e-discovery 2.0

When I first started working in the electronic discovery industry, I quickly learned two things about Summation: it has a huge installed base of law firm customers, and they all dislike using Summation’s products. It was feedback from these unhappy customers that led companies like Clearwell and kCura/Relativity to enter the review market, and the results are plain to see. While Clearwell and kCura/Relativity are both growing rapidly, Summation has suffered years of declining revenue.

Several people have pointed to poor marketing as the problem, and it’s true most customers are confused. Summation’s products all have different names (iBlaze, Discovery Cracker, CaseVault, CaseVantage), and it is unclear how they relate to one another. But the problem is more fundamental than just marketing. There has been no innovation from Summation for years; its products are difficult to use; and, they don’t integrate with each other. So, naturally, customers switch to more compelling solutions, revenue declines, management cuts costs, talented people leave, service levels deteriorate, more customers defect, and the cycle repeats.

As the management teams at Silicon Graphics, Siebel, or Yahoo! can tell you, once a technology company faces this death spiral, it’s very, very hard to turn things around. But that’s exactly what AccessData must do for its recent acquisition of Summation to work.

On the face of it, you would not expect AccessData to be capable of addressing Summation’s problems. As the #2 player in the forensics market to Guidance Software, it has no experience in legal review. Its customers are enterprises and government agencies, not law firms or litigation support service providers. Its headquarters is in Lindon (Utah), whereas Summation based is in San Francisco. But AccessData has a capable team, and must have some plan in mind. What is it likely to do? My guess is as follows:

• Claim “end-to-end” in the enterprise market: AccessData will likely bundle the iBlaze review platform with its own forensic collection products (FTK) and claim end-to-end coverage of the EDRM model. The products obviously don’t integrate with one another, or even have the same UI, but some customers may not realize how important that is until after they have purchased. This is the same strategy used by Autonomy, which also puts together disparate products (Aungate, Introspect, etc.) and markets them as an integrated package.

• Promote CaseVault and CaseVantage in the law firm market: These hosted review platforms are not widely used. AccessData will be hoping that with better marketing and sales execution, it can drive adoption of them by law firms and litigation support service providers. But most providers today seem pretty happy with Clearwell and/or kCura Relativity, so it’s unclear why they would switch away to CaseVault / CaseVantage.

• Cut costs: On the day the acquisition closed last month, AccessData fired most of Summation’s engineers. That’s understandable, given the shrinking revenue. But it only accelerates the death spiral. With no engineers, it’s impossible to innovate or improve the products.

• Sunset iBlaze product lines: This sounds radical since, according to Katey Wood at the451 Group, iBlaze accounts for 70% of Summation’s revenue. But AccessData may decide to focus its development efforts on CaseVault and CaseVantage, ceasing all investment in iBlaze. Effectively, this means it would “milk” the law firms using iBlaze, and pitch enterprises a product with no real roadmap for improvement. Given how far iBlaze has fallen behind, there is a strong argument that further investments are probably just throwing good money after bad.

It will take a few months before we can say for sure whether these, or other, changes will make any difference. If the experience of other companies is any guide, they may slow the decline for a while, but not reverse it. After all, there may be some people out there using Silicon Graphics computers to access their Siebel CRM systems or search the web on Yahoo, just like there will be some using Summation’s products for document review. But there are fewer and fewer every day.

Yesterday, Marsh & McLennan (M&M) announced the sale of Kroll, its investigative services division which last year generated $678 million in revenue. Kroll is being acquired by Altegrity, another investigative services company which is owned by Providence Equity. The acquisition price is $1.13 billion, below the $1.3 billion M&M was rumored to be asking, and the deal is financed by Apollo Investment Services and Goldman Sachs.

There are many aspects to this transaction, but I want to focus on just one: what does this mean for Kroll Ontrack, Kroll’s largest division with $250 million in revenue and a staggering 1,500 employees, making it by far the world’s largest e-discovery service provider?

To answer this question, I will first outline the strategic challenge facing Kroll Ontrack, before outlining two alternative strategies its new owners may adopt for addressing it.

Strategic Challenge: Kroll Ontrack Is The “Yahoo! Of E-Discovery”

Just as Yahoo was an internet pioneer in the 1990s, Kroll Ontrack was the pioneer of electronic discovery services. Like all pioneers, as the first to market, Kroll had to build everything itself. So Kroll Ontrack invested not only in recruiting and training its staff of skilled consultants, the company also developed its own suite of e-discovery tools and software. It offered this integrated package of services and software to the market and, justifiably, charged a price premium.

But as the industry matured, it disaggregated with more savvy customers and new companies focused on specific parts of the value chain. Customers became better educated and more confident making decisions, diminishing the value of Kroll’s “we-are-the-safe-choice” value proposition. These customers today have many more options for e-discovery than was the case in years gone by, primarily because of a generation of e-discovery software companies, such as Clearwell, Guidance, Exterro, and kCura/Relativity, which offer capabilities like collection, ECA (Early Case Assessment), litigation hold management, and linear review. These have been widely adopted by Kroll Ontrack’s competitors, negating Kroll’s technological advantage. Even worse, because Kroll Ontrack’s competitors do not need to invest in R&D, they have a substantially lower cost structure. As a result, they have undercut Kroll Ontrack on price, which has halted its growth and squeezed its margins.

In a directly analogous way, Yahoo! has seen its broad internet service to consumers eroded by a host of more focused competitors such as Google, Facebook, and Skype. Consumers today are much more familiar with the internet, and feel comfortable making separate choices for search, social networking, and messaging, without the need for an umbrella brand. That has left Yahoo! without a reason for being: even today, its CEO struggles to answer the fundamental question “what is Yahoo!?”

Solution: Sell It Or Fix It

As Kroll Ontrack’s new owner, Altegrity has a simple choice. It could sell Kroll Ontrack, making the strategic challenge someone else’s problem; or Altegrity could fix it, by adopting a fundamentally different strategy.

Let’s consider each in turn:

Sell It: Most sensible people would find it funny to think about selling something right after you bought it. But in this case, it could make a lot of sense. Altegrity is a leading provider of investigative services, not e-discovery, making the “non-Ontrack” part of Kroll’s business a much better fit. So why not sell Kroll Ontrack, pay down debt, and focus on the services business which it understands? This would be especially attractive if, as Vivian Tero at IDC suggests, there are willing buyers such as ECM or storage software companies which like Kroll Ontrack but do not want the services business.

Fix It: Mike Cherkasky, Altegrity’s CEO, is a former head of Kroll, and so is perhaps uniquely well placed to bring about a change in direction. To do so, he must decide what Kroll Ontrack wants to be. If its goal is to be the leading e-discovery service provider, then it should kill its internal software development efforts and focus on providing customers the absolute best service using industry leading tools. If it wants to be an e-discovery software company, which would be a much harder transition, then it needs to exit the services business and make its technology available every litigation support company.

Either way, it will take time and a lot of painful decisions for Kroll Ontrack to recover its momentum. But if any encouragement is needed, the Altegrity and the Kroll Ontrack teams need only look at what’s happening to Fios, another of the industry’s early pioneers. So far, Fios has refused to decide what it wants to be, abandoning its internal review platform for Relativity but keeping its proprietary processing software. The result? It’s had three different CEOs in the past 12 months, and competitors continue to steal market share.

After more than ten years of IT experience and over a year of experience as an attorney working exclusively with e-discovery, I am delighted to join the E-Discovery 2.0 team.  I am a member of the South Carolina Bar Association and the American Bar Association.  In this and future posts, I will try to bring a practical perspective or view from the trenches to this blog – a look at how to deal with some of the day-to-day problems facing e-discovery practitioners today.  I will begin with a discussion about how to approach the decision to move e-discovery in-house, and although the desire to build a solution “in a day” is tempting (and sometimes precipitated by necessity), a solution that will stand the test of time and provide the greatest ROI requires a bit more planning and care.

E-Discovery can sometimes be thought of as an ailment that requires a quick remedy in the form of software or services.  We continue to be reminded, however, that e-discovery is much more than a fleeting malady; it is an ongoing business problem that must be treated with the same diligence and meticulous execution as regulatory compliance or data security.

So where should the prudent practitioner begin?

Every good IT project manager I have ever worked with always had the same mantra when it came to solving a problem with technology – make sure the business problem has been well defined and establish detailed requirements before venturing into the marketplace.  So, why are so many companies sending out form RFPs containing canned text expecting to find a miracle “end-to-end” e-discovery solution in a relatively short period of time?  The answer, I believe, lies both in the abundance and availability of generic information about e-discovery and the fact that most companies looking to bring e-discovery in-house are already feeling the pain of rising costs and demands on existing staff.  They are, in short, trying to conquer their e-discovery problem in a day.  To truly conquer the problem, it should be attacked from the areas causing the greatest pain and expense first, and those areas should be thoroughly examined using proven project management techniques.

If e-discovery is indeed a significant business process, then companies must address that problem using the same proven methods that they have been using for years to solve other business problems.  For example, every company today, believe it or not, has an e-discovery solution in place.  If the company was sued tomorrow, and there was a significant e-discovery component to the matter, the company would likely react in a certain way based on a number of factors – hire outside consultants, work with a litigation support provider, rely on their outside counsel to coordinate e-discovery, etc.  So why not predict that reaction, analyze it, and determine where the greatest expense and pain lies in that process?  From that data, the company can decide which portions of the e-discovery workflow, if any, should be brought in-house, and it can seek out best-of-breed solutions rather than settling on the first end-to-end vendor that comes knocking.  The next step is to rely on those time-honored project management edicts – define the business problem and establish concrete requirements.  Then the company will be armed with the most powerful weapon in the marketplace – the power to distinguish.

The burning question, then, is how does the company decide which portions of the e-discovery workflow to bring in-house?  The answer is relatively simple: you follow the money (right out of the front door in many cases).  Where is the company spending most of its e-discovery budget, and are those portions of the workflow good candidates to bring in-house?  Typically, processing data and review are the most expensive phases of any e-discovery project.  The logic here is simple: if you send 100GB of ESI to outside counsel to review, it will be more expensive and time-consuming than sending only 20GB.  Thus, processing, analysis, and first-pass review are great candidates to be brought in-house from an ROI perspective, and bringing these phases in-house could facilitate a form of early case assessment given the right solution.

Now, suppose a company decides to bring processing, analysis, and first-pass review in-house, also leveraging their chosen technology solution for early case assessment.  Now what?  The process can simply be repeated.  Given the solution implemented, what happens if we get sued tomorrow?  What other portions of the e-discovery workflow will need to be outsourced and how will we do that?  What will that cost?  Is there a better way?  The company can continue this process until it determines that either all portions of its e-discovery workflow have been successfully brought in house or the ROI of bringing additional portions of the workflow in house does not justify additional projects at that time.  This analysis should then be repeated on a regular basis to ensure the current solution is still meeting the needs of the organization and that market or industry shifts have not created additional opportunities for cost savings.

Although an effective and defensible in-house e-discovery solution likely cannot be built in a day, a carefully crafted plan of attack and a thorough understanding of the organization’s particular needs can strategically position it for long term success.

Yesterday, I explained what I think Iron Mountain’s acquisition of Mimosa says about valuations in the archiving / e-discovery industry. Today, I will address the other questions that people commonly ask about the deal – why did Iron Mountain (Stratify) do it, and what does it mean for the electronic discovery industry?

In their letter to customers announcing the deal, Ramana Venkata (President of Iron Mountain Digital) and TM Ravi (CEO of Mimosa) point to two main benefits from combining the companies. On the archiving side, Iron Mountain can now offer Mimosa as an on-premise solution in addition to its existing hosted service. If it can integrate the two, then it can offer “location-independent” archiving which “will help you transparently and seamlessly move data between the on-premises data center and the cloud.” One additional benefit to Iron Mountain, which is not mentioned in the letter, is that it could even leverage Mimosa’s technology for its hosted offering, and replace Mimecast who it currently pays to provide this service.

On the e-discovery front, Iron Mountain now has a suite of 2 products and 1 service: Mimosa NearPoint for collection and preservation; the Stratify eVantage appliance for ECA (Early Case Assessment); and, Stratify Legal Discovery Services for review and production. This makes Iron Mountain a competitor to Autonomy, Clearwell, EMC/Kazeon, and everyone else listed in Gartner’s recent MarketScope covering e-discovery software companies. I’m sure the hope is that there’s synergy between the different products so that, for example, Mimosa’s experience in on-premise software will help Iron Mountain drive adoption of its new Stratify eVantage appliance behind the firewall.

Will the combination work? As Barry Murphy (a former Mimosa employee) points out in his excellent post on this topic, a lot depends on execution. But there are at least 2 reasons to be doubtful. First, the competition is far ahead, and will be hard to catch. As Barry, points out: “Iron Mountain will have a tough road ahead to compete with the likes of Autonomy, which bought successful archiving company Zantaz and has now had almost two years of development time for its hybrid on-premise/SaaS archiving offering.” The same is true on the e-discovery side, where companies like Clearwell have hundreds of corporate customers for on-premise ECA and review.

The second reason to doubt why the combined company will be any more successful than either were before the acquisition is that Mimosa and Iron Mountain Digital serve very different markets. Most of Mimosa’s customers are small to medium sized companies; most of Iron Mountain Digital (ie., Stratify)’s revenue comes from law firms. So it’s not obvious that by combining them you create a company well-suited to serving large corporations, which is the sweet spot for e-discovery and archiving.

It will be interesting to watch events unfold.

Earlier this month, Gartner published its third annual MarketScope For E-Discovery Product Vendors. Written by Debra Logan, Whit Andrews, and John Bace, the report is an excellent survey of this rapidly evolving market. It is also a useful buyer’s guide for anyone considering a purchase of electronic discovery software, since it analyzes and rates various e-discovery players. You can buy the report at Gartner’s site, or access a complimentary copy here.

The report covers 18 e-discovery software vendors. Missing from the report are e-discovery hosted/software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers and small e-discovery software vendors. Gartner believes the market is maturing and only larger companies are viable in the long run. So it increased the minimum annual revenue requirement for inclusion in the report to $15 million.

My guess is that next year Gartner will discontinue the MarketScope and move instead to a Magic Quadrant for e-discovery software. Doing so would be very helpful for the entire industry. Now that George Socha and Tom Gelbmann no longer publish their annual rankings, Gartner’s report is the only way for people to get a sense for how different products compare against each other. That alone makes it required reading for anyone considering an investment in e-discovery software.

Hello from Los Angeles, where the weather’s fine and summer’s in full swing! Accordingly, a few of us in the legal technology community spent the night before LegalTech enjoying a Dodger’s game hosted by LTN editor-in-chief and rabid Yankees fan Monica Bay (outfitted in full Yankee regalia for the occasion). So as to not incur Monica’s wrath, I left my Red Sox cap at home.

At the game, I happened to sit next to a colleague from another vendor who mentioned that her firm is about to celebrate twenty years in e-discovery.

Twenty years! What a remarkable milestone for any company. It got me wondering about how much technology has evolved over that time period, and raised an interesting question to noodle over between innings: With all of the investment and innovation in the e-discovery space, who’s actually winning the electronic data discovery tug of war, twenty years in?

What is the e-discovery tug of war, you ask? Let’s start with the scene in 1988.

On one side, the documents: They stared at you from across the mud puddle — hundreds or even thousands of boxes stacked one of top of another, hauled out from a warehouse where they’d spent their days, against their will, in windowless solitude, ready for battle. They were ticked.

And on the other side, you: With your new IBM PS/2 Model 80 (the best money could buy: 640×480 VGA color screen, 16mhz 386 processor, 80MB hard drive), flatbed scanner, and some new DOS-based database program called “Concordance.” To add insult to injury, Starbucks hadn’t even really gone national yet, so you were probably stuck with a jar of instant coffee to try to stay awake.

You didn’t stand a chance.

From then until now, two different dynamics have played against each other, pulling the flag back and forth over the dividing line:

1. On one side, the explosive growth of electronic documents has been truly mind-boggling. From a baseline of close to zero in 1988 (WordPerfect 5.1 wasn’t introduced until 1989), today essentially every single business document is created, transmitted, and stored electronically.
2. On the other side, technology innovators in the e-discovery space have used creativity and a large dose of Moore’s Law to store, process, and search electronic documents with ever-increasing speed and efficiency.

During the seventh inning stretch, with the Dodgers holding a commanding lead over the White Sox, I thought: Maybe technology is about to win.

Here’s the argument: Assuming that the creation of document content will still largely be human-driven, now that most every legally significant class of communication is being created and managed on-line, growth of e-discovery-relevant data volumes may quickly move from being exponential (when everything was “going digital”) to a rate driven more by productivity improvements and economic growth. Improvements in processing, search, and analysis of documents, however, will continue to improve at a Moore’s Law pace for the foreseeable future, presumably making it fairly trivial for advanced e-discovery technologies to outmuscle their longtime adversary.

Google shows some evidence of this victory of technology over data. Remember that just a few years back, search engines frequently trumpeted how much of the Internet they were able to index – and it was far from the whole thing. Today, that’s largely a solved problem. It’s simply amazing how quickly Google’s index ingests new data, often in what seems like a matter of minutes. In fact, I dare say that by the time you read this post, you’ll be able to perform a Google search on some of its content and have it come up front-and-center in your search results. Amazing.

What does this mean for electronic data discovery? The best e-discovery technologies will change to solve challenges that are far more strategic in nature. Instead of focusing on how fast and effectively they can process documents, or how quickly they can allow attorneys to review them, they’ll provide powerful capabilities for addressing some of the most important e-discovery problems that inside and outside counsel face, such as:

• How do I craft robust, defensible search strategies for my cases while minimizing e-discovery costs?
• How can I standardize a repeatable, high-quality discovery process that’s executed consistently across my organization?
• How can my organization become more proactive in identifying potential legal risks and liabilities based on our company’s “legal history”?

I’m sure you can come up with a number of others. What do you think – is the war against documents over, and electronic data discovery ready to move to a new phase? Or are there still many more battles to be fought?

The recent announcement of $18 million in financing for PSS Systems got me thinking about preservation.  PSS is a provider of enterprise-class preservation and litigation hold management systems with solutions starting in, from what I can tell, six figures.  Nevertheless, this begs the question, why would a Fortune 500 company need such an expensive enterprise class software application to manage legal holds?

So, let’s start from the top…

With the advent of e-discovery during the last decade an entirely new class of evidence spoliation came into existence – i.e., situations where electronically stored information (ESI), particularly back-up tapes, could inadvertently become overwritten, lost, erased, etc.  In the good old days of paper-based discovery, there was certainly an opportunity for spoliation, but paper documents didn’t routinely become lost or otherwise unavailable, unless in extreme instances of intentional spoliation.  For a particularly comprehensive tome on this type of negligent spoliation, please see this excellent piece written by Judge Scheindlin (of Zubulake fame).

Accordingly, in the past several years litigators have had to learn and then re-learn the notion that the duty to preserve ESI begins once litigation is “reasonably likely.”  Unfortunately, this duty to preserve is fraught with a number of practical challenges, including:

• When is the duty triggered?  For example, the duty is in most instances certainly in place prior to a complaint being actually served.  But, as you move upstream from that crystalline moment reasonable minds certainly can differ about when litigation is “reasonably likely.”  EEOC claims, in the HR context, are a good example of potentially early trigger points.
• Then, assuming that the duty is triggered what must then be preserved?  Is it just the ubiquitous email?  Or, as is more likely, will an increasingly broad and voluminous set of ESI be implicated, such as loose files, instant messaging, blog posts (maybe this one?), mobile or PDA/handheld data, deleted but forensically recoverable files, etc.?

Those two thorny problems aren’t the only issues that counsel needs to deal with when they embark upon issuing a legal “hold” – the decree that instructs custodians of their obligation to preserve all relevant information related to the matter at hand.  But, the duty to preserve is only the start of the challenge.  This is where folks like PSS come in, meaning that they manage the potentially complex logistical tasks associated with hold notification, monitoring, and compliance.

Here’s where I start to have a problems with large scale, complex preservation efforts.  Let’s take a somewhat common example:  a multi-national enterprise is sued for misappropriation of trade secrets.  Even prior to the complaint being filed, plaintiff’s counsel issued a demand letter, which in some cases could be held as a triggering event.  But, in either case, once the complaint hits the GC’s desk the duty to preserve is clearly in force.   Let’s then say that in consultation with outside counsel they wisely embark on a set of interviews to determine the scope of departments/locations/custodians that may be reasonably implicated.  Then, following the synthesis of this information they issue a legal hold notice to 2,500 people located throughout numerous domestic and international offices.

Now, here’s where the risk comes in…   One thing is statistically certain with that number of custodians: the legal hold will not be followed to perfection.  If I were more mathematically inclined I’d say it could be reduced to a formula along these lines:

Legal hold compliance *decreases* exponentially as you multiply:

• The number of custodians
• The length of time the legal hold is in effect
• The types and volumes of potential ESI that may be relevant
• The presence of individuals who don’t want data to be preserved due to their own perceived errors/foibles/omissions

The answer, in my mind, doesn’t lie in a better mouse trap to manage the vagaries of the legal hold process.  No, the best way to take the risk out of the legal hold process is to move very rapidly from preservation to collection.

Once ESI is collected two main things start to happen:

1. Subjective notions about the universe of data (allegedly) covered by the preservation process can be changed into objective observations that the custodians really are the right ones.  For example, in the above example the 2,500 custodian list is again almost certainly not correct.  Since the decision process was made subjectively (likely without insight into the data) the custodian list is inherently either under or over-inclusive.  However, with the advent of early case assessment solutions, the preserving party can now quickly collect and assess an initial corpus of data to ensure that exactly the right folks are in the collection/preservation process.
2. Once the ESI is collected, the risk of loss, deletion, etc. will largely have been taken out of the equation meaning that the danger of spoliation is greatly reduced.

My belief is that the larger the preservation effort the more likely there will be gaps that the opposition can use as leverage.  Scaling up the preservation effort is only one way to skin the cat.  Instead, the better practice is to start small, collect quickly, and then expand collection efforts once your legal team has objective insights into the case data.

Yes, preservation is still important. But, biting off more that you can chew simply means a statistically greater chance of failure.

I knew the rumors about FTI’s acquisition of Attenex were true when we received a call in early May. It was from a large Attenex partner, who said: “We need to switch out Attenex no later than the end of June.” There have been many similar calls since then; as one service provider told us the other day, “I cannot imagine any Attenex partner not looking for other alternatives.”

The reason is obvious: Attenex Advantage partners – such as BDO Seidman, Deloitte & Touche, DiscoverReady, DTI Global Document Technologies, Forensic Consulting Solutions, Navigant Consulting, SPI Litigation Direct, VMAX Consulting and 10-15 others – compete directly with FTI. If they must now rely on FTI for their Attenex technology, it puts them at a massive disadvantage when competing for business. FTI could easily undercut them on price, since it no longer pays usage fees to Attenex; or, FTI could promise additional features in the Attenex product that its competition cannot match. It could certainly claim to be the world’s greatest Attenex experts (after all, who knows Attenex better than Attenex itself?). Perhaps worst of all, every time an Attenex Advantage partner works on a client using the Attenex product, it has to inform FTI at the end of the month so that it may be invoiced for usage, thus enabling FTI to track its client engagements.

Yes, FTI will likely make all sorts of promises about “Chinese Walls” and continuing to support other Attenex Advantage partners. But those promises are impossible to enforce (ask the editor of the Wall Street Journal!), and FTI could change its mind at any time, leaving service providers which depend on Attenex in the lurch. I don’t know anyone who would take that risk.

So the single greatest impact of the FTI-Attenex deal is that every other “Attenex Dis-Advantaged” partner needs to find an alternative e-discovery solution – and fast!

A second impact can be surmised from the market’s reaction to the deal. As the chart shows, FTI’s stock immediately popped 10%, adding about $300 million to its market capitalization. Partly, that’s because FTI negotiated such a great deal. It purchased Attenex for only 3.5x revenue, in a transaction that is neutral/accretive to earnings. Partly, it’s because FTI has a great track record with software acquisitions. For example, it acquired RingTail (a hosted review platform) in 2005 for $34 million, and today RingTail generates over 3 times that amount in revenue. Personally speaking, I have always been impressed by FTI’s team which is without doubt among the best in the business.

The interesting thing in this acquisition, unlike many others, is that the value will not come from selling the acquired product, since FTI is doing that already. In fact, FTI has been selling Attenex for years, and has even integrated it with RingTail. Rather, my guess is that FTI will use Attenex to grow its consulting business in several ways, such as:

1. By convincing clients to switch consulting firms, not technology. Let’s take a hypothetical example and say Ford is presently using Attenex through LECG. If LECG now uses a different electronic data discovery solution, then Ford is left with a choice: keep LECG and lose Attenex, or change from LECG to FTI and keep Attenex. Ford’s decision will, of course, be driven by many factors, and it will be interesting to see what happens in scenarios like this.
2. By winning a greater share of e-discovery dollars. Today, companies primarily engage FTI on life-threatening issues: stock option investigations, merger 2nd requests from the DoJ/FTC, and so on. By leveraging Attenex’s brand, FTI might extend that to also cover everyday e-discovery issues like run-of-the-mill litigation and regulatory inquiries.
3. By building an e-discovery footprint behind the enterprise firewall. Attenex has struggled to sell its product for on-premise deployment at enterprise customers in the past. Its website has no customer logos and I’m only aware of a couple of installations, neither of which is publicly reference-able. FTI’s strong consulting business might help change that and make it easier for enterprises to adopt Attenex.

I am sure there are other ways for FTI to get value from the deal that I am not smart enough to think of. My point is that, given FTI’s leadership talent and the scope of its consulting engagements, there are lots of things FTI could do with Attenex to create shareholder value far in excess of the acquisition price. That’s why I believe the second impact of the deal is that it will have a positive impact on FTI’s core business.

In Judge Grimm’s recent opinion, Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008), he does a lot to instill fear into foolhardy attorneys who attempt to structure their own keyword searches for e-discovery, again quoting Equity Analytics:

“[F]or lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.”

And, while I agree with this sentiment, the notion of angels treading sounds a bit like a Christian rock band. But, I digress… on to the significance of this opinion.

First of all, it comes from Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm, a noted e-discovery jurist, who’s authored a number of significant opinions in this area, including Hobson and Thompson. Here, in Victor Stanley, he also gets the award for footnote of the decade: Footnote 10, which is so chockablock with relevant nuggets that I thought I’d dedicate an entire post to his riveting dicta.

Judge Grimm’s entire opinion is quite lengthy (43 pages) so a summary is dangerous, but the central issue in Victor Stanley revolved around whether the defendants, who’d inadvertently produced 165 privileged electronic documents, could get them back, in the absence of a valid clawback provision. The plaintiff’s contention was that defendants waived privilege because they failed to take reasonable precautions by performing a faulty review of text-searchable files that were part of defendants’ electronically stored information (ESI) production.

In order to evaluate the reasonableness of defendants’ privilege review methodology, Judge Grimm honed in on defendant’s use of keyword search techniques. Quoting In re Seroquel, O’Keefe and Equity Analytics, Grimm used the bulk of footnote 10 to expand on this core thesis:

(”[D]etermining whether a particular search methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) . . . .”);

And, while the implications of this expert oriented approach are controversial, this much should be eminently clear to practitioners (in cascading order of obviousness):

• Discovery, except in the most bizarre case, will always involve some measure of ESI.
• ESI is proliferating both in types (blogs, databases, VOIP, IM, text messaging, etc.) and volume (multi-terabyte cases are now common).
• Even the most basic search techniques (keyword, Boolean, etc.) are required to manage exploding data volumes. But, according to Judge Grimm, in order to have a keyword search pass judicial muster one of the following two scenarios must occur:

1. Collaborative Search Approach: The parties, presumably as part of the meet and confer process must “confer with their opposing party in an effort to identify a mutually agreeable search and retrieval method. This minimizes cost because if the method is approved, there will be no dispute resolving its sufficiency, and doing it right the first time is always cheaper than doing it over if ordered to do so by the court.” I like to call this the “measure twice, cut once” method.Or, alternatively:
2. Best Practices & Data Driven Search Approach: In order to have a defensible methodology in the absence of collaboration a party needs to:a) “be aware of literature describing the strengths and weaknesses of various methodologies, such as The Sedona Conference Best Practices,…. and select the one that they believe is most appropriate for its intended task.”b) And, if their selection is challenged, then they should expect to support their position with “affidavits or other equivalent information from persons with the requisite qualifications and experience, based on sufficient facts or data and using reliable principles or methodology.”c) Finally, they should do appropriate levels of data sampling and quality assurance to test core search assumptions.

Failure to adhere to this articulate standard is an invitation for disaster:

“Use of search and information retrieval methodology,…, requires the utmost care in selecting methodology that is appropriate for the task because the consequence of failing to do so, … , may be the disclosure of privileged/protected information to an adverse party, resulting in a determination by the court that the privilege/protection has been waived.”

So, while it’s not my intent to be overly dramatic, I think we are seeing a sea change in how search is performed in practice. It used to be de rigueur for attorneys to run solo with their search protocols. But, it’s not safe to take that path any longer. Now, counsel faces a fork in the road where they can either collaborate on their search protocols or be prepared to get called to the carpet if the opposition wants to make a fuss. This might turn out to be yet another “case within a case” situation similar to how the plaintiffs’ bar has made hay by arguing about spoliation in some instances where they didn’t have much on the merits. If that happens having a defensible process, and perhaps an expert and supporting statistics will go a long way towards preventing a catastrophic privilege waiver.

Assuming that you can buy each company for the same price, which would you acquire?

Company A has been in business 3 years, has 25 customers, no brand to speak of, and did about $5 million in revenue in the prior year; or,

Company B has been in business 7 years, has over 100 customers, a strong brand in its market, and is doing $25 million in annual revenue?

“No brainer,” you say, “obviously, Company B.” So it is that FTI looks to have got a great deal buying Attenex (Company B) today for $88 million, whereas Seagate looks like it grossly overpaid for Metalincs (Company A) which it bought for $82 million in December 2007. But things are not always as they appear, and there are good reasons why litigation support software company Attenex has sold for a paltry 3.5x revenue, a multiple well below the 16x commanded by Metalincs or even the 5x revenue that Iron Mountain paid for Stratify.

Three forces reduced Attenex’s acquisition price. The first is that FTI accounted for a large proportion of Attenex’s revenue. That gave FTI leverage over Attenex since it could say, “sell to us for $88 million, or we will take our business elsewhere, your revenue will plummet, and the value of your business will be greatly reduced.” This power that FTI had over Attenex made it the only logical acquirer, so there could be no pressure from other bidders to raise the purchase price.

The second force depressing Attenex’s valuation is that its revenue will likely decline post acquisition as Attenex’s partners (who compete with FTI) switch from Attenex to other solutions. Software investors value growth above all else – and are willing to pay up for it. For example, Bladelogic, an unprofitable software company, went public last year at a $500 million valuation with less trailing revenue than Attenex. But it did $62 million in revenue the following year (Bladelogic sold to BMC Software for $800 million in April 2008). Attenex, by contrast, will see declining revenue in the next 12 months.

Finally, acquirers worried that, since Attenex’s revenue comes almost entirely from its hosted offering via service providers, its revenue was more volatile than enterprise-oriented e-discovery software companies. This is due to the fact that customers (typically, law firms) purchase Attenex-powered services on a case-by-case basis and can switch away at any time. Enterprises, in contrast, purchase long-term software contracts that will not vary based on short-term changes in case volume.

Once these factors are taken into account, the price and the multiple start to look a lot better. Attenex’s founders, who are some of the pioneers of the e-discovery industry, get some well-earned liquidity; the venture investors make a decent return; and, employees get to join a professionally-run company that compensates its people well. My congratulations to the Attenex team, and to FTI which has negotiated a great deal.

Of course, all this says nothing about the deal’s impact on the broader e-discovery market. That will be the subject of my next post.