The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

To join the conversation and receive automatic updates when new information is posted to this blog, please subscribe to e-discovery 2.0.

Legal Holds/Preservation. As we all know, eDiscovery sanctions (at least here in the US) are critical business/legal drivers, particularly with regard to the legal hold area (which is the riskiest part of the EDRM).  As the Gibson report points out, the actual award of sanctions has remained relatively flat (56% in the first half of 2011 versus 55% for the full year in 2010) –  but, more important than this relatively stable metric, it’s very clear that the plaintiff’s bar has caught on to the ability to win cases by revealing shoddy (or just undocumented) legal hold procedures, even in some instances where data isn’t lost.  This is why the report notes a dramatic increase in the seeking of eDiscovery sanctions – 68 at mid-year 2011 versus 31 at mid-year 2010.  This doubling of attempts to pierce an entity’s legal hold regime should be a wake-up call to in-house practitioners and chief legal officers, since the attempt and success rates will likely only increase over time.

While there is still some considerable debate, at least for those following Judge Scheindlin’s Pension Committee logic, anything less than a formal, written legal hold policy is per se negligent.  Although it’s conceivable that  a reviewing court won’t use this rigorous standard, anything less formal will strike most organizations as simply too risky.  Ongoing compliance with the legal hold process is also another difficult task for many organizations, one which is considerably easier with an automated solution that is able to track acknowledgements and send reminders over time.  It’s all too easy for companies to think that once they’ve discharged their initial legal hold duty they’re in the clear – but as these obligations morph (with more custodians/data types) and elongate (from months to years) over time, keeping on top of the legal hold processes becomes that much more important.

Sanctions. The Gibson report also importantly points out that there’s currently a split in jurisdictions where some courts can levy sanctions for bad faith, while others can merely require proof of negligence.  Here, the important take-away is that a defendant entity doesn’t typically get to forum shop and therefore they can’t really tell which type of jurisdiction they’ll end up in as a litigant.  So, they need to build their eDiscovery processes to meet the high water (i.e., most rigorous) standard.  In most cases, it’s therefore prudent to be prepared to be sanctioned for merely negligent conduct – anything less can potentially be safe but that risk calculation needs to be considered carefully.

The other perilous part of the equation is that once sanctions are deemed warranted, the court has almost unlimited discretion to levy whatever blend of sanctions it thinks is appropriate.  In Green v. Blitz, for example, the court ordered a laundry list of sanctions, some of which were pretty unfathomable:

1. Defendant had to pay plaintiff $250,000

2. Defendant had to provide a copy of the court’s order to plaintiffs “in every lawsuit proceeding against it” for the past two years

3. Defendant had to file the court’s order in every case that it is involved in for the next 5 years

The bottom line is that sanctions, despite the fear factor, can be used to drive positive proactive conduct – namely in the shape of eDiscovery best practices.

Outside Counsel Duties. Here, the Gibson report notes that outside counsel’s Zubulake duties continue to increase over time, with a number of cases continuing the trend of holding attorneys responsible for ensuring that their clients properly implement legal holds, institute sound sampling protocols and conduct sufficient quality control steps.  This line of discussion can be useful when talking to outside counsel where we’re starting to see how their increasing responsibilities can lead to malpractice exposure, as seen in the recent McDermott case.

Search/Analysis. Lately there’s been a ton of buzz about predictive coding, but (despite the hype) it still doesn’t appear ready for prime time yet.  The Gibson report noted that there were no reported cases that addressed the use of predictive coding or other advanced search technologies.  My sense is that without some semblance of judicial approval or strong client backing, outside counsel (who are concerned about their malpractice exposure, per above) aren’t quickly going to be the first ones into the pool.  Unless an enterprise client demands that they use this type of technology, most will wait for judicial approval and that’s probably still a way off.  While next generation search technologies are more promise than reality right now, there is still a mandate to implement a defensible search methodology.  These are needed initially to demonstrate transparency in the eDiscovery process and to then withstand the challenges levied by counsel in the case of an inadvertent production.

In sum, the Gibson report shows the ongoing maturation of the eDiscovery space.  But, any niche market led by case law and/or attorneys deciding to adopt new technologies won’t be quick to change.  In many instances, therefore, the best practices will be decided a combination of standards bodies and vendors who are being pushed by their more forward thinking clients to get and stay on the cutting edge.

There are situations, though, where the existence of data (as opposed to its content) is central to the matter – when companies suspect employees of stealing proprietary information or when employees leave a company under suspicious circumstances.  In these and other similar situations, it may make sense to have the employee’s workstation hard drive imaged for full forensic analysis.  Even in these scenarios, I find that companies are more likely to hire an external investigator to perform this task to allay suspicions of tampering or bias, and the company generally would prefer that this investigator be the one to testify about this sensitive data acquisition.  Then, for ESI beyond the target employee’s hard drive, other collection methods may be used.  As we’re now midway through 2011 – a year in which I expect to see eDiscovery fully embraced by many corporations as a true business process – I wanted to analyze why the forensic disk image myth still exists, where it came from, and what the law really requires of an eDiscovery collections process.

Traditionally, cases that mentioned full forensic imaging of hard drives began their captions with United States v. or State v. because they were criminal matters.  In traditional civil litigation – even the behemoth eDiscovery cases that get all the bloggers blogging – forensic imaging simply is not required or needed.  In fact, in most cases, it will dramatically increase the cost associated with electronic discovery – this process adds unnecessary complexity in downstream phases of eDiscovery and leads to vast over-collection.  Why collect the Microsoft Office suite 50 times when what you are really required to preserve and collect are the files created with those programs?  When using disk imaging, program files are collected which drives up storage costs and requires the post-collection step of deNISTing (removing system files based on the NIST list).  Why not leave those system files behind and perform a targeted collection of only user-created content?    In addition, the primary rules governing civil litigation – the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence – simply do not require exact duplication of electronic files.  I am amazed that there are so many experts who are still pushing full forensic imaging and duplication in every case.  In fact, this goes against best practices published by The Sedona Conference, EDRM, and in the E-Discovery textbook co-authored by Judge Shira A. Sheindlin.

In comment 8c of the Sedona Principles, the authors call making forensic image backups of computers “the first step of an expensive, complex, and difficult process of data analysis that can divert litigation into side issues and satellite disputes involving the interpretation of potentially ambiguous forensic evidence.”  The comment goes on to say that “it should not be required unless exceptional circumstances warrant the extraordinary cost and burden.”  In a whitepaper authored for EDRM by three eDiscovery experts from KPMG, LLC, the authors discussed the high cost of forensic bit-level imaging and, instead, suggested that targeted collection of ESI would be sufficient in the vast majority of non-criminal matters.  They state, “[t]he challenge of Smart EDM [Evidence and Discovery Management] is to obtain targeted files in a forensically sound manner – chain-of-custody established, proven provenance, and metadata intact – without having to resort to drive imaging.”

In Electronic Discovery and Digital Evidence: Cases and Materials, written by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, Daniel J. Capra, and The Sedona Conference, the authors state that,

“because imaging software is commonly available, and because the vast majority of training programs in the field of electronic discovery revolve around forensics, there is a growing tendency to want to ‘image everything.’  But unless an argument can be made that the matter at hand will benefit from a forensic collection and additional examination, there is no reason to do a forensic collection just because the technology exists to do it.”

So, with the top experts in the field saying the days of “image everything” should be over, why does it still happen?  Why are the victims of this antiquated workflow still paying the exorbitant costs of a solution that does not really meet their requirements?  Perhaps a historical perspective will be helpful in explaining.

Why Drive Imaging and Proprietary Containers?

I do not think there is any debate on the benefit of having a bit-level image of a hard drive in a criminal investigation.  However, traditionally, the investigators using these methods needed a way to get the imaged drive safely back to a lab for further analysis.  Companies or law enforcement agencies that hired third-party investigators to image drives had to transport the data, maintaining chain of custody, and preserving all contents in an un-alterable state through several phases of the investigation.  And, in criminal matters, it was especially important to maintain the integrity of the evidence when the electronic evidence was central to the government’s case.  Remember, the burden of proof in a criminal matter is “beyond a reasonable doubt” (along with a host of constitutional considerations).  Alteration of key evidence could certainly create reasonable doubt and hose the prosecution’s case (or, worse, the evidence gets tossed by the Court before the trial even begins).  The container file ensures that no matter who handles the evidence, checksums can prove that the contents were not altered since the initial imaging.

Many vendors now offer logical image containers as an alternative to doing a full bit-level image of the drive.  However, in corporate eDiscovery, this is still overkill because the tools and solutions being used downstream still have to unpack or parse these proprietary container formats for processing and analysis.  In fact, even software from the vendors who created these container formats must “crack them open” to get to the contents within.  This seems to add a layer of complexity that has not been needed since the days of the external examiner coming in with her forensic toolkit to do drive images. The format was created to solve a very specific problem, and little thought was given to the use of this format in a holistic process like what is typically seen in civil eDiscovery.   There is no longer a need for a container for portability of evidence because it is most likely going to be processed in place after collection while residing on a secure evidence store on the company’s network.  I have heard “what if our collections methods are challenged?”  And to that, I would respond that we are not in criminal court and that the requirement in civil court is reasonableness, not perfection.  Now, if an employee is suspected of wrongdoing and the potential deletion of files will dramatically alter the case, then by all means, hire a forensic investigator and follow all of the protocols established over the last several decades in computer forensic science.

Fast forward to the 21^st century

Corporations are bringing eDiscovery in-house; they are building a business process around it to minimize risk and drive enormous cost savings, and in today’s world of civil litigation, there simply is not a need for these drive images or proprietary containers.  First of all, the burden of proof in a civil matter is “by a preponderance of the evidence.”  What this means is that the burden is satisfied if there is greater than 50% chance that a proposition is true.  This is a much lower standard than in criminal cases.  But, burden of proof goes more to the weight evidence is given by the court or jury.  Before that is even considered, evidence must pass several hurdles of admissibility.  As we will explore, these standards of admissibility have also been the recipients of significant bolstering from vendors over the years.

The Path to Admissibility

There are several hurdles to admissibility for any type of evidence, and because they are not within the scope of this post, I will forego any discussion of relevance, FRE 403, or the hearsay rules.  I will focus on the issues that tend to be associated with electronic evidence: authentication and the “best evidence rule”.  There are some examiners and perhaps even vendors that would argue electronic evidence is simply not admissible if not collected using bit-level imaging (and sometimes 2 copies – one that is referred to by examiners as the “best evidence” copy and another “working copy” to be analyzed).  This is simply not true.  What we will find is that the collection method will go more to the weight of the evidence rather than the minimum showing needed for admissibility (hence, the discussion of burden of proof above).

All evidence must be authenticated pursuant to FRE 901.  This is a “don’t pass Go” threshold requirement for admissibility.  FRE 901 is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  Notwithstanding a “self-authenticating” piece of evidence pursuant to FRE 902, the proponent must establish the identity of the exhibit by stipulation, circumstantial evidence, or the testimony of a witness with knowledge of its identity and authorship.  Typically, objections to this process would tend to go toward whether the exhibit is an original, was altered, or the witness with whom the proponent is attempting to authenticate the exhibit is not able to so based on lack of personal knowledge or some other defect.  Mostly these objections deal with the authenticity of the contents of the exhibit, and the rules in Article X of the FRE are helpful here.  Rule 1001 defines an “original” with respect to data stored in a computer or similar device as “any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately.”  This is a far cry from a bit-by-bit forensic image!  Rule 1002 – often referred to as the “Best Evidence Rule” – requires that “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.”  Not only do these rules not require exact duplication of the electronic files, but they do not require imaging the entire 80GB hard drive to collect the 100MB of files that are potentially relevant to the case.  What they do require, though, is the ability to show that a document being proffered is the same document that was originally created.  In Re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 444 (B.A.P. 9th 2005). Also, Judge Grimm sets out an extremely comprehensive analysis of what is required for the admissibility of electronic evidence in civil litigation in Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company, 241 F.R.D. 534 (D.Md. May 4, 2007).  In Lorraine, he notes that In Re Vee Vinhee may set out the most demanding test for admissibility of ESI.

Maintaining Forensic Integrity

So, how do I combat the claims that “they must have altered that document” or “Your, honor, I swear that line about ‘acceptable losses’ was not in the safety memo when I created it”?  This is where hash value becomes a wonderful thing.  Computing the hash of an electronic file, or computing a hexadecimal checksum based on analysis of the contents of an electronic document, is essentially like recording the DNA of an electronic file.  If the file is altered, its hash value would be different.  So, by computing the hash value at the source, in transit, and at the destination, I can ensure that the electronic file is in exactly the same state as it was at the source (or, that the collected document is the same as the document originally created).  Now, add the ability to report on that information and those container files and full forensic disk images really do become extreme overkill.

The important distinction here is that the term “forensic” does not refer to a type of technology or the products of a specific vendor – despite claims and propaganda to the contrary.  Forensic refers to the methodology used by the person collecting the evidence – whether it is finger prints from a weapon or electronic files from an employee’s laptop.  Forensic imaging, however, refers to the process by which an entire hard disk is copied bit by bit to create an exact duplicate of that hard drive in a forensic manner.  It is entirely possible for a collection of ESI to be “forensically sound” by simply employing the technique described above of taking hash values at each stage of the process to be able to prove that the files were not altered during collection.  As long as chain of custody is also maintained (much easier to do now that we are not using multiple tools, vendors, locations, and people to do the job), then the process should meet the threshold admissibility requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Opponents will still bring up claims that the evidence must have been altered, or the expert familiar only with forensic imaging technologies will try to use the argument that only vendor X’s technology is “court vetted,” so any other method is not acceptable.  But, to these opponents, I would argue two points:

1. No technology is “court vetted”.  The operator’s use of the technology in the specific case (in a specific jurisdiction) was acceptable to the court to meet the threshold showings required by FRE 901, 1001, and 1002 – as well as any rules of procedure governing the production of discovery in either a civil or criminal matter.  Wow – that would be a very long footnote on a marketing slide…probably why it is not usually mentioned.
2. The process is forensically sound, and you can prove that the documents were not altered from collection through production by referencing the hash value and maintaining copies of the original native files analyzed on a secured preservation store.  This would exceed the requirements of FRE 901, 1001, and 1002 – but would provide protection against claims going to the “weight” of the evidence by opponents who would cry foul.

What Now?

So, where does all of this leave us?  First, in the vast majority of civil litigation matters where electronic discovery is being performed, forensic bit by bit imaging of computer hard drives is simply not required.  Vendors have promoted this practice over the years, but all this has done is over-complicate the eDiscovery process for many unsuspecting litigants and dramatically increase costs because the model simply does not scale.  Moreover, the effort and cost required to deal with these full drive images downstream in the process is often overlooked by these vendors and overzealous consultants.  Next, we now know there is a better way – targeted, forensically-sound collection of ESI using streamlined and automated solutions that maintain custodian relationship – even for shared data sources – throughout the eDiscovery lifecycle, preventing form of production disputes and other calamities that have plagued this industry for the last decade.  There is a better way to collect ESI that will provide exponential cost savings all the way to production.

What do all Mr. Sheen’s seemingly random musings mean? Has he lost his mind? Is he pulling the wool over the eyes of the media by flawlessly executing the biggest Hollywood hoax in history? Maybe, just maybe, Mr. Sheen is a stealth e-discovery expert, secretly providing the legal community with a guide for handling litigation. Don’t agree? Well, maybe you’ll be a believer after reading my interpretation of how some of Mr. Sheen’s most popular quotes can serve as an e-discovery 101 guidebook.

“It was so gnarly I can’t remember.”

It’s hard to remember that the first Zubulake decision was penned by Judge Scheindlin long ago in 2003, but the gnarly $29.2 million jury verdict against UBS Warburg by a single plaintiff, in a fairly routine employment lawsuit, is one that most legal departments in Corporate America won’t soon forget.[1] Many industry experts feel the jury’s massive verdict could have been avoided if it wasn’t for repeated electronic discovery errors that resulted in the jury receiving an adverse jury instruction about UBS Warburg’s failure to produce emails. Eight years later, the incredible growth of electronic information continues to present e-discovery challenges for organizations, even though clearer guidelines have evolved.

“Sorry man, didn’t make the rules.”

Prior to Zubulake, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) did not squarely address the unique challenges of electronic evidence. Although she didn’t actually make the rules, Judge Scheindlin served as a member of the committee that helped draft the 2006 amendments to the FRCP. The amendments address many electronic evidence challenges faced by legal departments, and topics such as data sampling, proportionality, and data accessibility that were tackled in Zubulake, ultimately made their way into the notes or text of the amendments.

The amendments seek to minimize discovery disputes and provide clarity by, among other things, requiring parties to “discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information” and by outlining a protocol for dealing with electronically stored information (ESI) characterized as “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”[2] Despite these guidelines, the rules are not always bright line instructions so the conduct of the parties is typically evaluated based on “reasonableness” standards when a discovery dispute arises. Some are lobbying for further clarification regarding issues such as when the duty to preserve electronic evidence is triggered and there seems to be a movement afoot that could lead to additional Rule amendments as evidenced by last year’s Civil Litigation Review Conference at Duke University.[3]

“Your perimeter’s been breached.  You got work to do bro.”

No lawyer wants to be responsible for having the organization’s perimeter breached as a result of data spoliation. However, failing to take proper data preservation steps continues to be the number one reason organization’s face e-discovery sanctions.[4] In Zubulake IV, Judge Scheindlin explained that an organization has work to do when it “reasonably anticipates” litigation since the anticipation of litigation is enough to trigger counsel’s duty to issue a litigation hold notice to employees.[5] The duty is easy to understand, but determining the “triggering” event and the best approach for preserving data can be challenging. To minimize the risk of spoliation, many organizations are moving away from using email notifications and spreadsheets to track when, who, how, and why employees are notified of a litigation hold in favor of more automated solutions and repeatable workflows. Automated solutions allow notices, reminders, and surveys to be created with easy-to-use templates and the “reasonableness” of the entire litigation hold process can be illustrated since reports can be automatically generated with the click of a button.

“I’ve got tiger blood and Adonis DNA”

Although the line between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” conduct can be very blurry in some cases, in other situations the offending party simply chooses to flagrantly disregard the rules as if they have tiger blood and Adonis DNA. For example, in Daylight, LLC v. Mobilight Inc., the Utah Appellate court upheld the lower court’s entry of a default judgment after defendants threw a laptop off a building, ran it over with a vehicle and stated: “if this gets us into trouble, I hope we’re prison buddies.”[6] Uh, sorry Charlie….

Typically, most parties are not so cavalier about disregarding their legal obligations and the judge’s decision to issue sanctions when evidence is lost or deleted is not a slam dunk. One challenge is that the 2006 FRCP Amendments allow litigants to request any “Electronically Stored Information” stored in “any medium” that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.[7] That means the scope of the duty to preserve, collect, and produce information as part of litigation may be very broad and very complicated, even though data growth continues to increase exponentially and corporate information technology systems continue to become increasingly complex.

To meet these burdens, many organizations are demanding technology solutions that do more than manage the legal hold process because they also need to collect, analyze, and review ESI to evaluate the case. The holy grail of e-discovery is being able to leverage a single technology solution to manage all these tasks as well as the litigation hold process. The value is twofold. First, automating e-discovery steps related to preservation and collection that have traditionally been managed manually minimizes the risk of human error and makes it easier to demonstrate a repeatable process that is defensible. Second, using the same technology solution to filter, analyze, and review key documents faster results in significant cost savings and strategic advantages.

“You make a choice to win, and you win”

Despite the fact that organizations continue to make e-discovery mistakes, smart organizations choose to leverage a combination of repeatable workflows and legal technology solutions to help them win. Although the new technological era we live in has created new discovery challenges, legal technology can be used to streamline data preservation, collection, processing, and review. Legal technology can also be used to quickly find important documentary evidence earlier in the case, thereby resulting in strategic advantages so smart organizations can “just keep winning.”

[2] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)

[3] John G. Koeltl, 2010 Civil Litigation Review Conference Introduction: Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 Duke L.J. 537 (2010).

[4] See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones, and Gregory R. Antine, SANCTIONS FOR E-DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS: BY THE NUMBERS, 60 Duke L.J. 789 (2010), at 803 stating (“FAILURE TO PRESERVE ESI IS THE MOST PREVALENT SANCTIONABLE CONDUCT”

[5] Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

[6] Daylight, LLC v. Mobilight Inc., 2011 UT App. 28 (2011)

[7] Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).

“[T]here is no need to decide this question because FOIA does not conflict with the Rules. FOIA is silent with respect to form of production, requiring only that the record be provided in ‘any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.’… Defendants’ productions to date have failed to comply with Rule 34or with FOIA.”

Now that the government has appealed Judge Scheindlin’s ruling I thought I’d consult with a legal guru (in the form of Ralph Losey) to see how he thinks the chips will fall on both the request for a stay and the appeal.  Here’s what started as an impromptu email exchange, which is now paraphrased for your reading enjoyment:

Dean:  ”Ralph, how likely is the government to get stay in the first place?  After all, if they have to produce the metadata (as ordered) winning a downstream appeal won’t help much in the NDLON case?”

Ralph:  ”An interlocutory appeal to the Circuit Court on a discovery issue is always a long shot. Appeals courts usually do not accept appeals of non-final discovery orders. The appellant has to show irreparable harm. Still, this is an unusual case as production of documents goes to the merits of the case itself. They may well take it. I really don’t know. I might depend on someone’s breakfast.”

Dean:  “So, maybe the government loses this initial battle, but my guess would be that they’re still keenly interested in winning the war, since Judge Scheindlin’s metadata production standards will have far reaching affects across any entity responding to FOIA requests.  As an aside, a given agency may handle a multitude of FOIA requests ranging from dozens on the low end to thousands on the high end – so a change in any production protocol is guaranteed to have a material and long lasting impact.”

Ralph:  “Could be, but then again, maybe some agencies are already producing metadata. If they give actual native copies, then they certainly are. I don’t have statistics on that. Certainly, they should have seen this coming. The states that have looked at this all require reasonable metadata production. I probably don’t appreciate the governments real problems here, since in my world, metadata is produced between private parties all of the time without a fuss. Do the feds really have state secrets stashed away in metadata? I seriously doubt it. In my experience, searching for secrets in metadata is usually a big waste of time. It is a fear based on myth, not fact.”

Dean:  “The Supremes issued a ruling recently in Milner v. Dept. of Navy which effectively reigned in an expansionist construction of FOIA Exemption 2.  Aside from containing my new, favorite quote [“Our construction of the statutory language simply makes clear that Low 2 is all of 2 (and that High 2 is not 2 at all).”] do you think this ruling will have any impact on the NDLON outcome?”

Ralph:  “Honestly I don’t know. I consider myself somewhat educated about metadata and production of various metadata fields in load files, but not meta-foia, and I mean that literally, not “metafoicaly” <ouch!>”

Dean:  “Finally, do you think that the Plaintiff’s argument in NDLON that these very agencies ask producing parties for metadata (sometimes in more onerous fashion) will hamper their cause?  Or, is FOIA a different enough creature to throw out the ’good for the goose’ argument?”

Ralph:  “I am reminded of one of my favorite old sayings, ’hoisted by his own petard.’ Certainly many, if not most federal agencies require metadata production to them in e-discovery. Why should the federal government be any different?”