e-discovery 2.0

As a long-time reader of The Economist, I was excited to find that this week’s edition writes at length about the exponential growth in electronically stored information (ESI), and how people are using technology to manage it.  I believe this is one of the most significant “mega-trends” impacting our economy, and I was thrilled to see it recognized by a mainstream publication. But when I read the 14-page special report, I was disappointed to find that its analysis of the legal and regulatory implications of “the data deluge” is really weak.

The survey does a good job of teeing up the issue:

The world contains an unimaginably vast amount of digital information which is getting ever vaster ever more rapidly. This makes it possible to do many things that previously could not be done: spot business trends, prevent diseases, combat crime and so on. Managed well, the data can be used to unlock new sources of economic value, provide fresh insights into science and hold governments to account.

It goes on to talk about how companies like Walmart, which has 2.5 petabytes of point-of-sale transaction data, is using business intelligence software to analyze the 1 million transactions it does every hour. By doing so, Walmart is able to improve the efficiency of its supply chain and the effectiveness of its marketing. The article also describes how companies like Amazon and Google use web analytics software on click stream data to improve their services.

What’s missing is an equally intelligent analysis of the legal and regulatory implications of all this data. The move from paper to ESI (email and files) has created a user-generated, written record of everything that happens in a company. That’s incredibly helpful when, after the fact, questions or disputes arise. Rather than relying on incomplete recollections, courts and regulators can now consult a written record – one where every document is time-stamped and very often attached to a person’s name via email. That enables judges and regulators to get better information which, in turn, leads to better decisions. It’s hard to quantify the value of that, but there’s no doubt it’s substantial.

There is, however, a catch. Because the volume of ESI is so great, it’s really expensive to gather, sift through, and then produce information. Add the requirement that the process needs to be defensible (i.e., easily explained in court), and the whole thing gets really expensive really fast. Hence the need for electronic discovery software: it’s the only cost-effective way for companies to manage their ESI from a legal and regulatory perspective.

That’s why I believe e-discovery software will be as big a category as web analytics software or business intelligence software – it’s a different side to the same coin. Or, more specifically, a different dimension to managing digital information stores which, as The Economist points out, are growing tenfold every five years.

Update: Nick Patience at The 451 Group has also posted on this topic, at almost exactly the same time as me.

Judge Shira Scheindlin is famous for a number of things in her electronic data discovery opinions, but one notable aspect is her use of quotes to set the tone for her landmark decisions.  In Zubulake she quoted Cool Hand Luke (“What we’ve got here is a failure to communicate.”) and in her latest opinion she quotes George Santayana (”[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”).

Pension Committee of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan, et al., v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al. (“Pension Committee”) is generating a lot of buzz and reminds me of the Yogi Berra quote: “this is like déjà vu all over again” … particularly when thinking back to her landmark Zubulake decisions.  In this opinion, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York pens another potential electronic discovery classic, while simultaneously paying homage to her past opus.

Before we get into the “how” and “what” of the 85 page opinion, it’s probably reasonable to posit the “why” question, particularly when Judge Scheindlin and her team spent 300 hours on the mammoth undertaking.

“I, together with two of my law clerks, have spent an inordinate amount of time on this motion. We estimate that collectively we have spent close to three hundred hours resolving this motion. I note, in passing, that our blended hourly rate is approximately thirty dollars per hour (!) well below that of the most inexperienced paralegal, let alone lawyer, appearing in this case. My point is only that sanctions motions, and the behavior that caused them to be made, divert court time from other important duties-namely deciding cases on the merits.”

So, why was this fact pattern worthy of the inordinate amount of briefing time (regardless of the inconceivably low $9,000 fee)?  A skeptic might postulate that Judge Scheindlin has been out of the limelight lately, often being eclipsed by Judges Peck and Grimm.  It’s also been a year since her Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp., opinion and it’s likely that she wanted to hearken back to the good ole Zubulake days, where she had the ear of the entire electronic discovery world.  Her tribute is less than subtle, as she even subtitles Pension Committee: “Zubulake Revisited: Six Years Later.”

Less skeptically, however, she likely sees a host of matters rife with electronic data discovery disputes caused by the bar’s lack of e-discovery savvy.  It seems plausible that Pension Committee is a way for her to coalesce leanings from Zubulake (and beyond) into one, clear expression of legal duties.

Given the length of her opus, we won’t dissect the entire opinion as Ralph Losey did (chockablock with flying gerbils), but will instead focus in on the enduring and potentially controversial sections.  As way of background, the dispute at hand focused on claims by a group of investors who brought an action to recover losses of 550 million dollars stemming from the liquidation of two British Virgin Islands based hedge funds.  Unlike many typical e-discovery disputes, this instant action focused on the conduct of the plaintiffs as they attempted to deal with the often murky landscape of ESI preservation, collection and production.  Fortunately, Judge Scheindlin provided much needed foreshadowing to both readers and bloggers alike in her opening comments:

“Because this is a long and complicated opinion, it may be helpful to provide a brief summary up front. I begin with a discussion of how to define negligence, gross negligence, and willfulness in the discovery context and what conduct falls in each of these categories. I then review the law governing the imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to produce relevant information during discovery. This is followed by factual summaries regarding the discovery efforts–or lack thereof–undertaken by each of the thirteen plaintiffs against whom sanctions are sought, and then by an application of the law to those facts. Based on my review of the evidence, I conclude that all of these plaintiffs were either negligent or grossly negligent in meeting their discovery obligations. As a result, sanctions are required.”

The finding of sanctions aside, Judge Scheindlin goes out of her way to crystallize duties and identify the type of conduct can cause an e-discovery breach.  Despite significant caveats about the fact intensive nature of each discovery dispute, she nevertheless proffers the following synthesis, which has caused no shortage of consternation amongst electronic discovery practitioners and commentators:

“After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to contemporary standards can be considered gross negligence. Thus, after the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has attached:

• to issue a written litigation hold;
• to identify all of the key players and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved;
• to cease the deletion of email or to preserve the records of former employees that are in a party’s possession, custody, or control;
• and to preserve backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources.

[bullets added]

Assuming Pension Committee is followed beyond the bounds of the Southern District of New York, which is still speculative at this stage, it certainly means sleepless nights for corporate legal departments with litigation hold and preservation processes that are less than “contemporary.” While it’s hard to argue with the theoretical appropriateness of the above items, it’s questionable how practical these steps are, particularly for large enterprises that may have dozens (or hundreds) of litigation holds in place at any one point in time.  Multiply the numbers of holds times the disparate types of ESI and the complexities of the IT infrastructures and Judge Scheindlin’s seemly innocuous mandate can quickly become a tactical minefield, rife with sanctions possibilities.  Unfortunately, with the rapid proliferation of social media usage and cloud computing, this already complex paradigm is only going to become more vexing in the near term.

Given that the number of struggling enterprises is legion, it does certainly beg the question whether more folks than not can live up to this new “reasonableness” standard.  If not, this articulation may materially raise the bar and result in a demonstrable increase in spoliation motions, if that were possible.  Already, spoliation charges are often referred to as a “case within the case” by many, something which Judge Scheindlin reluctantly acknowledges.

“Finally, I note the risk that sanctions motions, which are very, very time consuming, distracting, and expensive for the parties and the court, will be increasingly sought by litigants. This, too, is not a good thing. For this reason alone, the most careful consideration should be given before a court finds that a party has violated its duty to comply with discovery obligations and deserves to be sanctioned. Likewise, parties need to anticipate and undertake document preservation with the most serious and thorough care, if for no other reason than to avoid the detour of sanctions.”

[Footnotes omitted]

Perhaps ratcheting up of the e-discovery standard of care can be rationalized as aspiration in nature.  Yet, it is hard to see how it reflects the actual business practices of many in corporate legal departments, particularly when the actions/inactions occurred (as in this case) several years ago when nascent notions about best practices were still evolving.

“The age of this case requires a dual analysis of culpability–plaintiffs’ conduct before and after 2005. The Citco Defendants contend that plaintiffs acted willfully or with reckless disregard, such that the sanction of dismissal is warranted.  Plaintiffs admit that they failed to institute written litigation holds until 2007 when they returned their attention to discovery after a four year hiatus. Plaintiffs should have done so no later than 2005, when the action was transferred to this District. This requirement was clearly established in this District by mid2004, after the last relevant Zubulake opinion was issued. Thus, the failure to do so as of that date was, at a minimum, grossly negligent.”

[Footnotes omitted]

Perhaps my biggest issue with this decision is that it (perhaps myopically) places an inordinate level of importance and awareness of the Zubulake decisions, particularly for those outside Judge Scheindlin’s district.  This lawsuit was initially brought in Florida and “[w]hile a duty to preserve existed in the Southern District of Florida at the time this action was filed, no court in the Eleventh Circuit articulated a ‘litigation hold’ requirement until 2007.”  In my mind, it hardly seems fair to retroactively imbue the Plaintiffs with this type of comprehension and duty.

At the end of the day, and despite quibbling with the equities involved, Judge Scheindlin has largely succeeded in moving the e-discovery ball forward.  The opinion will likely be one of the most widely read cases in 2010 and deservedly so since it describes with precision and clarity the burdens and penalties in the evolving area of ESI spoliation.  The main question will be to what extent will other jurisdictions adopt the same culpability framework and extend the reach of Pension Committee just as happened with the Zubulake line of cases.

Certainly, it could be “déjà vu all over again.”

There are many barriers preventing the creation of a new product category, especially in the legal industry. The biggest is inertia, since most people prefer to leverage the tools they have, both on grounds of cost (why spend money on something new?) and familiarity (who wants to spend time learning a new workflow?). A second barrier is risk-aversion, since the consequences of errors in the legal world can be severe for all concerned. A third is insensitivity to cost, since service providers simply pass on expenses to their corporate clients. When safety and risk mitigation rank above efficiency on the hierarchy of needs, there’s not much incentive to try new technology.

Yet, despite all these barriers, in the past few years “early case assessment” (ECA) has emerged as a product category. In a typical workflow, ECA products are used after collection and before review, to assess case facts and estimate the scope of electronic discovery. Whereas collection typically occurs within the corporation, and review is usually conducted by outside counsel, ECA bridges the two, and can occur either in-house or via an outsourced model. Either way, it leads to better case strategies, more effective discussions at the “Meet and Confer”, and fewer nasty surprises in downstream review.

How has this happened? Why has ECA been able to establish itself as a product category despite the barriers? There are two answers to that question, each of which is completely different.

One answer is that ECA possesses the unique combination of characteristics needed to create a new category. It capitalizes on macro trends, such as the growth in electronically stored information which makes it impossible to review every document, as occurred in a paper-based world. It’s disruptive, meaning it has completely new functionality, such as transparent search, that other products do not. And, it reduces the overall expense of litigation discovery, by giving savvy litigators the information they need to make better decisions earlier in the case. This cocktail of factors led to initial market traction from sophisticated corporations and law firms, which led to positive word-of-mouth and analyst coverage, which, in turn, educated the broader the market.

The second answer takes the opposite perspective: ECA may be a product category but, because of the barriers listed above, it’s a nascent one. No ECA is performed on the vast majority of data. Instead, the traditional workflow is still used in most cases, whereby service providers blindly run keywords, load the resulting dataset into a review platform, and hire a legion of contract attorneys to sift through it. This is changing over time, but new methodologies do not catch on overnight.

In my view, both answers are correct. Today, ECA is growing rapidly as a part of a workflow that emphasizes data minimization to lower costs. That’s spurred on by corporations who are acutely cost sensitive and increasingly taking control over the processing, analysis, and review phases of the e-discovery process. But inertia remains a huge factor, and ECA is still a small fraction of the total market.

From a historical perspective, this is to be expected. Five years ago, virtually no one did ECA; five years from now, everyone will do it, just as they all do collection and review. The only open questions are how quickly we move from one state to the other, and who will benefit from the change.

Part IV of this series on reducing e-discovery costs described how bringing e-discovery in-house can reduce costs.  One of the major decision points when in-sourcing e-discovery is to decide which parts of the e-discovery process should be in-sourced.  In making this decision, each company should look at the nature of their e-discovery process today, which parts of the e-discovery workflow they currently perform in-house, if any at all, and which are currently outsourced.  They should then look at which outsourced parts would produce the best return on investment (ROI) if in-sourced.

When most companies look at their current litigation software process, they often find that they are already in-sourcing the first stages of e-discovery: identification, preservation and collection.  While there are some companies that will occasionally outsource these steps, especially when there is a need to perform forensic collections, most sizable companies are already doing most of these steps themselves, though often advised by outside counsel.  For example, most companies will identify the custodians and sources of electronically stored information (ESI) in conjunction with outside counsel.  Litigation hold notices will be sent internally and data will be collected by the company’s IT, legal IT and/or internal forensic/investigations team.  It is typically at this point that e-discovery moves outside the company as the data is transferred to a litigation support service provider and/or law firm who perform processing, analysis, review, and production.

When a company takes a look at how they can reduce their e-discovery costs, they are most often looking at two high-level options:

1. Whether they can streamline their existing internal identification, preservation and collection processes
2. Whether they should bring processing, analysis, review and/or production in-house

There are of course exceptions to this.  Some companies do outsource their collection for example, especially when collection might need to be done in remote offices.  But the majority of companies seem to fall in the above categories.  Distinguishing these two options is important because the ROI analysis and decision-making process related to streamlining an existing process is very different than the analysis and decision-making related to bringing a process in-house.

When performing an ROI analysis of these different options, one typically comes to two conclusions.  The first is that both are often ROI positive projects.  The second is that in-sourcing some aspects of processing, analysis and review is far and away the biggest “bang for the buck” project that most companies can undertake when it comes to reducing e-discovery costs.  The biggest reason for the second conclusion is that the majority of the costs incurred during e-discovery are processing and review costs.  In a previous post where we analyzed e-discovery costs, we found that processing and review typically represent over 90% of these costs.  As a result, in-sourcing some or all aspects of processing, analysis and review can save very significant amounts of external processing fees and attorney review costs.  In contrast, while there can be real savings to improving and automating identification, preservation and collection, the size of savings pales in comparison because these steps represent less than 10% of the total cost of e-discovery.

The best approach to reducing e-discovery costs, of course, would be to do both of these projects: improve identification, preservation and collection as well as in-source processing, analysis and review.  However, if you have to sequence these projects or pick only one (a popular requirement in this economy) then in-sourcing processing, analysis and review is the one to pick.

Since I’ve finished off the last of the Halloween candy and tossed out the moldy, squirrel ravaged pumpkins, it occurred to me that now might be a good time to think about what 2010 will hold for the electronic discovery industry.  My 2009 list seems to have been fairly prescient and many of those notions still hold true since the legal industry (as we know) doesn’t move at the most blistering pace.

Again, doing my best Nostradamus impersonation, here are my top ten trends for 2010:

1. Early case assessment (ECA) moves from a “nice to have” to a “must have” requirement for any matter involving electronically stored information (ESI).  In 2009, we saw ECA move into the mainstream as a methodology to quickly understand case facts, assess risk and lower both review and data processing costs.  But, in 2010, with the advancement of the tools and the increased socialization within the bar and the litigation support community, ECA will graduate into a core methodology for savvy litigators regardless of matter type or size.
2. Appetites for broad information lifecycle management initiatives diminish as organizations realize these programs are far too complex to solve specific pain points, and they often take too much time (measured in years) to execute.  The economic reality is that these holistic, cross data, cross enterprise pipe dreams really can’t demonstrate the ROI that’s needed in today’s challenging economy.
3. Staffing roles continue to evolve with a newfound focus on project management. The role of an in-house e-discovery coordinator will emerge as more of a project management and analyst versus pure legal or IT. This shift will become increasingly necessary as e-discovery evolves from an ad-hoc fire drill to a standard business process that is repeatable, measurable, and defensible.
4. Data analytics and statistical methodologies gain traction to augment the type of subjective decision making approaches that have historically formed the backbone of the e-discovery search and review processes.  These objective methodologies have long been called on as best practices by the likes of the Sedona Working Group. In 2010, they now will start to move from theoretical to practical task as e-discovery tools increasingly move in-house and departments enhance defensibility and add elements such as sampling into the workflow.
5. Platform e-discovery solutions finally become a reality as customers finally graduate from painfully stitching point solutions together, thus requiring less physical document hand-offs (i.e., exports and imports) between applications, cutting costs and lowering the risk of data loss.
6. Associate-based review gradually goes extinct, as both clients and law firms tire of expensive, linear review processes.  More review work becomes either insourced or is managed with specialized contract attorneys, who are both cheaper and better trained for this type of work.
7. Similarly, FRE 502 and “clawback” agreements will be increasingly used to reduce the need for any manual, eyes-on review, although many litigators will resist this trend because of the fears of “un-ringing the bell” when privileged information is disclosed in any context.
8. While perhaps anathema, alternatives to the much lauded EDRM model will gain traction, as practitioners strive to find an even better, and perhaps more practical, project management framework, in many cases acknowledging the role that the EDRM has taken in forming *the* lingua franca of the e-discovery industry.
9. The push for cooperation in the e-discovery process, will make incremental progress despite reticence by old school litigators.  Increasingly, this type of cooperation, as strongly advocated by the Sedona Working Group, will be ironically forced by judges and local rules.
10. “Cloud” computing starts to really impact how e-discovery data preservation/collection is done, both in terms of social media and traditional ESI.  More and more companies block social media applications and file types in the workplace because of fears surrounding the inability to preserve and collect.

Recently, I moderated a panel at the Masters Conference with John Loveland, Sonya Thornton, and Bruce Markowitz entitled: How Defensible is Your E-Discovery Process? (Click here to read a summary of the panel.) It was well attended, and I think that the draw (aside from the esteemed panel) was that this topic still remains very vexing for most practitioners.

Initially, we started at ground zero with the notion that defensibility is in most instances equated with the “reasonableness” standard, which is pervasive across many areas of the EDRM spectrum… from preservation to production.  Instances include:

• Preservation — “[a]s soon as a potential claim is . . . identified, a party is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant to the future litigation.”
• FRE 502 (b) – the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if the (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure;
• General Privilege Waiver — In SEC v. Badian, 2009 WL 222783 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009)(link), “there is no basis … to conclude that there were precautions [to prevent the disclosure], let alone whether they were reasonable.”
• FRCP 37(e) — Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

While the foregoing isn’t exhaustive it does highlight the persistent nature of the reasonableness standard as practitioners seek a defensibility sanctuary.  The good news is that the law doesn’t require perfection and there are also a number of ways to obtain reasonable defensibility:

• Demonstrable acceptance by the opposition – here the notion is that collaboration with the opposition allows the parties to comfortably move ahead with their discovery process and even if it’s not objectively reasonable, the parties consent to the protocol will in most instances carry an imprimatur of reasonableness.
• Auditing / process transparency.  Similar to the first bullet, auditing the process and giving the opposition visibility into the process steps will often make it hard for them to lodge successful downstream challenges.
• Adherence to Local Rules (See 7th Circuit Pilot Program) or judicial order.  Another avenue than can provide some degree of safety is compliance with a discovery protocol mandated by local rules, although that compliance may ultimately be challenged.
• Statistical confidence intervals / sampling – the use of statistics as a way to bolster process defensibility is starting to come to maturity and in the future I think that detailed precision, recall and other statistical indicates will play a large role in e-discovery defensibility.

None of these steps can be guaranteed to really get you off the hook from a rapid opposing party calling foul, but using them in a “belt and suspenders” fashion will certainly help buttress any discovery process.

For more illumination on the topic please see the following video of my interview with John Loveland, who’s waxing poetically about discovery defensibility.

Recently, I attended the Sedona Conference’s annual meeting in Atlanta and, amongst other interesting topics, was the discussion of local rules developments and in particular the Seventh Circuit’s new Electronic Discovery Pilot Program (“Pilot Program”).  The Pilot Program was launched October 1, 2009 and seems to be a model for collaboration, since it was developed by eliciting input from a number of disparate groups:

“(a) continuing comments by business leaders and practicing attorneys, regarding the need for reform of the civil justice pretrial discovery process in the United States, (b) the release of the March 11, 2009 Final Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery (“Task Force”) and the Institute for the advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver (“IAALS”), and (c) The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation.”

The impetus of the Pilot Program was the “broken” nature of the electronic discovery process with the belief that better collaboration and cooperation would certain help remediate the situation.

“The goal of the Principles is to incentivize early and informal information exchange on commonly encountered issues relating to evidence preservation and discovery, paper and electronic, as required by Rule 26(f)(2). Too often these exchanges begin with unhelpful demands for the preservation of all data, which often are followed by exhaustive lists of types of storage devices. Such generic demands lead to generic objections that similarly fail to identify specific issues concerning evidence preservation and discovery that could productively be discussed and resolved early in the case by agreement or order of the court. As a result, the parties often fail to focus on identifying specific sources of evidence that are likely to be sought in discovery but that may be problematic or unduly burdensome or costly to preserve or produce.”

What I really like about the Pilot Program is that it strives to be both prescriptive and practical, which should hopefully avoid the type of ambiguity often exploited by obstreperous counsel.  For example, there is an entire section on early case assessment (ECA) principles, which require discussion of:

• Production issues
• Identification of electronically stored information (ESI)
• The scope of preservation
• The meet & confer process

There’s also the relatively novel requirement that counsel designate an e-discovery “liaison” to work with the parties to coordinate and flesh out germane e-discovery issues.  Regardless of whether the e-discovery liaison is an attorney, a third party consultant, or an employee of the party, the e-discovery liaison(s) must:

“(a) be prepared to participate in e-discovery dispute resolution;

(b) be knowledgeable about the party’s e-discovery efforts;

(c) be, or have reasonable access to those who are, familiar with the party’s electronic systems and capabilities in order to explain those systems and answer relevant questions; and

(d) be, or have reasonable access to those who are, knowledgeable about the technical aspects of e-discovery, including electronic document storage, organization, and format issues, and relevant information retrieval technology, including search methodology.”

Needless to say, this requirement alone should make marked improvements in the e-discovery dialogue, which unfortunately seems like it’s occurring (literally) among participants who both speak different languages and don’t realize it.

Finally, what makes the Pilot Program unique is that its Principles will be subjected to testing during the phases of the Pilot Program, which is scheduled to end on May 1, 2010 (for the first phase).

This project certainly seems like it’s on the right track and pending feedback from the bench and bar, it could serve as a model for local jurisdiction everywhere.

On of August 14, 2009, the California Judicial Counsel amended their Rules of Court to augment discussion of electronic discovery issues during the meet and confer process.

Rule of Court 3.724 was amended to require discussion of “Any issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored information” no later than 30 calendar days before the date set for the initial case management conference.  The broad language (i.e., “any”) was augmented by eight specific categories that must be expressly discussed:

(A) Issues relating to the preservation of discoverable electronically stored information;

(B) The form or forms in which information will be produced;

(C) The time within which the information will be produced;

(D) The scope of discovery of the information;

(E) The method for asserting or preserving claims of privilege or attorney work product, including whether such claims may be asserted after production;

(F) The method for asserting or preserving the confidentiality, privacy, trade secrets, or proprietary status of information relating to a party or person not a party to the civil proceedings;

(G) How the cost of production of electronically stored information is to be allocated among the parties;

(H) Any other issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored information, including developing a proposed plan relating to the discovery of the information;

Many of these issues track FRCP language (including forms of production, preservation, privilege issues, etc.).  However, section G seems somewhat novel given the historical “American Rule” where the producing party is required to bear all necessary costs of production.

Curiously missing, in comparison with FRCP 26 B(2)(b), is the need to discuss the handling of “inaccessible” ESI, although this could easily be subsumed in the “any other issues” language of section H.  Also missing is a discussion about proposed searching and/culling protocols (aka “keyword negotiations”) which are often part of the core meet and confer topics in Federal court.

Nevertheless, the scope is broad enough to require *a* discussion of all likely relevant electronic discovery issues, which was often lacking historically.  Once that discussion starts, reasonably savvy counsel should be able to flesh out most of the significant issues.  And, given this broad language a judge would presumably give them a hard time for any material omissions.

We’ve devoted a number of posts to the topic of ECA, ranging from a quest to define the acronym, all the way to the cost savings benefits of the ECA approach.  And, while there seems to be relative unanimity around the beneficial aspects of ECA, there still seem to be a number of myths and misconceptions.  So, ala the Mythbusters, we’ll run these myths through the gauntlet to see which survive scrutiny.

Myth #1: ECA Is Only Valuable if Performed “Early”

Certainly, ECA is best leveraged and will be most valuable when performed at the outset of litigation.  As has been stated before, it has value on two primary fronts, the first being the ability to scope electronic discovery (both in terms of cost and timelines).  The next is the more traditional value proposition where ECA is used to get an understanding of the case facts to enable the strategic decision making process.

As such, there are scenarios where an ECA methodology would still generate value even if performed “later” in the mater.  For instance, with bifurcated, class action litigation initial discovery about the class may occur months before discovery on the merits.  In this instance using a later ECA approach would still make sense since discovery about the case facts may not have been possible earlier on.  Similarly, “late” ECA may still hold value when new parties or claims are added to an existing lawsuit, or when there’s a substantial change in case direction, data, or custodians.

Myth #2: ECA Is Only Performed With Technology

Sure, enterprise grade ECA products  are an important part of the mix, but the products won’t perform an ECA by themselves.  There’s just too much subjective decision making involved in the assessment process.   Therefore, the right people are critically important — not only in terms of experience performing this analytical work, but also in their ability to capably testify about the underlying decision making process.  It’s also important to be able to follow a repeatable and defensible processes to show that the “recipe” used was aligned with industry best practices and wasn’t ginned up for a particular engagement.

Myth #3: ECA Only Works With Large ESI Volumes

Yes, ECA methodologies makes a lot of sense for large, bet-the-company matters because even modest savings when processing, analyzing and reviewing terabytes will easily approach six to seven figures.  However, smaller matters will still benefit from better budgetary insights that facilitate informed matter management.  And, in a way there’s almost more benefit from being able to quickly evaluate (fight/settle) smaller suits since the transactional costs are so high relative to the amount in controversy.  In both scenarios it’s important to view objective case data to prepare for meet & confer conferences.

Myth #4: Clients Don’t Want To Pay for ECAs

Many end clients (corporate counsel typically) have a similar litigation mindset:  i.e., the desire to avoid costs for as long as possible.  While avoiding early costs makes some sense on its face, the fact is that spending a small amount of money early on (for budgetary and case assessment purposes) will in most instances reduce the overall litigation budget.  It’s the classic, “you can pay me now, or pay me later” situation.

Counsel must understand that while some costs are incurred early in the process the benefits are crystal clear: i.e., determining customized case strategies early in the matter to decide whether to fight or settle.  Similarly, corporate clients must recognize that the benefits outweigh the costs and require their litigation counsel to include this process in every significant matter.

This illustration highlights how an initial ECA investment actually pays for itself over the life of the litigation.

Myth #5: ECAs Begin when the Complaint is Filed

Many newbie ECA practitioners may think that the timing for an ECA approach would start when the complaint is filed.  And, while this isn’t patently ridiculous, I think the better approach is to begin the clock at the time litigation becomes “reasonably likely” — versus later dates such as when the complaint is filed or when discovery is propounded.  This trigger is also the same for trigger preservation obligations and a host of interrelated activities such as ESI “identification,” which makes the matter kick-off more synchronized.

For more information about ECA, watch a recording of our recent webinar — E-Discovery MythBusters: Debunking Common Myths About Early Case Assessment.

Judge Grimm’s Victor Stanley case was lauded by many as one of the most significant electronic discovery cases of 2008, mainly for its bold proclamation that e-discovery search is a much more complex and technical discipline than has been typically understood by litigators.

“[F]or lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.”

Despite, legions of articles and blogs on the topic, at least certain portions of the bench haven’t taken heed.  In the case In re: Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47636 (June, 5, 2009) (hereinafter “Zurn“), U.S. District Judge Ann Montgomery receives points for understanding some basic e-discovery tenants around recall and precision, but then mysteriously goes where “angels fear to tread” by suggesting her own search terms.

Examining the case facts in more detail,…  Zurn is a class action products liability case where discovery was bifurcated (as is often the case – see Spieker v. Quest Cherokee) to first cover the class “certification” component.  Initially, the Magistrate partially closed the door on broader ESI discovery, stating that “while ESI may prove to be relevant to the first stage of discovery, we cannot meaningfully make that prediction now, and require the parties to engage in what could be vastly more expensive, and yet utterly futile, discovery.”  However, the Magistrate didn’t shut the door entirely, suggesting that “should the parties uncover voids in the information disclosed in hard copy form, they are . . . at liberty to press for further discovery including electronically stored information.”

Despite complying with Sedona’s Cooperation Proclamation (”The parties have worked amicably throughout the discovery process”) opposing counsel still got to loggerheads when plaintiff found “voids” in the initial paper productions via third party discovery.  The plaintiff brought a motion to compel ESI discovery and the defendant objected, stated two primary arguments: (1) the Magistrate earlier ruled out ESI discovery and (2) if they had to perform ESI discovery it would be unduly burdensome/expensive.

Judge Montgomery summary rejected the first argument, but was concerned about the burden surrounding the proposed ESI discovery.  Here, the calculations get a bit confusing, but plaintiff’s request would have resulted in 361 gigabytes of ESI from employee email sources, as well as shared “J” and “K” drives.  The defendant multiplied the gigabyte number by 75,000 pages per gigabyte, which would have required “approximately seventeen weeks and cost $ 1,150,000, exclusive of vendor collection and processing costs, to review and process the data.”  Assuming a rather modest $1,000 per gigabyte for processing and hosting costs, defendants could’ve added another $400,000 for the project.

Ultimately, the court was not persuaded by the supporting affidavits, nor the attorney’s representations about the resulting burden:

“It is unclear whether Zurn’s cost and time numbers are based on a review of 27 million pages of documents, the 3.6 million pages of documents limited to the J Drive and custodians’ emails, or a smaller sample of document pages likely to be flagged as a result of a search for certain relevant terms pro-posed by Plaintiffs. The affidavit of Ms. Freestone, an attorney and not an expert on document search and retrieval, is not compelling evidence that the search will be as burdensome as Zurn avers.”

The 361 gigabytes apparently resulted from “hits” corresponding to plaintiff’s 26 search terms.  The court correctly identified that those terms had precision issues (”many of Plaintiffs’ proposed search terms will likely produce a large number of ‘hits’ that have limited relevance in the case.”)

Unfortunately, in an effort to increase the search precision, the Judge did not take heed of Judge Grimm’s warning and surprisingly took matters into her own hands: “the Court will limit the search to the following fourteen terms based on the likelihood that they will  produce relevant documents without including a vast number of documents that are likely irrelevant to the litigation.”  Here is the Judge’s list of keywords:

(1) AADFW,
(2) Corrosion,
(3) Corrosive,
(4) Corrosive Water,
(5) Crack,
(6) De-zinc,
(7) Dezincification,
(8) DZR,
(9) Fail,
(10) IMR,
(11) Leak,
(12) MES,
(13) SCC,
(14) Stress corrosion cracking

Without looking at the underlying data, it’s clear from the outset that Judge Montgomery didn’t craft a good search strategy (as Judge Grimm might have predicted).  For example, terms 2, 3, 4 and 14 could’ve been captured by a single stemmed search using the term “corros*.” Without such a stemmed search approach, the terms would probably have been run singly in the proposed protocol, meaning that each one would’ve had tremendous duplication, thereby resulting in wasted attorney review time and processing costs.

Judge Montgomery did recognize the potential error of her ways and gave the parties an out:

“The parties may decide on a different set of fourteen terms if they choose to do so. Additionally, if the search, as ordered by the Court, proves to be overly burdensome or costly, Zurn may renew its objection by presenting the Court with specific information including evidence from computer experts on applying the search terms, the number of documents identified, and the cost and time burdens of vetting documents.”

This “specific evidence” language seems to track notions from Sedona’s search best practices protocol, which prescribes sampling and iterative search term refinement.  What is surprising is that knowing this she would nevertheless blindly proffer the 14 term search strategy.  Instead, she should’ve quoted Victor Stanley and required the parties to come up with a data driven approach that met requisite precision and recall metrics.