e-discovery 2.0

Recently, I moderated a panel at the Masters Conference with John Loveland, Sonya Thornton, and Bruce Markowitz entitled: How Defensible is Your E-Discovery Process? (Click here to read a summary of the panel.) It was well attended, and I think that the draw (aside from the esteemed panel) was that this topic still remains very vexing for most practitioners.

Initially, we started at ground zero with the notion that defensibility is in most instances equated with the “reasonableness” standard, which is pervasive across many areas of the EDRM spectrum… from preservation to production.  Instances include:

• Preservation — “[a]s soon as a potential claim is . . . identified, a party is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant to the future litigation.”
• FRE 502 (b) – the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if the (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure;
• General Privilege Waiver — In SEC v. Badian, 2009 WL 222783 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009)(link), “there is no basis … to conclude that there were precautions [to prevent the disclosure], let alone whether they were reasonable.”
• FRCP 37(e) — Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

While the foregoing isn’t exhaustive it does highlight the persistent nature of the reasonableness standard as practitioners seek a defensibility sanctuary.  The good news is that the law doesn’t require perfection and there are also a number of ways to obtain reasonable defensibility:

• Demonstrable acceptance by the opposition – here the notion is that collaboration with the opposition allows the parties to comfortably move ahead with their discovery process and even if it’s not objectively reasonable, the parties consent to the protocol will in most instances carry an imprimatur of reasonableness.
• Auditing / process transparency.  Similar to the first bullet, auditing the process and giving the opposition visibility into the process steps will often make it hard for them to lodge successful downstream challenges.
• Adherence to Local Rules (See 7th Circuit Pilot Program) or judicial order.  Another avenue than can provide some degree of safety is compliance with a discovery protocol mandated by local rules, although that compliance may ultimately be challenged.
• Statistical confidence intervals / sampling – the use of statistics as a way to bolster process defensibility is starting to come to maturity and in the future I think that detailed precision, recall and other statistical indicates will play a large role in e-discovery defensibility.

None of these steps can be guaranteed to really get you off the hook from a rapid opposing party calling foul, but using them in a “belt and suspenders” fashion will certainly help buttress any discovery process.

For more illumination on the topic please see the following video of my interview with John Loveland, who’s waxing poetically about discovery defensibility.

In the post, E-Discovery 911: Reducing E-Discovery Costs in a Recession, we analyzed the question: which electronic discovery activities are the most costly today and thus have the greatest room for cost reductions? An analysis of a typical, hypothetical case demonstrated that the bulk of e-discovery costs reside in the processing and review stages. In this post, we want to look at the different ways of reducing e-discovery costs and which are likely to be the most effective, especially given processing and review costs are the largest sources of expense.

Corporations have the following options for reducing e-discovery costs. Some of these approaches are aimed at changing the overall way e-discovery is performed. And some of these are aimed at improving the results of a particular step within a typical e-discovery process. None of the options are mutually exclusive.

• Retain less data through information management: one of the methods that corporations can undertake to reduce e-discovery costs even before e-discovery has begun is to adopt a data or document retention policy. Such a policy can, for example, stipulate that the corporation deletes all documents not required for specific business, legal or compliance reasons after a fixed period of time, such as 90 days. As a result, a properly implemented document retention policy has the potential to significantly reduce the amount of data that is identified and collected during electronic discovery.

• Better assess your case and your discovery issues: another approach to reducing the overall costs of litigation including discovery is to perform an early case assessment. Pioneered by Dupont and others, the objective of this approach is to understand all the key case facts within a short period of time so that the litigation team can make better decisions quicker. Because costs always rise over time, quicker resolution of litigation reduces costs. While early case assessment was originally an overall approach to litigation, there is now an equivalent in electronic discovery. The goal is to identify all the potentially discoverable data, but only collect, process, and analyze a prioritized portion of this data in order to inform an understanding of the case AND calculate an estimate of the ultimate potential e-discovery costs.

• Bring e-discovery in-house: another holistic method for reducing electronic discovery costs is to manage all or a portion of the e-discovery process in some or all matters inside the Enterprise as opposed to outsourcing it to law firms or litigation service providers. While bringing e-discovery in-house has other benefits, such as improved security and control, the principal benefit is to convert variable service costs, typically priced on a per Gigabyte basis, into fixed software costs thus producing a return on the investment to manage e-discovery in-house.

• Preserve and collect less data: in addition to holistic approaches, e-discovery costs can be reduced at each step in the e-discovery process. One way to reduce e-discovery costs would be to preserve and collect less data. Reducing the amount of preserved and collected data not only reduces the cost of each of these steps but also reduces the cost of each downstream step. There are pros and cons to this approach which I will discuss in a later post.

• Process less data: more data is frequently preserved and collected than needs to be processed for analysis and review. This excess data can be filtered out prior to processing thus reducing processing and all other downstream costs. The techniques used to do this are often referred to as pre-filtering, pre-processing or early data analysis.

• Process differently and review native: historically, most electronic data was converted to an image format, such as TIFF, prior to review. This process is computationally intensive and expensive. In recent years, e-discovery practitioners have been processing and reviewing more documents in a native or near-native format and avoiding the cost of converting documents to an image format until later in the process.

• Review less data: data can also be reduced after processing and prior to review and production. Much has been written in the e-discovery community about this process, often called “cull-down,” and the different search and analysis techniques that can be used as part of this process, such as keyword search, concept search, de-duplication, and others. The fewer documents requiring processing and review, which as we have seen is a substantial portion of the overall costs, the lower the overall costs.

• Review data faster: in addition to reducing less data, the electronic discovery community has pioneered new methods of reviewing data faster including data clustering, near de-duplication, and other more automated review techniques. The faster documents are reviewed, the lower the attorney review costs.

While all of these approaches have the potential to reduce the costs of electronic discovery, some are going to be more effective than others. Each approach can be implemented using a multitude of techniques or practices and each of these techniques has their pros and cons. For example, some techniques may have a greater risk of raising defensibility issues from the court or opposing side than others. Other practices may be less expensive initially, but, over the course of a changing and iterative e-discovery, may prove to be more costly overall. In a series of future posts, we’ll review the different practices used as part of these approaches and analyze the pros and cons of each to understand which may be the most effective for your organization.

It’s been a little over a month since the news first broke that Guidance Software was the frog in an electronic discovery kettle whose water had just reached the boiling point, with the arbitrator in an employment case demanding, “I want this game-playing stopped.” We thought that, with a little time between the initial story and now, it would be worth taking a step back and looking at possible lessons learned — not so much for Guidance specifically, but for enterprises who find themselves in similar situations, as well as the electronic discovery community that serves them.

First, a quick summary. Based on published accounts, it seems like a classic discovery situation (that’s just plain old discovery, without the “e”): a party is sued and fails to produce a document that, lo and behold, surfaces via some other source, throwing the integrity of the sued party into question. After all, if one potentially incriminating document wasn’t discovered, then who knows what else could be out there?

Guidance contended that it did everything that was required of it, and that it didn’t have (or couldn’t find, despite good faith efforts) the emails in question. But, of course, that didn’t stop the litigation support community (via forums such as the Litigation Support List) from pouncing on the perceived hypocrisy.

After all, how could a leading, publically-traded electronic discovery company get caught up in such a mess? How could their cutting-edge electronic discovery technology not have saved them? Or their (hopefully) best-in-class internal electronic discovery processes? If the electronic discovery companies don’t have their acts together, what about all the other poor souls who lack their knowledge and expertise?

That last question is a scary one, particularly given today’s environment, and it’s why the situation has stirred up so much chatter out in the electronic discovery blogosphere. Almost without exception, commenters have jumped to one of two conclusions. Either (a) Guidance has not followed proper e-discovery best practices, or (b) Guidance has willfully chosen to hide relevant documents that it could have produced, because they would be detrimental to its case.

Let’s explore each of those conclusions in a little more detail.

First, is there any direct evidence that Guidance did not follow electronic discovery best practices? The answer there is murky. Certainly, from Guidance’s perspective, the answer is a resounding “no”. They continue to claim that the emails that were produced from another source did not exist on the various laptops, desktops, and servers that were part of the initial discovery request, and it is certainly possible that that is true. Perhaps Guidance had a 1-year retention policy for emails, and the emails in question were outside of that policy. Perhaps the individuals involved had legitimately deleted the emails in question prior to receiving a litigation hold notice, without thinking that they would ever be relevant to a legal matter. Certainly an independent observer has grounds for incredulity here, but it does not necessarily follow that Guidance did not follow electronic discovery best practices for a company of their size and resources. Certainly, from the reports, they did not exactly act in a way that earned much confidence from or favor with the arbitrator. However, that’s a completely different issue, and one which may be a legitimate tactical decision by Guidance (to avoid, for example, the high cost of recovering the corrupt backup tapes).

Second, what if Guidance willfully chose to hide relevant documents? At this point, there is no evidence that this is the case. And, you would think that of all of the companies out there, Guidance would be keenly aware of the extremely high level of risk associated with this strategy. A company well-versed in computer forensics understands keenly that the odds of any potentially negative emails not being out there, somewhere, in cyberspace are incredibly small. Thus there is little incentive to intentionally hide documents. If, however, a company did make such a perilous and unethical decision, it has nothing to do with a lack of e-discovery best practices or technology: it simply has to do with a lack of ethics.

So, has the coverage of the Guidance situation been nothing more than an electronic discovery witch hunt? Far from it… even if both of the “conventional wisdom” conclusions are in fact wrong.

Why? Because even if Guidance has its electronic discovery house in order and is acting with complete integrity, if there’s one thing that anyone in the electronic discovery business should have taken away from the last 5 years of court rulings, it’s that perception and transparency in electronic discovery is everything. Electronic discovery is technically complex and fraught with challenges, and companies – particularly those who are perceived as having vast expertise in the space, whether as vendors (i.e. Guidance) or institutions (i.e. pick your favorite TARP recipient) – have to act in such a way as to appear spotless before the court of law and the court of public opinion.

Assuming you already have your electronic discovery house in relative order (a baseline, fundamental requirement for doing business today), perhaps the most important take-away from Guidance is how carefully you need to consider how minor electronic discovery slip-ups, whether real or perceived, can bite, big time. The legal and media environment is primed to pounce on any hint of a cover-up or conspiracy, and enterprises must go the extra mile (or two, or three…) to ensure that their e-discovery efforts are, and will be perceived, as upright, ethical, and above reproach – or be ready and willing to pay the price in sanctions or loss of public confidence.

Without getting in Dutch with the key Sedona Conference principle that “what happens at Sedona, stays at Sedona” I thought I’d nevertheless write a post that focuses on the core topic at this year’s annual meeting, namely the case for cooperation in e-discovery.

According to the “Cooperation Proclamation” e-discovery is facing an unprecedented crisis:

“The costs associated with adversarial conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious burden to the American judicial system. This burden rises significantly in discovery of electronically stored information (”ESI”). In addition to rising monetary costs, courts have seen escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes – in some cases precluding adjudication on the merits altogether – when parties treat the discovery process in an adversarial manner. Neither law nor logic compels these outcomes. With this Proclamation, The Sedona Conference launches a national drive to promote open and forthright information sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, and the development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative, collaborative, transparent discovery.”

These sentiments about the “broken” nature of the discovery process echo in many ways the draft findings from the Interim Report & 2008 Litigation Survey from the Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers which stated:

“The joint study grew out of a concern that discovery is increasingly expensive and that the expense and burden of discovery are having substantial adverse effects on the civil justice system. There is a serious concern that the costs and burdens of discovery are driving litigation away from the court system and forcing settlements based on the costs, as opposed to the merits, of cases.”

In both instances, the core notion is that “we’ve met the enemy and the enemy is us” because it’s the participants in the process have collectively perverted the discovery process to the point it’s at today.

Sedona’s focus on this front has received at least some traction from the bench, as echoed in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 2008 WL 4595175 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2008).  Mancia, written by leading e-discovery jurist Judge Grimm, was a fairly pedestrian employment litigation case where the parties had come to loggerheads over the e-discovery process.  Judge Grimm held that “[c]ourts repeatedly have noted the need for attorneys to work cooperatively to conduct discovery, and sanctioned lawyers and parties for failing to do so” citing both the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation and the Survey.

Judge Grimm also observed that the these recent lamentations about the costs of civil litigation aren’t terribly dissimilar to those voiced eighteen years ago when the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq., was passed:

“Perhaps the greatest driving force in litigation today is discovery. Discovery abuse is a principal cause of high litigation transaction costs. Indeed, in far too many cases, economics-and not the merits-govern discovery decisions. Litigants of moderate means are often deterred through discovery from vindicating claims or defenses, and the litigation process all too often becomes a war of attrition for all parties.”

Given the fundamentally adversarial nature of litigation, the Sedona initiative is either dramatically ambitious or simply tilting at windmills.  While generally a skeptic by nature, I think that the bench’s early participation and downstream behavior modification is the linchpin to reforming the litigating masses.  Given the long term “sales” cycle involved here, I doubt if we’ll know whether this effort will gain real traction for at least several years.

E-Discovery search has become a hot topic of late (in blogs and in the news), and I think it’s pretty clear that the unwashed (attorney) masses still don’t really grok the importance of using a defensible search protocol.  Neither do they seem to understand the enhanced scrutiny that’s being applied by the judiciary.

Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 2008 WL 4372005 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2008) is another in what will assuredly be a long string of cases that demonstrate how easy it is for litigators to get wrapped around the axel of e-discovery search.  In Kipperman, the defendant (Onex) presented several motions to the court, including attempts to obtain relief from the need to produce email identified after searching several backup tapes.

During a previous hearing the court ordered Onex to search all the mailboxes on two tapes, as well as on an additional tape selected by Plaintiff. The court determined that despite Onex’s objections and representations, the backup tapes were “producing meaningful discoverable information.”  The court was nevertheless sympathetic to Onex’s burden and therefore weighed in with some guidance:

“The court did suggest, … , that Plaintiff be more artful with its search terms and that Plaintiff utilize a list of the people, provided by Defendants, to review whether all mailboxes needed to be searched.”

The court also gave Onex the chance to narrow the search terms.  Unfortunately, they didn’t seize the opportunity to provide a narrower list or a refinement of their search terms.  “As such, they agreed to search and restore all the mailboxes with the search terms provided by Plaintiff.”

Not surprisingly, Onex then sought relief from having to review and produce all of the results from the search because the “broad search terms resulted in thousands and thousands of irrelevant hits.”  For example, the search terms included the word “republic” which used to elicit emails regarding Republic Builders Products, one of the companies involved in this matter.

“Defendants claim that the search captured thousands of irrelevant pages due to one occurrence of the word ‘republic’ often related to Onex business interests having nothing to do with Magnatrax in the ‘Republic of France,’ ‘Republic of Ireland,’ and ‘Czech Republic’.”

Again the court reaffirmed their sympathy with Onex’s burden and yet denied the requested relief, in large part because Onex was warned about not being more “artful”:

“[T]he court is not unsympathetic to the massive amount of discovery involved in this matter, the considerable burden of working with it, and the overproduction that often comes with e-mail production. Therefore, the court gave Defendants numerous tools by which to reduce the burden of e-mail discovery, including an opportunity to limit Plaintiff’s search terms and an opportunity to provide a list by which the number of peoples and the number of boxes being searched could be reduced. Defendants did not take advantage of these opportunities. Defendants must now lie in the bed that they have made. Thus, Defendants’ objections on the basis of relevancy and volume are DENIED.” (emphasis added).

Needless to say, Kipperman is probably not all that atypical.  Attorneys everywhere have historically used blunt e-discovery search instruments and haven’t often run afoul of the judiciary.  Now, post Victor Stanley, et al, the playing field has changed dramatically.  It’s important to leverage best practices (from Sedona and others), craft a defensible search strategy, sample the results and “show your work.”  Missteps along the way, especially ones that the court has tried to help the parties avoid won’t be met with much tolerance