e-discovery 2.0

Picking five out of the sea of electronic discovery cases isn’t as easy as it sounds.  Sure, a few, like our “Case of the Year” will be no-brainers, but others aren’t as clear cut.  And, they’re certainly open to debate.  But, in my humble opinion here’s THE list, counting down David Letterman style:

5) Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 2008 WL 4595175 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2008)

If there ever was an opinion written by a judge to make a larger societal point, Mancia was certainly it.  Judge Paul Grimm, who’ll appear on this list in another slot as well, has clearly taken the mantle from Judge Scheindlin as the leading electronic discovery jurist.  He’d heretofore authored a number of significant opinions in this area, including Hobson and Thompson. Now, in Mancia he used a garden variety discovery dispute, which was typically rife with boilerplate objections and other obstreperous tactics, to highlight the Sedona Conference’s Cooperation Proclamation.

The lasting takeaway from the opinion is the notion that “[c]ourts repeatedly have noted the need for attorneys to work cooperatively to conduct electronic discovery, and sanctioned lawyers and parties for failing to do so.” To support this notion he cites the Sedona Conference Proclamation and the little used FRCP 26(g).  This opinion is noteworthy because it gives precedent to bolster the Sedona initiative and should provide a ready citation for all those counsel who aren’t getting the level of cooperation they need from the opposition.  It remains to be seen if other judges will follow suit, but this could be the beachhead for a more cooperative electronic discovery process in 2009 and beyond.

4) Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008)

Flagg highlights the growing need to reconcile the electronic discovery landscape, which typically focuses somewhat myopically on email, with the larger informational trends which are now categorized by the use of blogs, social networking sites, instant messaging, and text messaging.  Flagg was one of the first to determine text messages (e.g., messages exchanged among certain officials and employees of the City of Detroit via city-issued text messaging devices) were discoverable under the standards of FRCP 26(b)(1).  The holding further demonstrated the challenges of conducting electronic discovery across information systems that mix personal information with business communications.  This type of information commingling will continue to escalate, causing significant long term electronic discovery challenges due to thorny privacy, privilege and policy implications.

3) Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 2008 WL 4916026 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2008)

Rhoads is one of the first cases post Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 502, which recently created a national standard (versus the previous split in jurisdictions) and now states a “middle ground” for the determining of inadvertent disclosure during electronic discovery.  The key provision is (b)(2) which provides protection only if “the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.”  So, Rhoads took that “reasonableness” question head on in a scenario where the plaintiff Rhoads admittedly (yet inadvertently) produced over eight hundred privileged, electronic documents.  The decision is significant because it used the five-factor test stated in Fidelity, but put an undue weighting on the final test which was: “whether the overriding interests of justice would be served by relieving the party of its errors.”   This approach potentially threatens the development of sound case law that will be necessary to help the deployment of FRE 502 into practice because it casts too much uncertainty with its weighting of “fairness” (a problematically vague notion) in the analysis.  It will be interesting to see if/how this approach is subsequently adopted as we enter the New Year.

2) Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008)

This for many was the case of the year given it’s far reaching implications for the legal community.  Some have argued that this isn’t an e-discovery abuse case per se, but more of an example of discovery abuses that just so happened to be centered around ESI.  In either case, the fraud, resulting cover-up, sanctions, ethical issues and privilege discussions made for insightful and thought provoking reading throughout 2008.  The lasting takeaway from Qualcomm appears to be the implications of not just committing discovery abuses, but the failure of having a well thought out e-discovery plan that is actively executed/monitored by outside counsel.  The resulting tension between outside counsel, inside counsel and the internal IT department may continue to escalate if more cases like this make the headlines in 2009.

1)  E-Discovery Case of the Year: Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008)

Judge Grimm’s hallmark opinion has had the legal community buzzing over the past several months and the reason appears pretty straight forward.  In Victor Stanley Grimm builds on the holdings in Seroquel, O’Keefe and Equity Analytics, to boldly cast doubt on a practice so routine that it’s literally shocked the legal community into reevaluation:

(”[D]etermining whether a particular search methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) . . . .”

The notion that electronic discovery search is beyond the ability of most attorneys has caused tremors within the litigation support community who had a long history of blindly receiving keywords from counsel, running them and turning back over the results - often blissfully unaware of the extent to which those keyword searches actually located relevant information.  Victor Stanley’s analysis of the “reasonableness” of search protocols also has impact on the FRE 502 and therefore cements its place alongside other e-discovery “must reads” such as Zubulake and Morgan Stanley.

The cases above are my Top 5.  What additional cases do you think were important?  Please let me know by commenting on the cases you think shaped electronic discovery in 2008 and why.

With the recent implementation of Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 502 litigants have been waiting to see what kind of impact this rule will have in practice - particularly with the anticipated reduction of attorney review costs during electronic discovery.  In Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 2008 WL 4916026 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2008) we see an early indication that things aren’t quite as clear as people had hoped.

In this breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation action plaintiff Rhoads admittedly (yet inadvertently) produced over eight hundred privileged, electronic documents during eDiscovery.  After returning the documents, Defendants filed a motion claiming that Rhoads waived privilege because:

• its production was careless,
• its response in seeking the return of the documents was delayed, and
• it failed to produce complete and accurate privilege logs.

The court began its analysis by focusing on FRE 502 which recently created a national standard (versus the previous split in jurisdictions) and now states a “middle ground” for the determining of inadvertent disclosure during eDiscovery.  The key provision being (b)(2) which provides protection if “the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.”

As the court began its legal analysis it quickly noted the similarity to Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., which had “analogous facts” despite being decided pre-FRE 502.  Both Rhoads and Victor Stanley leveraged similarly the five-factor test stated in Fidelity which were:

1. the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of the document production,
2. the number of inadvertent disclosures,
3. the extent of the disclosure,
4. any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure, and
5. whether the overriding interests of justice would be served by relieving the party of its errors.

The Rhoads court indicated its belief that “the most appropriate approach is to first determine whether the producing party has at least minimally complied with the three factors stated in Rule 502, i.e., that the waiver was inadvertent, the party took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and attempted to rectify the error.”  Acknowledging that the reasonableness of Rhoads’ review was the crux of the dispute, the court then concluded, “that once the producing party has shown at least minimal compliance with the three factors in Rule 502, but ‘reasonableness’ is in dispute, the court should proceed to the traditional five factor test.”

Factor 1 (the reasonableness of the precautions)

Despite the unfortunate results, Rhoads actually started out on the right foot.  First, they recognized that with extensive electronic discovery on the horizon they needed an IT consultant to research software for the in-house processing and searching effort.  The consultant tested and then purchased a tool to perform the necessary electronic data searches, although it wasn’t clear how they selected that product or whether they reviewed any other similar solutions.

“The fact that Rhoads retained a consultant who recommended and used a fairly sophisticated screening device shows that Rhoads substantially complied with the following Explanatory Note to Rule 502: ‘A party that uses advanced analytical software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and work product may be found to have taken “reasonable steps” to prevent inadvertent disclosure. The implementation of an efficient system of records management before litigation may also be relevant.’”

After picking out the software tool, the IT consultant identified a large volume of potentially responsive documents after consulting Rhoads’ attorneys to identify keyword searches intended to filter the privileged material and removed those documents from the group.  The search was run a second time to verify its accuracy.  Given the large volume of documents remaining even after removing materials hit by the privilege search, Rhoads’ counsel modified the original search terms and reduced the volume of potentially responsive documents to 78,000.   Rhoads’ counsel then manually reviewed a separate group of emails from specific accounts to identify and remove privileged documents, which were then added to separate privilege logs.

On the other side of the ledger, there were a number of things the court found lacking in Rhoads’ methodology, citing Victor Stanley, including a failure in crafting a viable search strategy: “Plaintiff produced documents that its limited search should have caught. Therefore Plaintiff not only failed to craft the right searches, but the searches it ran failed. Plaintiff has no explanation for this.  … Here there was no testing [read: no sampling] of the reliability or comprehensiveness of the keyword search. Plaintiff’s only testing of its search was to run the same search again.”

Factor 2 (The Number of Inadvertent Disclosures)

While 800 inadvertently produced documents was only 1-2% of the data set it still was a large number standing alone, especially compared to Victor Stanley, which had 165 at issue.  So, the court found that this issue favored the Defendants.

Factor 3 (The Extent of the Disclosure)

Read on.

Factor 4 (Any Delay in Measures Taken to Rectify the Disclosure)

The court skipped factor 3 and went instead to factor four, finding that this too favored Defendants.  Significantly the court found fault with the resources Plaintiff brought to bear on the issue and also noted that “Defendants had to bring Plaintiff’s error to its attention instead of Plaintiff catching its own mistake” (as in Victor Stanley).

Factor 5 (Fairness)

Now here’s where things get interesting.  Despite finding for the Defendants on the previous 4 (really 3) factors - meaning that they weren’t on balance “reasonable” - the court puts an unbalanced weighting on this final fairness factor:

“Although Rhoads took steps to prevent disclosure and to rectify the error, its efforts were, to some extent, not reasonable…. The most significant factor, …, is that Rhoads failed to prepare for the segregation and review of privileged documents sufficiently far in advance of the inevitable production of a large volume of documents.”

And yet, “I find that the fifth factor, the interest of justice, strongly favors Rhoads. Loss of the attorney-client privilege in a high-stakes, hard-fought litigation is a severe sanction and can lead to serious prejudice. … [D]enying these documents to Defendants is not prejudicial to Defendants because, in the first place, they have no right or expectation to any of Rhoads’ privileged communications.”

The judge went on to further shore up his over reliance on the “fairness” prong by taking a crack at Judge Grimm’s analysis in Victor Stanley: “I believe that Judge Grimm’s analysis reflects, to a more significant degree than I believe appropriate, application of hindsight, which should not carry much weight, if any, because no matter what methods an attorney employed, an after-the-fact critique can always conclude that a better job could have been done.”

Interesting….  It seems that Rhoads stands for a fairness weighted approach that effectively eviscerates the entire reasonableness analysis mandated by FRE 502 as applied in Victor Stanley and Fidelity.  It seems to me that waiver of privilege is always going to be a “severe sanction” leading to “serious prejudice.”  That’s why inadvertent disclosure is called the third rail of e-discovery.  But, if you want the newly articulated reasonableness standard to mean anything, the “fairness” prong can’t trump the rest of the analysis.

I’m sure this will play out in the near future, but it’s my guess that “reasonable” minds will prevail…

Without getting in Dutch with the key Sedona Conference principle that “what happens at Sedona, stays at Sedona” I thought I’d nevertheless write a post that focuses on the core topic at this year’s annual meeting, namely the case for cooperation in e-discovery.

According to the “Cooperation Proclamation” e-discovery is facing an unprecedented crisis:

“The costs associated with adversarial conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious burden to the American judicial system. This burden rises significantly in discovery of electronically stored information (”ESI”). In addition to rising monetary costs, courts have seen escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes - in some cases precluding adjudication on the merits altogether - when parties treat the discovery process in an adversarial manner. Neither law nor logic compels these outcomes. With this Proclamation, The Sedona Conference launches a national drive to promote open and forthright information sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, and the development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative, collaborative, transparent discovery.”

These sentiments about the “broken” nature of the discovery process echo in many ways the draft findings from the Interim Report & 2008 Litigation Survey from the Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers which stated:

“The joint study grew out of a concern that discovery is increasingly expensive and that the expense and burden of discovery are having substantial adverse effects on the civil justice system. There is a serious concern that the costs and burdens of discovery are driving litigation away from the court system and forcing settlements based on the costs, as opposed to the merits, of cases.”

In both instances, the core notion is that “we’ve met the enemy and the enemy is us” because it’s the participants in the process have collectively perverted the discovery process to the point it’s at today.

Sedona’s focus on this front has received at least some traction from the bench, as echoed in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 2008 WL 4595175 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2008).  Mancia, written by leading e-discovery jurist Judge Grimm, was a fairly pedestrian employment litigation case where the parties had come to loggerheads over the e-discovery process.  Judge Grimm held that “[c]ourts repeatedly have noted the need for attorneys to work cooperatively to conduct discovery, and sanctioned lawyers and parties for failing to do so” citing both the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation and the Survey.

Judge Grimm also observed that the these recent lamentations about the costs of civil litigation aren’t terribly dissimilar to those voiced eighteen years ago when the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq., was passed:

“Perhaps the greatest driving force in litigation today is discovery. Discovery abuse is a principal cause of high litigation transaction costs. Indeed, in far too many cases, economics-and not the merits-govern discovery decisions. Litigants of moderate means are often deterred through discovery from vindicating claims or defenses, and the litigation process all too often becomes a war of attrition for all parties.”

Given the fundamentally adversarial nature of litigation, the Sedona initiative is either dramatically ambitious or simply tilting at windmills.  While generally a skeptic by nature, I think that the bench’s early participation and downstream behavior modification is the linchpin to reforming the litigating masses.  Given the long term “sales” cycle involved here, I doubt if we’ll know whether this effort will gain real traction for at least several years.

There’s a lot of excitement (and corresponding uncertainty) about the recent passing of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (FRE 502), which was signed into law on Sept 19th.  The main reason that the legal community is excited about FRE 502 is because of the potential for cost savings by reducing the amount of money associated with the e-discovery review process, which is routinely viewed as the most expensive area in the entire e-discovery process.

In combination with the codification of a national standard to determine when a privilege has been waived, FRE 502 is primarily designed to make the use of claw-back agreements a truly viable prospect when doing e-discovery privilege review.  It should provide some panacea (ideally) for rapidly escalating e-discovery costs.  Or, at least that was the impetus behind the rule’s creation - according to the Comments:

“The proposed new rule facilitates discovery and reduces privilege-review costs by limiting the circumstances under which the privilege or protection is forfeited, which may happen if the privileged or protected information or material is produced in discovery. The burden and cost of steps to preserve the privileged status of attorney-client information and trial preparation materials can be enormous. Under present practices, lawyers and firms must thoroughly review everything in a client’s possession before responding to discovery requests. Otherwise they risk waiving the privileged status not only of the individual item disclosed but of all other items dealing with the same subject matter. This burden is particularly onerous when the discovery consists of massive amounts of electronically stored information.”

In short, FRE 502 is designed to establish uniform, nationwide standards for waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product protection, with the main goal being to protect producing parties against the inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials or work product in either federal or state proceedings.  The salient section is subsection (b) which states that when a disclosure of privileged information is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal agency, the disclosure does not constitute a waiver if:

1. the disclosure is inadvertent;
2. the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
3. the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).

The end game here is presumably to increasingly leverage automated review methodologies to save costs.  But, in order to facilitate this type of review methodology without taking on unhealthy levels of risk means that claw-back provisions must be as airtight at possible to prevent inadvertent electronically stored information (ESI) productions.  And yet, exactly how FRE 502 will work in practice is up to debate since there isn’t any case law interpreting it yet.

One area that’s top of mind is how this new Rule will impact the recent decisions on e-discovery search, including the Victor Stanley case authored by Chief Magistrate Judge Grimm.  Since FRE 502 contains a core “reasonableness” prong in section (b) it’s likely that Grimm’s proclamation about e-discovery search will still be controlling.  Grimm fundamentally had to evaluate whether the producing party’s search protocols and procedures were in fact reasonable.

“Defendants, who bear the burden of proving that their conduct was reasonable for purposes of assessing whether they waived attorney-client privilege by producing the 165 documents to the Plaintiff, have failed to provide the court with information regarding: the keywords used; the rationale for their selection; the qualifications of M. Pappas and his attorneys to design an effective and reliable search and information retrieval method; whether the search was a simple keyword search, or a more sophisticated one, such as one employing Boolean proximity operators; or whether they analyzed the results of the search to assess its reliability, appropriateness for the task, and the quality of its implementation.” (footnotes omitted).

In Victor Stanley, the producing party wasn’t able to demonstrate reasonableness because they didn’t strategically craft out their strategy nor conduct any sampling to make sure that the e-discovery search worked as designed.  This type of analysis would still seem to come into play under FRE 502 and so, as Grimm states, the use of either a best practices or collaborative approach to e-discovery would seem to be as important as ever.

Given that backdrop it’s just as important as ever that parties “show their work” when it comes to e-discovery search.   Whether FRE 502 will really make parties feel safe enough to use automated review processes (thereby reducing costs) will remain to be seen.  But, this first step which unifies standards and expectations is at least a very positive step.

In my last post, I started a discussion on the myths surrounding concept search.  The first myth I dispelled was the “concept search is concept search” myth.  The myth is that there is an agreed upon definition of concept search.  In actuality, when people in e-discovery use the term concept search, they don’t always mean the same thing.  Frequently they are not actually talking about concept search technology at all and are actually talking about concept or content categorization technology, which is very different.  The second myth that needs dispelling is that concept search is better than keyword search.

The thinking behind this myth goes something like this:

Keyword search has a lot of problems.  It is prone to being over-inclusive, i.e., finding some non-relevant documents, and under-inclusive, i.e., not finding some relevant documents.  Concept search technologies are new and interesting and using these technologies you can find documents that keyword search can’t find.  Therefore, concept search must be better than keyword search.

Let’s examine this thinking.  The first two statements are accurate.  Keyword search is not perfect and can produce over- and under-inclusive results.  And concept search and content categorization technologies can both help identify documents that keyword search technologies might not find.  However, the conclusion that concept search is better than keyword search is not valid and doesn’t follow from these two statements.  Why?

In order to answer this question, we first need to go back to the difference between concept search and content categorization. Because these are different technologies, we really need to separately compare concept search versus keyword search and content categorization versus keyword search.  Let’s start with content categorization and keyword search.

The issue with this comparison is that keyword search and content categorization do different things.  Keyword search can be used in many ways in e-discovery.  The two most common are: (1) analysis or case assessment: finding the hot documents and understanding the matter by determining who knew what, when, how and why, etc., and (2) culling: removing non-responsive documents and/or identifying potentially privileged documents in order to reduce a large, starting set of documents to a smaller set before review.

Content categorization, on the other hand, has historically been used within the review phase of e-discovery.  Categorization can help reviewers to better understand the documents they are reviewing and thus potentially increase the speed of review.  Practitioners with whom I have worked also find that categorization can be useful during analysis by helping to understand a matter and identify potentially important keywords.

However, content categorization has not been used as part of culling.  First, culling needs to be transparent.  You need to be able to get agreement with or at least explain to the opposing side and the court exactly how you have culled the data set.  If you cull based on categories of documents that have been generated by a proprietary, black-box algorithm, it’s going to be difficult to gain agreement on or explain your culling methodology.  This is why the typical method of culling is still to use keyword search and either agree on the set of search terms with the opposing side or to use e-discovery search best practices to perform keyword searches on your own.

Second, content categorization has its own issues when it comes to being over- and under-inclusive.  There is no guarantee that your group of documents that have been categorized as being related to, for example, a company’s hiring policies include all of the documents in your matter related to hiring policies or that they do not include some documents that may not really be related to hiring policies.  Content categorization, like keyword search and virtually every information retrieval technology, is not perfect.

So what about concept search technology?  Surely, concept search technology is better than old, boring keyword search.  Well, actually it’s not that clear-cut.  The problem with concept search technology is that while it might find more relevant documents than plain keyword search, it will also likely find more false positives.  Imagine searching for documents containing “terminate” in an employment matter and your concept search technology automatically searching for “fire”, “dismiss”, etc. as well.  You’ll find more documents related to the termination of employees, but you’ll also find a lot more non-relevant documents concerning house fires, the fire department, etc.

So concept search can help address the under-inclusive problem with keyword search, (though it won’t solve it) and can be helpful during analysis.  But it can often increase the over-inclusive problem.  In addition, today’s concept search technologies share the transparency problem with concept categorization.  These technologies have largely been designed as “black boxes”, which as I have discussed in the past, makes sense for Enterprise search but not for e-discovery search, and, as a result, could also be potentially difficult to explain and defend.   For these reasons, concept search technology isn’t used very much in e-discovery today.  In order for its use to become widespread, it will need to become more transparent.  But that’s a topic for another day.

The bottom line here is that despite all the hype, concept search and content categorization technologies do not solve all the challenges of e-discovery search.  Both of these technologies can be very useful and the technology behind them is always improving.  However, as most of the experienced practitioners I work with already know, these technologies are generally better thought of as supplements to keyword search, not replacements.  The important question is not whether to use one technology over the other but which technology is best suited to your objectives and how best to use all the available technologies to achieve the desired goal.