e-discovery 2.0

Many people, including me, have written about how our current economic malaise will likely drive a wave of regulation and litigation that, in the long-term, will increase the need for electronic discovery solutions. But in the short-term, we are facing a severe recession and – as some readers have pointed out to me over email – that may have a dampening effect because of smaller legal budgets. Recent events present a mixed picture. On the one hand, law firms like Heller Ehrman, Thelen, and Dreier have collapsed and FTI has missed its revenue targets. On the other, many e-discovery software companies and litigation support service providers are growing at a rapid clip.

My own research, which has involved talking to dozens of attorneys, litigation support professionals, and in-house counsels, suggests a more nuanced picture, with the recession spurring changes to the type of electronic discovery that’s being conducted. Consider the following data points:

• According to a practice leader at a large e-discovery consulting firm, “discretionary litigation” such as many IP-related matters is down significantly, as firms are less inclined to fight every patent claim. But conversely, litigation related to the financial crisis, and regulatory inquiries from bodies such as the SEC and the FDIC, are up.

• According to a partner at a major law firm, second requests are down, along with M&A activity generally. The example he gave is the car industry: a year ago, if Chrysler had talked of merging with GM, there would have been all sorts of anti-trust concerns; today, the government is likely to encourage the deal. But on the other side of the coin, there are a lot more contract disputes as companies cannot live up to commitments they made in better times.

• According to a GC at a leading technology company, his CFO has become intensely interested in e-discovery as potential area for cost savings. As a result, the in-house legal team is actively evaluating in-house solutions to both lower costs and increase predictability.

I could go on with many more, similar anecdotes, but the themes coming out of these conversations are the same. More and more enterprises are waking up to electronic discovery as a way to make their cost savings targets for 2009. These are value-oriented buyers, who want cost effective solutions with a predictable fee structure. They are more cautious about what kind of litigation to pursue and are more inclined to settle cases where possible. That suggests more early case analysis, as a pre-cursor to settlement talks, but less document-by-document linear review, since fewer cases make it to the stage where linear review is necessary.

These shifts in the type of e-discovery being done will have a big impact on the vendor landscape. It promises to be a very interesting new year.

To the casual observer, it is surprising that a small private company (AccessData) could even think of acquiring a larger, public one (Guidance Software). But that’s exactly what AccessData publicly proposed to Guidance’s shareholders on November 6, after Guidance’s board had rejected its offer of $4.50 per share.

Leaving aside the personalities involved, and the history of bitter rivalry between these two companies, it’s easy to see why Guidance’s board rejected the offer. First, it’s only a 19% premium over Guidance’s share price on October 6, the date that the offer was made. Second, given 23 million shares outstanding, AccessData is offering a total price of just over $100 million for a company with $90 million in revenue and about $25 million in cash. Compare that to other e-discovery acquisitions, such as FTI’s $88 million purchase of Attenex or Iron Mountain’s $158 million deal for Stratify, each of which only had about 30% of Guidance’s revenue, and you cannot help feeling that the price is very low. Third, there’s the question of where AccessData will come up with the money. It’s hard to believe they happen to have $100 million in cash lying around and, with the recent market meltdown, debt is much less of an option than it used to be.

Still, this is not necessarily bad news for Guidance Software. Since its IPO in October 2006, the stock has fallen from a high of $17 per share to a low of $2 per share. The public markets are very unforgiving to small software companies. Guidance has recently made some bold moves, announcing usage-based pricing for its e-discovery product and several notable customer wins, but nothing has moved the stock. So an acquisition offer may be just the ticket to boost the share price, especially if it encourages other, more attractive acquirers to throw their hats into the ring.

Stay tuned, this might get interesting.

Earlier today, Gartner published its eDiscovery MarketScope for 2009. Written by Debra Logan, John Bace, and Whit Andrews, it is perhaps the most comprehensive “buyers guide” available for companies interested in using electronic discovery technology to lower costs.

The eDiscovery MarketScope analyzes about 20 software companies focused on electronic data discovery. Based on extensive interviews with end customers and data from the companies themselves, Gartner rates the companies using criteria similar to those used in its famous Magic Quadrant reports. It also identifies market trends, and makes predictions for 2009 and beyond.

This report is required reading for anyone considering an investment in eDiscovery software, and I strongly recommend that you get a copy, either from Gartner or some other authorized source. To give you a flavor for Gartner’s analysis, a few of its main conclusions are as follows:

1. Bringing eDiscovery In-House Dramatically Reduces Cost

This is a claim that electronic discovery software vendors often make, and prospective customers rightly question. Gartner investigates and finds that many of its corporate clients are saving large amounts of money by using eDiscovery software to reduce the amount they spend on lawyers and legal service providers. It reports that customers typically recover their money from buying eDiscovery software within 3-6 months of implementation.

2. There’s No Single, End-To-End Solution For eDiscovery

Gartner addresses what is probably the most common question I get asked by corporate counsels and litigation support managers – namely, “Isn’t there a single product I can buy that will do end-to-end eDiscovery, covering all aspects of the EDRM?” The answer, of course, is “no” and Gartner goes further by predicting that the answer will remain “no” until at least 2011. So, for the foreseeable future, customers will need to buy best-of-breed products from different vendors for different stages of the EDRM model, and ensure they integrate smoothly.

3. There Are 4 Leading eDiscovery Software Companies

List of vendors achieving highest rating of “strong positive” (from Figure 2, page 10)

Of all the companies it analyzed, Gartner only gives 4 its highest rating of “strong positive”. Each of the four has different strengths. For processing, analysis and review, Clearwell is “fast-to-install and easy-to-use” (page 12) , while FTI’s ability to offer Attenex / RingTail either hosted or on-premise “positions it well for the future” (page 13) . Symantec’s leadership in email archiving makes Discovery Accelerator a good option for its customers who need to search and export data from Enterprise Vault. Finally, Zylab is well-known within law-enforcement circles and has a strong presence in Europe and Asia.

4. There Will Be Consolidation In The Next 12 Months

As the market matures, Gartner predicts that as many as 25% of eDiscovery software providers will either merge, be acquired, or exit the business. Access Data’s ambitious bid for Guidance has publicly put Guidance in play. Beyond that, Gartner suggests that Kazeon and several other players are all likely acquisition targets for larger companies wishing to enter the eDiscovery space.

Of course, Gartner is not the only influential voice in eDiscovery. Earlier this year, George Socha and Tom Gelbmann published their Socha-Gelbmann Survey, which also provides a valuable perspective on the market. How do the two reports compare? That will be the subject of my next post.

Yesterday, George Socha and Tom Gelbmann published summary results for their 2008 EDD survey. George and Tom gathered self-reported data from 85 e-discovery service providers and 40 e-discovery litigation software companies. To help vendors resist the temptation to “exaggerate” their accomplishments, they then cross-referenced the responses against independent surveys submitted by 29 law firms and 19 corporations, and applied a healthy dose of their own good judgment. The outcome, which they will publish in-full next month, is a great snapshot of the industry, and probably the most objective ranking of e-discovery vendors that you can find.

By comparing this year’s results to the 2007 survey, you get a sense for how much has changed in the e-discovery world over the past 12 months:

Top E-Discovery Software Companies

Note: arrows show change to rankings from last year’s Socha-Gelbmann Survey

Autonomy and Clearwell move up to the Top 5, overtaking Attenex and CT Summation which slip back to the second tier. There are also 3 new names ranked 6 through 10 (Epiq, iConect and Symantec) who displace Cataphora, Doculex, ISYS, and Oracle, none of whom even make it into the top 15. In other words, 70% of the rankings have changed since last year.

If a litigation support manager were to focus only on the Top 5 in making her e-discovery software decision, she would have a choice of some very different solutions. Autonomy positions itself as a high-end (expensive) platform for corporations, while Lexis offers a comprehensive toolset for law firms. Guidance and Clearwell are complementary in that both provide best-of-breed solutions for parts of the EDRM model: Guidance is the leader in collection and preservation, while Clearwell is the leader in processing, analysis and review. Finally, FTI takes a services-based approach which centers around RingTail, its hosted review application.

Looking lower down the list, there were some other interesting results, primarily around which companies were NOT ranked. Kazeon made it into the third tier (ranked 11-15) whereas StoredIQ, its main competitor, did not. Nor did Recommind break into the rankings, despite making a major push into e-discovery from knowledge management over the past year. But the most striking absentees are PSS Systems and Exterro, which have pioneered litigation hold management for Fortune 100 companies. I can only guess that they cover too much of niche market to warrant inclusion in an industry-wide report.

Top E-Discovery Service Providers

In contrast to the world of software, e-discovery services saw much less movement in this year’s rankings:

Note: arrows show change to rankings from last year’s Socha-Gelbmann Survey

There was only one change to the top 5: Fios moved up, displacing Guidance which plummeted 10-20 places down to a 16-25 ranking. In addition, there were two new players in the top 10, Epiq and Huron, who edged out Electronic Evidence Discovery and Ernst & Young.

Conclusion

Changes to the software rankings reflect broader changes in the litigation software market. As litigation discovery has moved in-house, corporations have become a major driver of purchase decisions that were previously left to law firms. Many software companies, such as Attenex, have struggled to make this transition, while others, such as Clearwell, have capitalized on it. There has been no such change in the service provider world and, as a result, the rankings are relatively stable.

It will be interesting to see what happens next year. Every other software space is dominated by a small number of players, like Oracle for databases or VMWare for virtualization. If the same is true for e-discovery, then we can expect many fewer changes to the software rankings in future surveys as the leaders pull away from the pack.

I knew the rumors about FTI’s acquisition of Attenex were true when we received a call in early May. It was from a large Attenex partner, who said: “We need to switch out Attenex no later than the end of June.” There have been many similar calls since then; as one service provider told us the other day, “I cannot imagine any Attenex partner not looking for other alternatives.”

The reason is obvious: Attenex Advantage partners – such as BDO Seidman, Deloitte & Touche, DiscoverReady, DTI Global Document Technologies, Forensic Consulting Solutions, Navigant Consulting, SPI Litigation Direct, VMAX Consulting and 10-15 others – compete directly with FTI. If they must now rely on FTI for their Attenex technology, it puts them at a massive disadvantage when competing for business. FTI could easily undercut them on price, since it no longer pays usage fees to Attenex; or, FTI could promise additional features in the Attenex product that its competition cannot match. It could certainly claim to be the world’s greatest Attenex experts (after all, who knows Attenex better than Attenex itself?). Perhaps worst of all, every time an Attenex Advantage partner works on a client using the Attenex product, it has to inform FTI at the end of the month so that it may be invoiced for usage, thus enabling FTI to track its client engagements.

Yes, FTI will likely make all sorts of promises about “Chinese Walls” and continuing to support other Attenex Advantage partners. But those promises are impossible to enforce (ask the editor of the Wall Street Journal!), and FTI could change its mind at any time, leaving service providers which depend on Attenex in the lurch. I don’t know anyone who would take that risk.

So the single greatest impact of the FTI-Attenex deal is that every other “Attenex Dis-Advantaged” partner needs to find an alternative e-discovery solution – and fast!

A second impact can be surmised from the market’s reaction to the deal. As the chart shows, FTI’s stock immediately popped 10%, adding about $300 million to its market capitalization. Partly, that’s because FTI negotiated such a great deal. It purchased Attenex for only 3.5x revenue, in a transaction that is neutral/accretive to earnings. Partly, it’s because FTI has a great track record with software acquisitions. For example, it acquired RingTail (a hosted review platform) in 2005 for $34 million, and today RingTail generates over 3 times that amount in revenue. Personally speaking, I have always been impressed by FTI’s team which is without doubt among the best in the business.

The interesting thing in this acquisition, unlike many others, is that the value will not come from selling the acquired product, since FTI is doing that already. In fact, FTI has been selling Attenex for years, and has even integrated it with RingTail. Rather, my guess is that FTI will use Attenex to grow its consulting business in several ways, such as:

1. By convincing clients to switch consulting firms, not technology. Let’s take a hypothetical example and say Ford is presently using Attenex through LECG. If LECG now uses a different electronic data discovery solution, then Ford is left with a choice: keep LECG and lose Attenex, or change from LECG to FTI and keep Attenex. Ford’s decision will, of course, be driven by many factors, and it will be interesting to see what happens in scenarios like this.
2. By winning a greater share of e-discovery dollars. Today, companies primarily engage FTI on life-threatening issues: stock option investigations, merger 2nd requests from the DoJ/FTC, and so on. By leveraging Attenex’s brand, FTI might extend that to also cover everyday e-discovery issues like run-of-the-mill litigation and regulatory inquiries.
3. By building an e-discovery footprint behind the enterprise firewall. Attenex has struggled to sell its product for on-premise deployment at enterprise customers in the past. Its website has no customer logos and I’m only aware of a couple of installations, neither of which is publicly reference-able. FTI’s strong consulting business might help change that and make it easier for enterprises to adopt Attenex.

I am sure there are other ways for FTI to get value from the deal that I am not smart enough to think of. My point is that, given FTI’s leadership talent and the scope of its consulting engagements, there are lots of things FTI could do with Attenex to create shareholder value far in excess of the acquisition price. That’s why I believe the second impact of the deal is that it will have a positive impact on FTI’s core business.

Assuming that you can buy each company for the same price, which would you acquire?

Company A has been in business 3 years, has 25 customers, no brand to speak of, and did about $5 million in revenue in the prior year; or,

Company B has been in business 7 years, has over 100 customers, a strong brand in its market, and is doing $25 million in annual revenue?

“No brainer,” you say, “obviously, Company B.” So it is that FTI looks to have got a great deal buying Attenex (Company B) today for $88 million, whereas Seagate looks like it grossly overpaid for Metalincs (Company A) which it bought for $82 million in December 2007. But things are not always as they appear, and there are good reasons why litigation support software company Attenex has sold for a paltry 3.5x revenue, a multiple well below the 16x commanded by Metalincs or even the 5x revenue that Iron Mountain paid for Stratify.

Three forces reduced Attenex’s acquisition price. The first is that FTI accounted for a large proportion of Attenex’s revenue. That gave FTI leverage over Attenex since it could say, “sell to us for $88 million, or we will take our business elsewhere, your revenue will plummet, and the value of your business will be greatly reduced.” This power that FTI had over Attenex made it the only logical acquirer, so there could be no pressure from other bidders to raise the purchase price.

The second force depressing Attenex’s valuation is that its revenue will likely decline post acquisition as Attenex’s partners (who compete with FTI) switch from Attenex to other solutions. Software investors value growth above all else – and are willing to pay up for it. For example, Bladelogic, an unprofitable software company, went public last year at a $500 million valuation with less trailing revenue than Attenex. But it did $62 million in revenue the following year (Bladelogic sold to BMC Software for $800 million in April 2008). Attenex, by contrast, will see declining revenue in the next 12 months.

Finally, acquirers worried that, since Attenex’s revenue comes almost entirely from its hosted offering via service providers, its revenue was more volatile than enterprise-oriented e-discovery software companies. This is due to the fact that customers (typically, law firms) purchase Attenex-powered services on a case-by-case basis and can switch away at any time. Enterprises, in contrast, purchase long-term software contracts that will not vary based on short-term changes in case volume.

Once these factors are taken into account, the price and the multiple start to look a lot better. Attenex’s founders, who are some of the pioneers of the e-discovery industry, get some well-earned liquidity; the venture investors make a decent return; and, employees get to join a professionally-run company that compensates its people well. My congratulations to the Attenex team, and to FTI which has negotiated a great deal.

Of course, all this says nothing about the deal’s impact on the broader e-discovery market. That will be the subject of my next post.