e-discovery 2.0

Jason R. Baron was a keynote speaker at a recent electronic discovery summit and he mentioned an electronic data discovery topic that “ought to be blogged about.”  So, with that kind of softball I had to take a swing, particularly because it’s been a topic we (at e-discovery 2.0) have been discussing lately.

The genesis of this blog (per Jason) is the recent “skepticism” evidenced by the bench regarding the defensibility of custodian based collections.  ARMA has a good piece on this very topic, entitled “Is ‘Manual’ Collection of ESI Defensible?”  The core notion is that the tried and true practice of custodian based ESI collection is now under fire by courts, which appear to be looking at this practice with an increasing level of distrust.

“While it is common for companies to use automated data-collection software and hardware, some corporate litigants opt for more informal, “manual” collection methods (i.e., searches performed by individual records custodians) when responding to ESI requests. Companies may choose the manual collection of ESI to reduce costs, particularly if they have limited levels of litigation or lower risk levels posed by the litigation itself.”

While there’s no dispute that the “automated” collection methods available in litigation software referenced above have a number of features that make this approach more efficient, the question is whether a “manual” (i.e., custodian based) collection process is somehow less defensible.  If this is truly the case, then many midsized companies without the budget to purchase such e-discovery applications will inherently be found deficient – which is a daunting notion.

Take the recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418 (D.N.J. 2009) where the dispute arose out of the demolition of a Ford assembly plant in New Jersey.  Ford and Edgewood entered into a contract whereby Ford agreed to provide 50,000 cubic yards of concrete to Edgewood in exchange for Edgewood removing it from the site.  When the concrete turned out to be contaminated, the dispute started in earnest.

The crux of Edgewood’s complaint was that it was unhappy with Ford’s production and somehow suspected that the dearth of documents was due to the electronic data collection process.  Edgewood sought to “’confirm the adequacy of Ford’s manual document collection process’ by using a third-party vendor to perform keyword searches on documents not in the existing repository of ESI, but instead, documents within the possession of certain Ford custodians.”

To reconcile the dispute the court looked to the Sedona Conference’s work in the area:

“In The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, Practice Point 1 states that “[i]n many settings involving electronically stored information, reliance solely on a manual search process for the purpose of finding responsive documents may be infeasible or unwarranted. In such cases, the use of automated search methods should be viewed as reasonable, valuable, and even necessary.”(emphasis added). Once again, the Court confronts this peculiar situation insofar as Edgewood has a point that the document collection method used by Ford is not necessarily contemplated under the Sedona Principles, but that agreement by the parties at the outset as to the mode of collection would have been the proper and efficacious course of action.  However, “[a]bsen[t] agreement, a [responding] party has the presumption, under Sedona Principle 6, that it is in the best position to choose an appropriate method of searching and culling data.”

Accordingly, the court found that the lack of agreement coupled with Ford being in the best position to make a call about the methodology, was a deciding factor in generally upholding Ford’s manual collection process.

“It would be improvident at this juncture to grant Edgewood the relief it seeks when it has not shown any indicia of bad faith on the part of Ford. To countenance such a holding would unreasonably put the shoe on the other foot and require a producing party to go to herculean and costly lengths (especially in a document-heavy case such as this) in the face of mere accusation to rebut a claim of withholding. This scenario is not contemplated by the Federal Rules.”

While Ford wasn’t penalized for its manual collection, this practice has come under fire in several other opinions.  In the highly controversial case of Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Utah 2009) custodian based collection/preservation policies were similarly under fire.

“ASUS’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs. ASUS alone bears responsibility for the absence of evidence it would be expected to possess. While Adams has not shown ASUS mounted a destructive effort aimed at evidence affecting Adams or at evidence of ASUS’ wrongful use of intellectual property, it is clear that ASUS’ lack of a retention policy and irresponsible data retention practices are responsible for the loss of significant data.”

Adams was in fact cited by Judge Scheindlin in her latest opus – Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec. LLC, No. 05 Civ. 9016, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), where she found fault with the Plaintiff’s reliance on manual collections:

“This instruction does not meet the standard for a litigation hold. It does not direct employees to preserve all relevant records–both paper and electronic-nor does it create a mechanism for collecting the preserved records so that they can be searched by someone other than the employee.  Rather, the directive places total reliance on the employee to search and select what that employee believed to be responsive records without any supervision from Counsel.

From the foregoing, it’s probably too early to call the skepticism over manual collection a trend per se.  Certainly, lobbing a preservation notice over the proverbial wall to custodians without the requisite level of supervision is a recipe for disaster.  Education (about the matter and the required tasks), compliance (with the preservation instructions) and ongoing monitoring (to ensure that compliance continues over time) are all critical responsibilities that must be thoughtfully undertaken by counsel for a defensible ediscovery process.

The question then becomes, is the problem here really about the “manual” collection efforts by the custodians or more simply the fact that they aren’t supervised with the requisite degree of care?  If this is the case, which I’d opine that it is, then “properly executed” manual collections should be fine (i.e., defensible).

But, as Ford indicates, if your company is going to rely upon a manual collection modus operandi, then it may be advisable to let the opposition in on the use of this tactic.  This approach may be mandated by local rule or it may just be the type of transparent cooperation that’s all the rage these days.

While not quite rising to the level of the Tiger Woods affair, the 2008 Qualcomm v. Broadcom brouhaha was the leading electronic  discovery scandal for two years.  Finally, the other shoe has dropped and despite all the handwringing and speculation, nobody will be disbarred.  Even so, there are many lessons to be learned from this case, but first a quick summary of the latest ruling.

On appeal, United States Magistrate Judge Barbara Major provided a quick summary for those who haven’t been following the trials and tribulations closely.  During the initial hearings, Judge Major found that Qualcomm “intentionally withheld tens of thousands of documents” during discovery.  In reaching this conclusion she also stressed the “quantity of suppressed documents, the ease with which Qualcomm ultimately was able to locate the documents, the simplicity and relevancy of the search terms and search locations that led to the discovery of the documents, and the lack of evidence indicating that Qualcomm had engaged in any meaningful oversight of its document production.”

As to finding the scapegoats, and levying $8.5M in sanctions, Judge Major held that six attorneys assisted Qualcomm in withholding the critical documents by “failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the adequacy of Qualcomm’s document production.”  She specifically identified several inadequacies in Qualcomm’s document search, including “the failure to search the computers belonging to, or used by, deponents and trial witnesses, the failure to adequately investigate when significant, relevant, and unproduced documents were discovered, and the failure to ensure there was a legitimate factual basis for the legal arguments made to the Court before making them.”

After her initial sanctions order was set aside, on remand Judge Major provided the responding attorneys with “an almost unlimited opportunity to conduct discovery,” and during fifteen months, the parties undertook a massive discovery effort – including searching and reviewing over 1.6 million documents.  In resolving the Order to Show Cause, Judge Major reversed tracks despite concluding “this massive discovery failure resulted from significant mistakes, oversights, and miscommunication on the part of both outside counsel and Qualcomm employees.”  Yet, the testimony “also revealed that the Responding Attorneys made significant efforts to comply with their discovery obligations,” causing the Court to ultimately decline to sanction any of the Responding Attorneys.

Judge Major, in an effort to better educate the bar, goes on to detail some of the many electronic data discovery abuses. This provides a set of important lessons that for anyone in the practice of e-discovery:

1. “The fundamental problem in this case was an incredible breakdown in communication. The lack of meaningful communication permeated all of the relationships (amongst Qualcomm employees (including between Qualcomm engineers and in-house legal staff), between Qualcomm employees and outside legal counsel, and amongst outside counsel) and contributed to all of the other failures.” The communication issue has been raised by many including Judge Scheindlin (who quoted Cool Hand Luke) and is one of the many reasons that Sedona had pushed for more cooperation in the discovery process.  I cannot stress the important of transparent communication in the e-discovery process.  Not only is it mandated, it’s simply a wise practice.
2. “Moreover, outside counsel did not obtain sufficient information from any source to understand how Qualcomm’s computer system is organized: where emails are stored, how often and to what location laptops and personal computers are backed up, whether, when and under what circumstances data from laptops are copied into repositories, what type of information is contained within the various databases and repositories, what records are maintained regarding the search for, and collection of, documents for litigation, etc.” This failure too, first widely articulated in Zubulake V (and followed by Phoenix Four, Inc.,) requires counsel to discover all sources of relevant information involving substantial communicating with information technology personnel and key players in the litigation to understand how electronic information is stored.  Failure here (even absent spoliation) is grounds for sanctions.  See, In re A&M Fla. Props. II, LLC, 2010 WL 1418861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2010)
3. “Finally, no attorney took supervisory responsibility for verifying that the necessary discovery had been conducted (including ensuring that all of the correct locations, servers, databases, repositories, and computers were correctly searched for potentially relevant documents) and that the resulting discovery supported the important legal arguments, claims, and defenses being presented to the court.” Where does the buck stop? It’s clear that a supervisory role with the proper experience in e-discovery is a critical component to an efficient and defensible e-discovery process.
4. Another factor that contributed to the discovery failure was a lack of agreement amongst the participants regarding responsibility for document collection and production. See previous comments about the importance of cooperation and communication.

So despite all those blunders Judge Major wasn’t able to find any evidence that the involved attorneys acted in bad faith, which allowed her to rationalize her change of heart.  But, if I were counsel reading the opinion I wouldn’t take this reversal as a license to conduct shoddy legal discovery because the bar (pun intended) is quickly rising such that missteps occurring two years ago probably won’t be tolerated today (see Judge Scheindlin’s latest opinion – Pension Committee).

Qualcomm is still a wake-up call, but just one that (fortunately for the involved attorneys) won’t end up an enduring disaster.

Judge Shira Scheindlin is famous for a number of things in her electronic data discovery opinions, but one notable aspect is her use of quotes to set the tone for her landmark decisions.  In Zubulake she quoted Cool Hand Luke (“What we’ve got here is a failure to communicate.”) and in her latest opinion she quotes George Santayana (”[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”).

Pension Committee of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan, et al., v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al. (“Pension Committee”) is generating a lot of buzz and reminds me of the Yogi Berra quote: “this is like déjà vu all over again” … particularly when thinking back to her landmark Zubulake decisions.  In this opinion, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York pens another potential electronic discovery classic, while simultaneously paying homage to her past opus.

Before we get into the “how” and “what” of the 85 page opinion, it’s probably reasonable to posit the “why” question, particularly when Judge Scheindlin and her team spent 300 hours on the mammoth undertaking.

“I, together with two of my law clerks, have spent an inordinate amount of time on this motion. We estimate that collectively we have spent close to three hundred hours resolving this motion. I note, in passing, that our blended hourly rate is approximately thirty dollars per hour (!) well below that of the most inexperienced paralegal, let alone lawyer, appearing in this case. My point is only that sanctions motions, and the behavior that caused them to be made, divert court time from other important duties-namely deciding cases on the merits.”

So, why was this fact pattern worthy of the inordinate amount of briefing time (regardless of the inconceivably low $9,000 fee)?  A skeptic might postulate that Judge Scheindlin has been out of the limelight lately, often being eclipsed by Judges Peck and Grimm.  It’s also been a year since her Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp., opinion and it’s likely that she wanted to hearken back to the good ole Zubulake days, where she had the ear of the entire electronic discovery world.  Her tribute is less than subtle, as she even subtitles Pension Committee: “Zubulake Revisited: Six Years Later.”

Less skeptically, however, she likely sees a host of matters rife with electronic data discovery disputes caused by the bar’s lack of e-discovery savvy.  It seems plausible that Pension Committee is a way for her to coalesce leanings from Zubulake (and beyond) into one, clear expression of legal duties.

Given the length of her opus, we won’t dissect the entire opinion as Ralph Losey did (chockablock with flying gerbils), but will instead focus in on the enduring and potentially controversial sections.  As way of background, the dispute at hand focused on claims by a group of investors who brought an action to recover losses of 550 million dollars stemming from the liquidation of two British Virgin Islands based hedge funds.  Unlike many typical e-discovery disputes, this instant action focused on the conduct of the plaintiffs as they attempted to deal with the often murky landscape of ESI preservation, collection and production.  Fortunately, Judge Scheindlin provided much needed foreshadowing to both readers and bloggers alike in her opening comments:

“Because this is a long and complicated opinion, it may be helpful to provide a brief summary up front. I begin with a discussion of how to define negligence, gross negligence, and willfulness in the discovery context and what conduct falls in each of these categories. I then review the law governing the imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to produce relevant information during discovery. This is followed by factual summaries regarding the discovery efforts–or lack thereof–undertaken by each of the thirteen plaintiffs against whom sanctions are sought, and then by an application of the law to those facts. Based on my review of the evidence, I conclude that all of these plaintiffs were either negligent or grossly negligent in meeting their discovery obligations. As a result, sanctions are required.”

The finding of sanctions aside, Judge Scheindlin goes out of her way to crystallize duties and identify the type of conduct can cause an e-discovery breach.  Despite significant caveats about the fact intensive nature of each discovery dispute, she nevertheless proffers the following synthesis, which has caused no shortage of consternation amongst electronic discovery practitioners and commentators:

“After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to contemporary standards can be considered gross negligence. Thus, after the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has attached:

• to issue a written litigation hold;
• to identify all of the key players and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved;
• to cease the deletion of email or to preserve the records of former employees that are in a party’s possession, custody, or control;
• and to preserve backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources.

[bullets added]

Assuming Pension Committee is followed beyond the bounds of the Southern District of New York, which is still speculative at this stage, it certainly means sleepless nights for corporate legal departments with litigation hold and preservation processes that are less than “contemporary.” While it’s hard to argue with the theoretical appropriateness of the above items, it’s questionable how practical these steps are, particularly for large enterprises that may have dozens (or hundreds) of litigation holds in place at any one point in time.  Multiply the numbers of holds times the disparate types of ESI and the complexities of the IT infrastructures and Judge Scheindlin’s seemly innocuous mandate can quickly become a tactical minefield, rife with sanctions possibilities.  Unfortunately, with the rapid proliferation of social media usage and cloud computing, this already complex paradigm is only going to become more vexing in the near term.

Given that the number of struggling enterprises is legion, it does certainly beg the question whether more folks than not can live up to this new “reasonableness” standard.  If not, this articulation may materially raise the bar and result in a demonstrable increase in spoliation motions, if that were possible.  Already, spoliation charges are often referred to as a “case within the case” by many, something which Judge Scheindlin reluctantly acknowledges.

“Finally, I note the risk that sanctions motions, which are very, very time consuming, distracting, and expensive for the parties and the court, will be increasingly sought by litigants. This, too, is not a good thing. For this reason alone, the most careful consideration should be given before a court finds that a party has violated its duty to comply with discovery obligations and deserves to be sanctioned. Likewise, parties need to anticipate and undertake document preservation with the most serious and thorough care, if for no other reason than to avoid the detour of sanctions.”

[Footnotes omitted]

Perhaps ratcheting up of the e-discovery standard of care can be rationalized as aspiration in nature.  Yet, it is hard to see how it reflects the actual business practices of many in corporate legal departments, particularly when the actions/inactions occurred (as in this case) several years ago when nascent notions about best practices were still evolving.

“The age of this case requires a dual analysis of culpability–plaintiffs’ conduct before and after 2005. The Citco Defendants contend that plaintiffs acted willfully or with reckless disregard, such that the sanction of dismissal is warranted.  Plaintiffs admit that they failed to institute written litigation holds until 2007 when they returned their attention to discovery after a four year hiatus. Plaintiffs should have done so no later than 2005, when the action was transferred to this District. This requirement was clearly established in this District by mid2004, after the last relevant Zubulake opinion was issued. Thus, the failure to do so as of that date was, at a minimum, grossly negligent.”

[Footnotes omitted]

Perhaps my biggest issue with this decision is that it (perhaps myopically) places an inordinate level of importance and awareness of the Zubulake decisions, particularly for those outside Judge Scheindlin’s district.  This lawsuit was initially brought in Florida and “[w]hile a duty to preserve existed in the Southern District of Florida at the time this action was filed, no court in the Eleventh Circuit articulated a ‘litigation hold’ requirement until 2007.”  In my mind, it hardly seems fair to retroactively imbue the Plaintiffs with this type of comprehension and duty.

At the end of the day, and despite quibbling with the equities involved, Judge Scheindlin has largely succeeded in moving the e-discovery ball forward.  The opinion will likely be one of the most widely read cases in 2010 and deservedly so since it describes with precision and clarity the burdens and penalties in the evolving area of ESI spoliation.  The main question will be to what extent will other jurisdictions adopt the same culpability framework and extend the reach of Pension Committee just as happened with the Zubulake line of cases.

Certainly, it could be “déjà vu all over again.”

As Tiger Woods is to golf, the honorable Shira A. Scheindlin is to electronic discovery.  She has unquestionably been the most dominant/visible/outspoken jurist in the electronic discovery realm over the past decade, penning amongst others, the Zubulake opinion, which is commonly referred to as the gold standard in electronic discovery.

But, like Woods, who recently took a sabbatical to mend his surgically repaired knee, Judge Scheindlin has recently been eclipsed by several other notable electronic discovery jurists, namely Judge Grimm (of Victor Stanley and Mancia fame) and Judge Facciola (aka “the Italian Stallion“) both of whom made numerous “best of the year” electronic discovery case law lists.

With Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 2009 WL 94311 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 13, 2009) Judge Scheindlin serves notice that the sheriff is back in town.  She not only tackles a number of thorny electronic discovery topics, but ambitiously takes on the US government in the process.  It’s fairly lengthy opinion, well worth the read, so I’ll just excerpt out a few of the notable takeaways.

As a bit of background…  the Collins case centered around a securities fraud complaint brought by the SEC against the Collins & Aikman Corp. and its former CEO David A. Stockman.  The crux of the dispute surrounded questions concerning the government’s discovery obligations in civil discovery (versus in a purely SEC investigation per se).

There were four distinct but interrelated disputes, namely:

“(1) Whether identifying responsive documents that have been organized by the producing party invades the protection accorded to attorney work-product and how a government agency-acting in its investigative capacity-must respond to a request for the production of documents. (2) Whether a government agency may unilaterally restrict the scope of its search based on an assertion of an “undue burden” on limited public resources. (3) How much information the Government must disclose in order to allow an adversary-and the court-to assess an objection based on the deliberative process privilege. (4) Whether a government agency may unilaterally exclude its own e-mail from document production on the ground that most-but not all-will be privileged.”

Addressing the work product claims, the court found against the government, again reinforcing several recent opinions about electronic discovery search:

“The SEC contends that Stockman can search through the ten million pages and find substantially the same documents identified by the SEC without impinging on the thought processes of the SEC attorneys. Indeed-at significant expense and delay-Stockman could search the document databases using appropriate search terms, but the inaccuracy of such searches is by now relatively well known.  A page-by-page manual review of ten million pages of records is strikingly expensive in both monetary and human terms and constitutes “undue hardship” by any definition.” [Citing, George L. Paul and Jason R. Baron's article: Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?

After losing the first battle, the SEC argued that even if the compilations were not protected as work product, it could produce the "complete, unfiltered, and unorganized investigatory file" since this was how the documents were "maintained in the usual course of its business."  This second attempt was similarly unpersuasive as Judge Scheindlin held that the "usual course of business" exemption did not apply:

"[C]onducting an investigation-which is by its very nature not routine or repetitive-cannot fall within the scope of the “usual course of business.” While the SEC routinely collects and maintains regulatory submissions such 10-K reports, in its investigative capacity the agency conducts tailored probes of a company or an industry, requiring the gathering of records from diverse sources. Many if not most of the 1.7 million documents in the SEC production here were likely collected in the agency’s investigatory role. Thus it is no surprise that the complete collection is maintained as it was collected-in large disorderly databases. The documents can only be provided in a useful manner if the agency organizes or labels them to correspond to each demand.”

Next, Judge Scheindlin addressed the SEC’s decision to “unilaterally” limit its search to “centralized compilations” which ultimately “turned up nothing.”  She found that the SEC’s “blanket refusal to negotiate a workable search protocol” was “patently unreasonable” citing both Mancia and the Sedona Conference’s Cooperation Proclamation:

“Rule 26(f) requires the parties to hold a conference and prepare a discovery plan. … Had this been accomplished, the Court might not now be required to intervene in this particular dispute. I also draw the parties’ attention to the recently issued Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, which urges parties to work in a cooperative rather than an adversarial manner to resolve discovery issues in order to stem the ‘rising monetary costs’ of discovery disputes.”

As the coup de gras, Judge Scheindlin addressed and rejected out of hand the SEC’s most untenable claim that it would not produce e-mail “generated or received by the Commission itself” because “nearly all responsive e-mails will be privileged, protected, or non-substantive.”

“Because e-mails are inherently searchable, the SEC’s blanket refusal to produce any in-coming or outgoing e-mails is unacceptable. Without even an attempt to negotiate search terms that would weed out privileged, protected, or irrelevant e-mails, the SEC cannot reasonably assert that a routine aspect of modern discovery-search and review of a party’s e-mail-is beyond its capability. Essentially, the SEC’s position is that the cost of such a search is simply too high, but it has made no effort to document the cost or the likelihood that it would produce relevant, nonprivileged material. The concept of sampling to test both the cost and the yield is now part of the mainstream approach to electronic discovery.”

At the end of the day, the Collins opinion seems to make statement the Judge Scheindlin is back with a vengeance and she’s serving notice that the government isn’t above the law:

“Like any ordinary litigant, the Government must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Besides knocking the government down a peg, Judge Scheindlin throws her judicial weight behind a number of important but nascent trends, including the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation, the related need to meet & confer, the use of sampling and the challenges of electronic discovery search. While none of these notions are groundbreaking, her substantial backing means increasing clarity for lawyers and litigation support practitioners everywhere.  And, that’s certainly welcome.