e-discovery 2.0

The eDiscovery frenzy that has gripped the American legal system over the past decade has become increasingly expensive.  Particularly costly to both clients and courts is the process of preserving, collecting and producing documents.  This was supposed to change after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended in 2006.  After all, weren’t the amended rules designed to streamline discovery, allowing parties to focus on the merits while making discovery costs more reasonable?  Instead, it seems the rules have spawned more collateral discovery disputes than ever before about preservation, collection and production issues.

As a solution to these costs, the eDiscovery cognoscenti are emphasizing the concept of “proportionality.”  Proportionality typically requires that the benefits of discovery be commensurate with its corresponding burdens.  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the directive that discovery be proportional is found in Rules 26(c), 26(b)(2)(C) and Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  Under Rule 26(c), courts may generally issue protective orders that limit or even proscribe discovery that causes “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”  More specifics are set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which enables courts to restrict discovery if the requests are unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, the discovery can be obtained from an alternative source that is less expensive or burdensome, or the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its benefit.  In the specific context of electronic discovery, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) restricts the discovery of backup tapes and other electronically stored information that are “not reasonably accessible” due to “undue burden or cost.”

Despite the existence of these provisions, they are often bypassed.  The most recent and notable example of this trend is found in Pippins v. KPMG (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011).  In Pippins, the court ordered the defendant accounting firm to continue preserving thousands of employee hard drives.  In so doing, the court sidestepped the firm’s proportionality argument, citing Orbit One v. Numerex (S.D.N.Y. 2010) for the premise that such a standard is “too amorphous” and therefore unworkable.  Regardless of cost or burden, the court reasoned that “prudence” required preservation of all relevant materials “until a more precise definition [of proportionality] is created by rule.”

The Pippins order and its associated costs for the firm – potentially into the millions of dollars – has given new fuel to the argument that an amended federal rule should be implemented to include a more express mandate regarding proportionality.  Surprisingly enough, a blueprint for such an amended rule is already in place in the State of Utah.  Effective November 1, 2011, Utah implemented sweeping changes to civil discovery practice through amended Civil Procedure Rule 26.  The new rule makes proportionality the standard now governing eDiscovery in Utah.

Proportionality Dictates the Scope of Permissible Discovery

Utah Rule 26 has changed the permissible scope of discovery to expressly condition that all discovery meet the standards of proportionality.  That means parties may seek discovery of relevant, non-privileged materials “if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality.”  This effectively shifts the burden of proof on proportionality from the responding party to the requesting party.  Indeed, Utah Rule 26(b)(3) specifically codifies this stunning change:  “The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality and relevance.”  This stands in sharp contrast to Federal Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c), which require the responding party to show the discovery is not proportional.

The “standards of proportionality” that have been read into Utah Rule 26 incorporate those found in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  In addition, Utah Rule 26 requires that discovery be “reasonable.”  Reasonableness is to be determined on the needs of a given case such as the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the complexity and importance of the issues, and the role of the discovery in addressing such issues.  Last but not least, discovery must expressly comply with the cost cutting mandate of Rule 1 and thereby “further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case.”

Proportionality Limits the Amount of Discovery

To further address the burdens and costs of disproportionate discovery, Utah Rule 26(c) limits the amount of discovery that parties may conduct as a matter of right based on the specific amounts in controversy.  For those matters involving damages of $300,000 or more, parties may propound 20 interrogatories, document requests and requests for admissions.  Total fact deposition time is restricted to a mere 30 hours.  For matters between $50,000 and $300,000, those figures are halved.  And for matters under $50,000, only five document requests and requests for admissions are allotted to the parties.  Fact depositions are curtailed to three hours total per side, while interrogatories are eliminated.

If these limits are too restrictive, parties may request “extraordinary discovery” under Rule 26(c)(6).  However, any such request must demonstrate that the sought after discovery is “necessary and proportional” under the rules.  The parties must also certify that a budget for the discovery has been “reviewed and approved.”

A Potential Model for Federal Discovery Rule Amendments

Utah Rule 26 could perhaps serve as a model for amending the scope of permissible discovery under the Federal Rules.  Like Utah Rule 26, Federal Rule 26 could be amended to expressly condition discovery on meeting the principles of proportionality.  The Federal Rules could also be modified to ensure the propounding party always has the burden of demonstrating the fact specific good cause for its discovery.  Doing so would undoubtedly force counsel and client to be more precise with their requests and do away with the current regime of “promiscuous discovery.”  Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223 (1997) (urging courts to “aggressively” curb discovery abuses which, “like a cancerous growth, can destroy a meritorious cause or defense”).

Tiering the amounts of permitted discovery based on alleged damages could also reduce the costs of discovery.  With limited deposition time and fewer document requests, discovery of necessity would likely focus on the merits instead of eDiscovery sideshows.  Coupling this with an “extraordinary discovery” provision would enable courts to exercise greater control over the process and ensure that genuinely complex matters are litigated efficiently.

If all of this seems like a radical departure from established discovery practice, consider that the new Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases has also incorporated tiered and extraordinary discovery provisions.  See DCG Systems v. Checkpoint Technologies (N.D. Ca. Nov. 2, 2011) (adopting the model order and explaining the benefits of limiting eDiscovery in patent cases).

For those who are seeking a vision of how proportionality might be incorporated into the Federal Rules, new Utah Rule 26 could be a blueprint for doing so.

We’ve all heard the phrase that “everything is bigger in Texas” and the little “mini-conference” held in Dallas, TX last Friday was no exception.  The Discovery Subcommittee held a small, one-day conference to tackle some big issues related to preservation and sanctions that could ultimately lead to amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).

The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

To join the conversation and receive automatic updates when new information is posted to this blog, please subscribe to e-discovery 2.0.

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[1] A more exhaustive list of participants and sample questions was incorporated into the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum announcing the mini-conference.  Similarly, the events leading up to the mini-conference are described in more detail as part of my previous postings on the same subject.

If you have been following my previous posts regarding possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), then you know I promised a special interview with former United States Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges.  The timing of the discussion is perfect considering that a “mini-conference” is being hosted by a Federal Rules Discovery Subcommittee today (September 9th) in Dallas, TX.  The debate will focus on whether or not the Rules should be amended to address evidence preservation and sanctions.  I am attending the mini-conference and will summarize my observations as part of my next post.  In the meantime, please enjoy reading the dialogue below for a glimpse into Judge Hedges’ perspective regarding possible Rule amendments.

Nelson: You were recently quoted in a Law Technology News (LTN) article written by Evan Koblentz as saying, “I don’t see a need to amend the rules” because these rules haven’t been around long enough to see what happens.  Isn’t almost five years long enough?

Judge Hedges: No.  For the simple reason that both attorneys and judges continue to need education on the 2006 amendments and, more particularly, they need to understand the technologies that create and store electronic information.  The amendments establish a framework within which attorneys and judges make daily decisions on discovery.  I have not seen any objective evidence that the framework is somehow failing and needs further amendment.

Nelson: You also said the “big problem” is that people don’t talk enough.  What did you mean?  Hasn’t the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation made a difference?

Judge Hedges: The centerpiece of the 2006 amendments (at least in my view) is Rule 26(f).  I think it is fair to say that the legal community’s response to 26(f) has been, to say the least, varied. Civil actions with large volumes of ESI that may be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) cry out for extensive 26(f) meet-and-confer discussions that may take a number of meetings and require the presence of party representatives from, for example, IT.  There is an element of trust required between adversary counsel (with the concurrence of the parties they represent) that may be difficult to establish – but some cooperation is necessary to make 26(f) work.  Overlay that reality with our adversary system and the duty of attorneys to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients and you can understand why cooperation isn’t always a top priority for some attorneys.

However, “transparency” in discussing ESI is essential, along with advocacy and the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality. That’s where the Sedona Conference Proclamation can make a big difference. Has the Proclamation done that? It’s too early to reach a conclusion on that question, but the Proclamation is often cited and, as education progresses in eDiscovery, I am confident that the Proclamation will be recognized as a means to realize the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of litigation, as articulated under Rule 1.

Nelson: You also mentioned that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee might be running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.  Can you explain?

Judge Hedges: There is a distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” rules.  The Rules Enabling Act governs the adoption of the former.  Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an example of a substantive rule that was proposed by the Judicial Conference.  However, since Rule 502 is a rule dealing with substantive privilege and waiver issues, it had to be enacted into law through an Act of Congress.  I am concerned that proposals to further amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may cross the line from procedural to substantive.  I am not prepared to suggest at this time, however, that anything I have seen has crossed the line.  Stay tuned.

Nelson: If you had to select one of the three options currently being considered (see page 264), which option would you select and why?

Judge Hedges: To start, I would not choose option 1, which presumes that the Rules can reach pre-litigation conduct consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.  My concern here is also that, in the area of electronic information, a too-specific rule risks “overnight” obsolescence, just as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, enacted in 1986, is considered by a number of commentators to be, at best, obsolescent.  Note also that I did not use the word “stored” when I mentioned electronic information, as courts have already required that so-called ephemeral information be preserved.  Nor would I choose option 2.  Absent seeing more than the brief description of the category on page 264, it seems to me that option 2 is likely to do nothing more than be a restatement of the existing law on when the duty to preserve is “triggered.”

So, by default, I am forced to choose option 3.  I presume a rule would say something like, “sanctions may not be imposed on a party for loss of ESI (or “EI”) if that party acted reasonably in making preservation decisions.”  There are a number of problems here. First, in a jurisdiction which allows the imposition of at least some sanction for negligence, all the rule would likely do is be interpreted to foreclose “serious” sanctions. Isn’t that correct? Or is the rule intended to supersede existing variances in the law of sanctions?  At that point, does the rule become “substantive”?   Second, how will “reasonableness” be defined?  Reasonableness supposes the existence of a duty – in this case, a duty to preserve.  For example, is there a duty to preserve ephemeral data that a party knows is relevant?  We come back full circle to where we began.

Remember, Rule 37(f) (now 37(e)) was intended to provide some level of protection against the imposition of sanctions, just as the categories are intended to.  Right?  And five years later 37(e) remains defined variously to be a “safe harbor” or a “lighthouse” by some lawyers such as Jonathan Redgrave or an “uncharted minefield” by others like me.

Nelson: What about heightened pleading standards after the Iqbal and Twombly decisions?  Do these decisions have any relevance to electronic discovery and the topic at hand?

Judge Hedges: Let me begin by saying that I am no fan of Twombly or Iqbal. The decisions, however well intended, have led to undue cost and delay all too often.  Not only is motion to dismiss practice costly for parties, but it imposes great burdens on the United States Courts and, as often as not, leads to at least one other round of motion practice as plaintiffs are given leave to re-plead.  All the while, parties have preservation obligations to fulfill and, in the hope of saving expense, discovery is often stayed until a motion is “finally” decided.  I would like to see objective evidence of the delay and cost of this motion practice (and I expect that the Administrative Office of the United States has statistical evidence already).  I would also like to see objective evidence from defendants distinguishing between the cost of motion practice and later discovery costs.

Putting all that aside, and if I had to accept one option, I would choose to allow some discovery that is integrated to the motion practice.  First, even without the filing of a responsive pleading, there should be a 26(f) meet-and-confer to discuss, if nothing else, the nature and scope of preservation and the possibility of securing a Rule 502(d) order. Second, while I have serious concerns about “pre-answer discovery” for a number of reasons, I would have the parties make 26(a)(1) disclosures while a motion to dismiss is pending or leave to re-plead has been granted in order to address the likely “asymmetry of information” between a plaintiff and a moving defendant.  Once the disclosures are made, I would allow the plaintiff to secure some information identified in the disclosures to allow re-pleading and perhaps obviate the need for continued motion practice.

All of this would, of course, require active judicial management.  And one would hope that Congress, which seems so interested in conserving resources, would recognize the vital role of the United States Courts in securing justice for everyone and give adequate funding to the Courts.

In my last post I announced that discussions are taking place that could change the way preservation and sanctions issues are handled within the federal court system.  The next round of discussions about possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is scheduled to take place on September 9th in Dallas, Texas as part of a “mini-conference” led by the Discovery Subcommittee – a committee appointed by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  This post discusses three different rule amendment approaches that attendees have been asked to consider in order to help them prepare for the mini-conference.  A complete list of attendees, preparation materials, and questions the group will consider are included in the Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum to the participants.

The debate about whether or not rule amendments are even required is far from over.  A 452-page document located on the U.S. Courts’ website chronicles many of the meetings, notes, and submissions driving the current discussion.  Page 265 of the document contains a memorandum prepared by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee earlier this year, stating that:

“the Subcommittee has reached no conclusion on whether rule amendments would be a productive way of dealing with preservation/sanctions concerns, much less what amendment proposals would be useful.”

Despite concerns that amending the current rules now would amount to jumping the gun, there is an undeniable desire for more clarity around when the duty to preserve electronically stored information (ESI) is triggered, what must be preserved, and when the duty expires.  This momentum has resulted in the crafting of draft proposals that are likely to help frame the discussion on September 9th. The “proposals” are really draft approaches that have been broken down into three general categories described in the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s memorandum, titled: “PRESERVATION/SANCTIONS ISSUES” (see page 263).  The Category 1 approach can best be described as providing a higher degree of specificity than the other approaches.  For example, the Category 1 approach provides a fairly detailed explanation of the duty to preserve evidence (Rule 26.1(a)) and details possible triggers (26.1(b)), the scope of the duty to preserve (26.1(c)), and sanctions (Rule 37).  Category 2 proposes a more general preservation rule, while Category 3 only addresses sanctions as a tool for influencing behavior.  The three categories are discussed in more detail below.

Category 1: Specific Rule

This draft includes many different exemplary lists, alternative approaches, and footnotes that highlight the fact that one of the key challenges with drafting a specific rule is trying to foresee all of the challenges that might lie in the road ahead.  For example, the draft rule provides a long list of events that could trigger the duty to preserve evidence, including everything from serving a pleading to taking “any other action” in anticipation of litigation.   The rule also provides a list of information types that are “presumptively excluded” from the preservation duty, such as deleted data on hard drives, temporary internet files, and physically damaged media.

The lists are helpful in that they provide guidance.  However, each list also includes a “catch-all” provision to address scenarios that might not be foreseeable.  The inclusion of catch-all provisions highlights the inherent challenge of providing more clarity and certainty without creating rules that are so inflexible that they are difficult to apply to unforeseen factual scenarios or technological developments.  Some might argue that trying to provide a laundry list of examples will make passage of new rules difficult because each item on the list will stir debate.  Others contend that the lists add little value because the catch-all provisions will still require litigators to pass the sniff test of “reasonableness.”

Despite the inherent challenges related to drafting rules with specificity, most practitioners would likely support the inclusion of lists or examples that provide at least some direction.  What is likely to be far more controversial with respect to Category 1 is the use of alternative language proposing fixed limits around custodians and litigation holds.  For example, one alternative would limit data preservation requirements to a fixed number of custodians and the duty to preserve evidence would similarly expire after a fixed number of years.  Bright line rules like these may be easier to understand, but they also tend to be controversial since they lack the flexibility necessary to fairly address every conceivable situation.

Category 2: General Rule

Like the Category 1 proposal, the Category 2 proposal uses lists and outlines several alternative approaches throughout the rule.  However, the Category 2 proposal fundamentally differs from Category 1 by outlining a more general approach.  For example, one of the alternatives essentially states that the duty to preserve evidence is triggered whenever a “reasonable person” would expect to be a party to an action.  Similarly, the ongoing duty to preserve information after the duty has been triggered would be evaluated based on what is described as a “reasonable period” under the circumstances.

The beauty of this more general approach lies in its simplicity and flexibility.  The idea is that evaluating conduct based on the “reasonableness” of a person’s actions is much easier than attempting to draft bright line legal guidelines that account for every possible factual scenario.  The flip side is that reasonable minds could differ and results could be inconsistent if there are no bright line rules.  What this means in the context of the federal rule discussion is that one judge might find a party’s conduct with respect to data preservation efforts reasonable, while another judge might issue sanctions based on the same set of facts.  In large part, it is this lack of certainty and guidance in the current rules that sparked the current debate in the first place.

Category 3: Sanctions-Based Rule

Unlike the first two categories, the Category 3 approach focuses only on sanctions and would act like more of a “back-end” rule.  In other words, the rule would not contain any specific directives about preservation, but it would provide direction in the areas of when and how sanctions might be applied.

Despite the draconian image a “sanctions” based rule might conjure up, the Category 3 rule may seem surprisingly lenient to some.  For example, absent extraordinary circumstances, the court would be prohibited from imposing any of the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b)(2) or from giving an adverse-inference instruction unless:

“the party’s failure to preserve discoverable information was willful or in bad faith and caused [substantial] prejudice in the litigation.”

The sanctions based approach would almost certainly have an impact on how parties handle upstream preservation related issues.  However, the key ingredients that will impact what kind of behavior this rule drives are the severity of the threatened sanction as well as the applicable standard.  For example, a party facing severe sanctions for conduct that is either negligent, willful or in bad faith is likely to take their preservation obligations seriously.  On the other hand, if the realm of possible sanctions is trivial, parties are less likely to take their preservation related obligations seriously.

Conclusion

The three rule approaches represent very early attempts at framing possible approaches to amending the FRCP.  If the Discovery Subcommittee chooses to recommend rule amendments following the September 9th mini-conference in Dallas, the proposed language is likely to be closer to final form and easier to assess than the current proposals.  I will continue to monitor the rule making discussion and provide commentary in future posts.  Stay tuned for my next post where former US Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges explains why he thinks the rule changes are unnecessary and why the current proposals might run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.

There’s a lot of excitement (and corresponding uncertainty) about the recent passing of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (FRE 502), which was signed into law on Sept 19th.  The main reason that the legal community is excited about FRE 502 is because of the potential for cost savings by reducing the amount of money associated with the e-discovery review process, which is routinely viewed as the most expensive area in the entire e-discovery process.

In combination with the codification of a national standard to determine when a privilege has been waived, FRE 502 is primarily designed to make the use of claw-back agreements a truly viable prospect when doing e-discovery privilege review.  It should provide some panacea (ideally) for rapidly escalating e-discovery costs.  Or, at least that was the impetus behind the rule’s creation – according to the Comments:

“The proposed new rule facilitates discovery and reduces privilege-review costs by limiting the circumstances under which the privilege or protection is forfeited, which may happen if the privileged or protected information or material is produced in discovery. The burden and cost of steps to preserve the privileged status of attorney-client information and trial preparation materials can be enormous. Under present practices, lawyers and firms must thoroughly review everything in a client’s possession before responding to discovery requests. Otherwise they risk waiving the privileged status not only of the individual item disclosed but of all other items dealing with the same subject matter. This burden is particularly onerous when the discovery consists of massive amounts of electronically stored information.”

In short, FRE 502 is designed to establish uniform, nationwide standards for waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product protection, with the main goal being to protect producing parties against the inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials or work product in either federal or state proceedings.  The salient section is subsection (b) which states that when a disclosure of privileged information is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal agency, the disclosure does not constitute a waiver if:

1. the disclosure is inadvertent;
2. the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
3. the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).

The end game here is presumably to increasingly leverage automated review methodologies to save costs.  But, in order to facilitate this type of review methodology without taking on unhealthy levels of risk means that claw-back provisions must be as airtight at possible to prevent inadvertent electronically stored information (ESI) productions.  And yet, exactly how FRE 502 will work in practice is up to debate since there isn’t any case law interpreting it yet.

One area that’s top of mind is how this new Rule will impact the recent decisions on e-discovery search, including the Victor Stanley case authored by Chief Magistrate Judge Grimm.  Since FRE 502 contains a core “reasonableness” prong in section (b) it’s likely that Grimm’s proclamation about e-discovery search will still be controlling.  Grimm fundamentally had to evaluate whether the producing party’s search protocols and procedures were in fact reasonable.

“Defendants, who bear the burden of proving that their conduct was reasonable for purposes of assessing whether they waived attorney-client privilege by producing the 165 documents to the Plaintiff, have failed to provide the court with information regarding: the keywords used; the rationale for their selection; the qualifications of M. Pappas and his attorneys to design an effective and reliable search and information retrieval method; whether the search was a simple keyword search, or a more sophisticated one, such as one employing Boolean proximity operators; or whether they analyzed the results of the search to assess its reliability, appropriateness for the task, and the quality of its implementation.” (footnotes omitted).

In Victor Stanley, the producing party wasn’t able to demonstrate reasonableness because they didn’t strategically craft out their strategy nor conduct any sampling to make sure that the e-discovery search worked as designed.  This type of analysis would still seem to come into play under FRE 502 and so, as Grimm states, the use of either a best practices or collaborative approach to e-discovery would seem to be as important as ever.

Given that backdrop it’s just as important as ever that parties “show their work” when it comes to e-discovery search.   Whether FRE 502 will really make parties feel safe enough to use automated review processes (thereby reducing costs) will remain to be seen.  But, this first step which unifies standards and expectations is at least a very positive step.

There have been several recent press releases from enterprise software companies proclaiming FRCP “compliance,” which certainly sounds appealing.  But, the use of that term begs the question:  how does a litigation support software search technology (or methodology) become FRCP “compliant” and is that goal even possible?

IBM launched the first salvo:

“The software will allow companies to move from scattered, point-solution approaches to a disciplined approach that controls electronic information, helps support Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) compliance,…”

Learn more about ediscovery software.

And, Autonomy quickly followed suit:

“The Autonomy pan-enterprise search platform automates the retrieval, processing, and management of all information throughout a global organization irrespective of languages, operating systems, and file types, avoiding non-FRCP compliant search techniques.”

I’m more than tolerant of both puffery and marketing-speak (though woe to those who forward such releases to Monica Bay), but this notion of “FRCP compliance” seems to take advantage of an already bombarded buying public, who have likely grown weary of FRCP articles, CLEs, and maybe even blogs posts.  Nevertheless, it seems useful to really tease out what the FRCP means and does not mean in relationship to e-discovery and enterprise search.

So, in an attempt to debunk this “compliance” myth, I thought I’d devote this blog post to demystifying some of the inaccurate notions about the frcp electronic discovery.

Federal First

Initially, it’s important to note that the Rules only apply to litigation within the United States Federal court system.  State court litigation, international lawsuits, arbitrations and administrative actions (just to name a few) aren’t under the aegis of the Rules.  While it’s true that certain state courts (Minnesota for example) have selectively adopted the new discovery provisions, most have not.  So, the first step is to check your venue.  Then, assuming the Rules do apply because your organization is in Federal litigation, the impact, while still not crystal clear, does take on more definition.

Relevancy Filters

As a starting place, the discovery process (as part of litigation) is fundamentally limited by Rule 26 to information (electronic and otherwise) that is “relevant” to the case at hand (i.e., “relevant to the claim or defense of any party”).  This distinction is critical because for the most part it prevents the responding party from having to cast a company wide net for all data, a task envisioned by many content management systems.   Certainly, the ability of certain litigation support software systems to access all user created data is valuable when searching for relevant data, but there are many ways to skin that cat.

No Express Retention or Preservation Duties

Legions of articles proclaim that the amended Rules create wholly new duties to retain information in general, as well as infusing new duties to preserve electronic data once litigation is anticipated.  Instead however, the new Rules expressly disavow creating truly new retention or preservation duties.  While it is undoubtedly a good practice to have a retention policy, given the welter of statutes and regulations that do create retention duties, the Rules do not mandate that a company create one ahead of litigation. Read more about electronic data discovery.

What is true, however, is that the new Rules have powerful implications for preservation once litigation is likely because of the requirements to understand, negotiate and produce relevant information early in the litigation process.  Under the new Rules, it is critical to be able to identify and retain potentially relevant data once litigation is filed (or is “reasonably likely”).  And yet, the burden of placing a legal “hold” on data, while often significant, certainly can be achieved without a formal document retention/deletion policy.  Again, the litigation “trigger” is key.

“Records” Aren’t the Focus

Continuing on this theme, but in a slightly different vector, there are differing opinions about the impact that the Rules have on “business records.”  This issue is nebulous since during litigation discovery, it is easy to confuse potentially relevant data corresponding to litigation with “business records,” which are often used in two different contexts.  Initially, there is the “business records” exception to the hearsay rule, which is quite specific and affects the admissibility of evidence in court.

The second, broader definition applies to organizations as they attempt to define a records management program to meet the numerous state, local and Federal mandates.  Commonly, as part of this complex initiative, companies will create records retention programs that specifically define official “records,” unofficial “records,” “non-records,” as well as specific retention periods for certain types of records.  Once the company’s records protocol is put into place there may be some downstream nexus with the Rules, but it won’t manifest itself until Federal court litigation arises, as described above.   The most common intersection occurs when a records retention policy prescribes a deletion event that contradicts the legal “hold” requirements for a record that is likely to be relevant to litigation.

In sum, the foregoing describes the role the FRCP plays in Federal court litigation.  It should be clear that the important, yet relatively narrow, use cases do not include any general compliance mandate in the absence of specific litigation.  I think it’s important to separate myth from reality when it comes to understanding how and when the revised Rules really do come into play.  Failure to do so can create an unpleasant scenario where your organization will either under- or over-prepare for these important litigation guidelines.