e-discovery 2.0

When I first started working in the electronic discovery industry, I quickly learned two things about Summation: it has a huge installed base of law firm customers, and they all dislike using Summation’s products. It was feedback from these unhappy customers that led companies like Clearwell and kCura/Relativity to enter the review market, and the results are plain to see. While Clearwell and kCura/Relativity are both growing rapidly, Summation has suffered years of declining revenue.

Several people have pointed to poor marketing as the problem, and it’s true most customers are confused. Summation’s products all have different names (iBlaze, Discovery Cracker, CaseVault, CaseVantage), and it is unclear how they relate to one another. But the problem is more fundamental than just marketing. There has been no innovation from Summation for years; its products are difficult to use; and, they don’t integrate with each other. So, naturally, customers switch to more compelling solutions, revenue declines, management cuts costs, talented people leave, service levels deteriorate, more customers defect, and the cycle repeats.

As the management teams at Silicon Graphics, Siebel, or Yahoo! can tell you, once a technology company faces this death spiral, it’s very, very hard to turn things around. But that’s exactly what AccessData must do for its recent acquisition of Summation to work.

On the face of it, you would not expect AccessData to be capable of addressing Summation’s problems. As the #2 player in the forensics market to Guidance Software, it has no experience in legal review. Its customers are enterprises and government agencies, not law firms or litigation support service providers. Its headquarters is in Lindon (Utah), whereas Summation based is in San Francisco. But AccessData has a capable team, and must have some plan in mind. What is it likely to do? My guess is as follows:

• Claim “end-to-end” in the enterprise market: AccessData will likely bundle the iBlaze review platform with its own forensic collection products (FTK) and claim end-to-end coverage of the EDRM model. The products obviously don’t integrate with one another, or even have the same UI, but some customers may not realize how important that is until after they have purchased. This is the same strategy used by Autonomy, which also puts together disparate products (Aungate, Introspect, etc.) and markets them as an integrated package.

• Promote CaseVault and CaseVantage in the law firm market: These hosted review platforms are not widely used. AccessData will be hoping that with better marketing and sales execution, it can drive adoption of them by law firms and litigation support service providers. But most providers today seem pretty happy with Clearwell and/or kCura Relativity, so it’s unclear why they would switch away to CaseVault / CaseVantage.

• Cut costs: On the day the acquisition closed last month, AccessData fired most of Summation’s engineers. That’s understandable, given the shrinking revenue. But it only accelerates the death spiral. With no engineers, it’s impossible to innovate or improve the products.

• Sunset iBlaze product lines: This sounds radical since, according to Katey Wood at the451 Group, iBlaze accounts for 70% of Summation’s revenue. But AccessData may decide to focus its development efforts on CaseVault and CaseVantage, ceasing all investment in iBlaze. Effectively, this means it would “milk” the law firms using iBlaze, and pitch enterprises a product with no real roadmap for improvement. Given how far iBlaze has fallen behind, there is a strong argument that further investments are probably just throwing good money after bad.

It will take a few months before we can say for sure whether these, or other, changes will make any difference. If the experience of other companies is any guide, they may slow the decline for a while, but not reverse it. After all, there may be some people out there using Silicon Graphics computers to access their Siebel CRM systems or search the web on Yahoo, just like there will be some using Summation’s products for document review. But there are fewer and fewer every day.

It’s been a little over a month since the news first broke that Guidance Software was the frog in an electronic discovery kettle whose water had just reached the boiling point, with the arbitrator in an employment case demanding, “I want this game-playing stopped.” We thought that, with a little time between the initial story and now, it would be worth taking a step back and looking at possible lessons learned — not so much for Guidance specifically, but for enterprises who find themselves in similar situations, as well as the electronic discovery community that serves them.

First, a quick summary. Based on published accounts, it seems like a classic discovery situation (that’s just plain old discovery, without the “e”): a party is sued and fails to produce a document that, lo and behold, surfaces via some other source, throwing the integrity of the sued party into question. After all, if one potentially incriminating document wasn’t discovered, then who knows what else could be out there?

Guidance contended that it did everything that was required of it, and that it didn’t have (or couldn’t find, despite good faith efforts) the emails in question. But, of course, that didn’t stop the litigation support community (via forums such as the Litigation Support List) from pouncing on the perceived hypocrisy.

After all, how could a leading, publically-traded electronic discovery company get caught up in such a mess? How could their cutting-edge electronic discovery technology not have saved them? Or their (hopefully) best-in-class internal electronic discovery processes? If the electronic discovery companies don’t have their acts together, what about all the other poor souls who lack their knowledge and expertise?

That last question is a scary one, particularly given today’s environment, and it’s why the situation has stirred up so much chatter out in the electronic discovery blogosphere. Almost without exception, commenters have jumped to one of two conclusions. Either (a) Guidance has not followed proper e-discovery best practices, or (b) Guidance has willfully chosen to hide relevant documents that it could have produced, because they would be detrimental to its case.

Let’s explore each of those conclusions in a little more detail.

First, is there any direct evidence that Guidance did not follow electronic discovery best practices? The answer there is murky. Certainly, from Guidance’s perspective, the answer is a resounding “no”. They continue to claim that the emails that were produced from another source did not exist on the various laptops, desktops, and servers that were part of the initial discovery request, and it is certainly possible that that is true. Perhaps Guidance had a 1-year retention policy for emails, and the emails in question were outside of that policy. Perhaps the individuals involved had legitimately deleted the emails in question prior to receiving a litigation hold notice, without thinking that they would ever be relevant to a legal matter. Certainly an independent observer has grounds for incredulity here, but it does not necessarily follow that Guidance did not follow electronic discovery best practices for a company of their size and resources. Certainly, from the reports, they did not exactly act in a way that earned much confidence from or favor with the arbitrator. However, that’s a completely different issue, and one which may be a legitimate tactical decision by Guidance (to avoid, for example, the high cost of recovering the corrupt backup tapes).

Second, what if Guidance willfully chose to hide relevant documents? At this point, there is no evidence that this is the case. And, you would think that of all of the companies out there, Guidance would be keenly aware of the extremely high level of risk associated with this strategy. A company well-versed in computer forensics understands keenly that the odds of any potentially negative emails not being out there, somewhere, in cyberspace are incredibly small. Thus there is little incentive to intentionally hide documents. If, however, a company did make such a perilous and unethical decision, it has nothing to do with a lack of e-discovery best practices or technology: it simply has to do with a lack of ethics.

So, has the coverage of the Guidance situation been nothing more than an electronic discovery witch hunt? Far from it… even if both of the “conventional wisdom” conclusions are in fact wrong.

Why? Because even if Guidance has its electronic discovery house in order and is acting with complete integrity, if there’s one thing that anyone in the electronic discovery business should have taken away from the last 5 years of court rulings, it’s that perception and transparency in electronic discovery is everything. Electronic discovery is technically complex and fraught with challenges, and companies – particularly those who are perceived as having vast expertise in the space, whether as vendors (i.e. Guidance) or institutions (i.e. pick your favorite TARP recipient) – have to act in such a way as to appear spotless before the court of law and the court of public opinion.

Assuming you already have your electronic discovery house in relative order (a baseline, fundamental requirement for doing business today), perhaps the most important take-away from Guidance is how carefully you need to consider how minor electronic discovery slip-ups, whether real or perceived, can bite, big time. The legal and media environment is primed to pounce on any hint of a cover-up or conspiracy, and enterprises must go the extra mile (or two, or three…) to ensure that their e-discovery efforts are, and will be perceived, as upright, ethical, and above reproach – or be ready and willing to pay the price in sanctions or loss of public confidence.

To the casual observer, it is surprising that a small private company (AccessData) could even think of acquiring a larger, public one (Guidance Software). But that’s exactly what AccessData publicly proposed to Guidance’s shareholders on November 6, after Guidance’s board had rejected its offer of $4.50 per share.

Leaving aside the personalities involved, and the history of bitter rivalry between these two companies, it’s easy to see why Guidance’s board rejected the offer. First, it’s only a 19% premium over Guidance’s share price on October 6, the date that the offer was made. Second, given 23 million shares outstanding, AccessData is offering a total price of just over $100 million for a company with $90 million in revenue and about $25 million in cash. Compare that to other e-discovery acquisitions, such as FTI’s $88 million purchase of Attenex or Iron Mountain’s $158 million deal for Stratify, each of which only had about 30% of Guidance’s revenue, and you cannot help feeling that the price is very low. Third, there’s the question of where AccessData will come up with the money. It’s hard to believe they happen to have $100 million in cash lying around and, with the recent market meltdown, debt is much less of an option than it used to be.

Still, this is not necessarily bad news for Guidance Software. Since its IPO in October 2006, the stock has fallen from a high of $17 per share to a low of $2 per share. The public markets are very unforgiving to small software companies. Guidance has recently made some bold moves, announcing usage-based pricing for its e-discovery product and several notable customer wins, but nothing has moved the stock. So an acquisition offer may be just the ticket to boost the share price, especially if it encourages other, more attractive acquirers to throw their hats into the ring.

Stay tuned, this might get interesting.

Yesterday, George Socha and Tom Gelbmann published summary results for their 2008 EDD survey. George and Tom gathered self-reported data from 85 e-discovery service providers and 40 e-discovery litigation software companies. To help vendors resist the temptation to “exaggerate” their accomplishments, they then cross-referenced the responses against independent surveys submitted by 29 law firms and 19 corporations, and applied a healthy dose of their own good judgment. The outcome, which they will publish in-full next month, is a great snapshot of the industry, and probably the most objective ranking of e-discovery vendors that you can find.

By comparing this year’s results to the 2007 survey, you get a sense for how much has changed in the e-discovery world over the past 12 months:

Top E-Discovery Software Companies

Note: arrows show change to rankings from last year’s Socha-Gelbmann Survey

Autonomy and Clearwell move up to the Top 5, overtaking Attenex and CT Summation which slip back to the second tier. There are also 3 new names ranked 6 through 10 (Epiq, iConect and Symantec) who displace Cataphora, Doculex, ISYS, and Oracle, none of whom even make it into the top 15. In other words, 70% of the rankings have changed since last year.

If a litigation support manager were to focus only on the Top 5 in making her e-discovery software decision, she would have a choice of some very different solutions. Autonomy positions itself as a high-end (expensive) platform for corporations, while Lexis offers a comprehensive toolset for law firms. Guidance and Clearwell are complementary in that both provide best-of-breed solutions for parts of the EDRM model: Guidance is the leader in collection and preservation, while Clearwell is the leader in processing, analysis and review. Finally, FTI takes a services-based approach which centers around RingTail, its hosted review application.

Looking lower down the list, there were some other interesting results, primarily around which companies were NOT ranked. Kazeon made it into the third tier (ranked 11-15) whereas StoredIQ, its main competitor, did not. Nor did Recommind break into the rankings, despite making a major push into e-discovery from knowledge management over the past year. But the most striking absentees are PSS Systems and Exterro, which have pioneered litigation hold management for Fortune 100 companies. I can only guess that they cover too much of niche market to warrant inclusion in an industry-wide report.

Top E-Discovery Service Providers

In contrast to the world of software, e-discovery services saw much less movement in this year’s rankings:

Note: arrows show change to rankings from last year’s Socha-Gelbmann Survey

There was only one change to the top 5: Fios moved up, displacing Guidance which plummeted 10-20 places down to a 16-25 ranking. In addition, there were two new players in the top 10, Epiq and Huron, who edged out Electronic Evidence Discovery and Ernst & Young.

Conclusion

Changes to the software rankings reflect broader changes in the litigation software market. As litigation discovery has moved in-house, corporations have become a major driver of purchase decisions that were previously left to law firms. Many software companies, such as Attenex, have struggled to make this transition, while others, such as Clearwell, have capitalized on it. There has been no such change in the service provider world and, as a result, the rankings are relatively stable.

It will be interesting to see what happens next year. Every other software space is dominated by a small number of players, like Oracle for databases or VMWare for virtualization. If the same is true for e-discovery, then we can expect many fewer changes to the software rankings in future surveys as the leaders pull away from the pack.