choose from solutions as diverse as Guidance EnCase (forensic collection), Index Engines (back-up tapes) and Mimosa NearPoint (email archive). Third, it provides an independent assessment of what vendors do, as opposed to what they may claim. For example, Kazeon claims analysis and review capabilities, whereas the report shows its product does identification, collection, and preservation; Recommind claims its Axcelerate eDiscovery and MindServer products do processing, whereas the report finds that they do not.

Step 2: Evaluate the products prior to purchase

Just as anyone would test-drive a car prior to purchase, it’s critical to test-drive e-discovery software. Any vendor should be willing to provide their software free of charge for an evaluation on-premise. The most effective evaluations are when the customer uses the product themselves, either on a live case or test data. This is far preferable to just sending the data to the vendor who then loads it into their system, as in that scenario there are too many opportunities for the vendor to hide their product’s shortcomings.

Step 3: Check references carefully

The trick with references is to insist on relevant references. It’s not good enough for the vendor to dredge up some random person who says nice things; or even a credible knowledgeable person who is using the product in a completely different way. For example, if a company is happy with Autonomy’s IDOL for enterprise search, that does not tell you much about what Autonomy might be like for e-discovery. What really counts are references from other customers who are using the product for the same application that you are.

All this can sound like a lot of work, but I have seen people go through the process in as little as a month, and be much happier for it. A little work up front can save a lot of time (and heart-ache!) later on.

First, a quick summary. Based on published accounts, it seems like a classic discovery situation (that’s just plain old discovery, without the “e”): a party is sued and fails to produce a document that, lo and behold, surfaces via some other source, throwing the integrity of the sued party into question. After all, if one potentially incriminating document wasn’t discovered, then who knows what else could be out there?

Guidance contended that it did everything that was required of it, and that it didn’t have (or couldn’t find, despite good faith efforts) the emails in question. But, of course, that didn’t stop the litigation support community (via forums such as the Litigation Support List) from pouncing on the perceived hypocrisy.

After all, how could a leading, publically-traded electronic discovery company get caught up in such a mess? How could their cutting-edge electronic discovery technology not have saved them? Or their (hopefully) best-in-class internal electronic discovery processes? If the electronic discovery companies don’t have their acts together, what about all the other poor souls who lack their knowledge and expertise?

That last question is a scary one, particularly given today’s environment, and it’s why the situation has stirred up so much chatter out in the electronic discovery blogosphere. Almost without exception, commenters have jumped to one of two conclusions. Either (a) Guidance has not followed proper e-discovery best practices, or (b) Guidance has willfully chosen to hide relevant documents that it could have produced, because they would be detrimental to its case.

Let’s explore each of those conclusions in a little more detail.

First, is there any direct evidence that Guidance did not follow electronic discovery best practices? The answer there is murky. Certainly, from Guidance’s perspective, the answer is a resounding “no”. They continue to claim that the emails that were produced from another source did not exist on the various laptops, desktops, and servers that were part of the initial discovery request, and it is certainly possible that that is true. Perhaps Guidance had a 1-year retention policy for emails, and the emails in question were outside of that policy. Perhaps the individuals involved had legitimately deleted the emails in question prior to receiving a litigation hold notice, without thinking that they would ever be relevant to a legal matter. Certainly an independent observer has grounds for incredulity here, but it does not necessarily follow that Guidance did not follow electronic discovery best practices for a company of their size and resources. Certainly, from the reports, they did not exactly act in a way that earned much confidence from or favor with the arbitrator. However, that’s a completely different issue, and one which may be a legitimate tactical decision by Guidance (to avoid, for example, the high cost of recovering the corrupt backup tapes).

Second, what if Guidance willfully chose to hide relevant documents? At this point, there is no evidence that this is the case. And, you would think that of all of the companies out there, Guidance would be keenly aware of the extremely high level of risk associated with this strategy. A company well-versed in computer forensics understands keenly that the odds of any potentially negative emails not being out there, somewhere, in cyberspace are incredibly small. Thus there is little incentive to intentionally hide documents. If, however, a company did make such a perilous and unethical decision, it has nothing to do with a lack of e-discovery best practices or technology: it simply has to do with a lack of ethics.

So, has the coverage of the Guidance situation been nothing more than an electronic discovery witch hunt? Far from it… even if both of the “conventional wisdom” conclusions are in fact wrong.

Why? Because even if Guidance has its electronic discovery house in order and is acting with complete integrity, if there’s one thing that anyone in the electronic discovery business should have taken away from the last 5 years of court rulings, it’s that perception and transparency in electronic discovery is everything. Electronic discovery is technically complex and fraught with challenges, and companies – particularly those who are perceived as having vast expertise in the space, whether as vendors (i.e. Guidance) or institutions (i.e. pick your favorite TARP recipient) – have to act in such a way as to appear spotless before the court of law and the court of public opinion.

Assuming you already have your electronic discovery house in relative order (a baseline, fundamental requirement for doing business today), perhaps the most important take-away from Guidance is how carefully you need to consider how minor electronic discovery slip-ups, whether real or perceived, can bite, big time. The legal and media environment is primed to pounce on any hint of a cover-up or conspiracy, and enterprises must go the extra mile (or two, or three…) to ensure that their e-discovery efforts are, and will be perceived, as upright, ethical, and above reproach – or be ready and willing to pay the price in sanctions or loss of public confidence.