e-discovery 2.0

A federal jury returned a stunning, $919 million verdict yesterday for DuPont in a trade secret theft case.  In E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Kolon Industries, the verdict was the culmination of a two-and-a-half year battle that DuPont waged against Kolon Industries to prove that Kolon had misappropriated key aspects of its formula for Kevlar®.

The court delivered a decisive blow shortly before trial when it found that Kolon had destroyed emails and other electronically stored information linking it to the trade secret theft.  The sanction for that spoliation was an instruction to the jury that Kolon executives and employees had deleted key evidence after the company’s preservation duty was triggered.

The verdict against Kolon is just the beginning of its problems.  DuPont will now request over $50 million in punitive damages from Kolon, another $30 million for reimbursement of its attorney fees and a permanent injunction forbidding Kolon from using the stolen trade secrets.  Not surprisingly, Kolon’s stock dropped 15% after news of the verdict reached the markets today.

The eDiscovery sanctions order and corresponding verdict make it clear that organizations should invest the time and effort to properly prepare for litigation and discovery.  As we argued in our previous post on the DuPont case, having the right tools in place could have prevented much of the spoliation – and the resulting instruction to the jury – that occurred in the DuPont case.

We’ve all heard the phrase that “everything is bigger in Texas” and the little “mini-conference” held in Dallas, TX last Friday was no exception.  The Discovery Subcommittee held a small, one-day conference to tackle some big issues related to preservation and sanctions that could ultimately lead to amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).

The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

To join the conversation and receive automatic updates when new information is posted to this blog, please subscribe to e-discovery 2.0.

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[1] A more exhaustive list of participants and sample questions was incorporated into the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum announcing the mini-conference.  Similarly, the events leading up to the mini-conference are described in more detail as part of my previous postings on the same subject.

If you have been following my previous posts regarding possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), then you know I promised a special interview with former United States Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges.  The timing of the discussion is perfect considering that a “mini-conference” is being hosted by a Federal Rules Discovery Subcommittee today (September 9th) in Dallas, TX.  The debate will focus on whether or not the Rules should be amended to address evidence preservation and sanctions.  I am attending the mini-conference and will summarize my observations as part of my next post.  In the meantime, please enjoy reading the dialogue below for a glimpse into Judge Hedges’ perspective regarding possible Rule amendments.

Nelson: You were recently quoted in a Law Technology News (LTN) article written by Evan Koblentz as saying, “I don’t see a need to amend the rules” because these rules haven’t been around long enough to see what happens.  Isn’t almost five years long enough?

Judge Hedges: No.  For the simple reason that both attorneys and judges continue to need education on the 2006 amendments and, more particularly, they need to understand the technologies that create and store electronic information.  The amendments establish a framework within which attorneys and judges make daily decisions on discovery.  I have not seen any objective evidence that the framework is somehow failing and needs further amendment.

Nelson: You also said the “big problem” is that people don’t talk enough.  What did you mean?  Hasn’t the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation made a difference?

Judge Hedges: The centerpiece of the 2006 amendments (at least in my view) is Rule 26(f).  I think it is fair to say that the legal community’s response to 26(f) has been, to say the least, varied. Civil actions with large volumes of ESI that may be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) cry out for extensive 26(f) meet-and-confer discussions that may take a number of meetings and require the presence of party representatives from, for example, IT.  There is an element of trust required between adversary counsel (with the concurrence of the parties they represent) that may be difficult to establish – but some cooperation is necessary to make 26(f) work.  Overlay that reality with our adversary system and the duty of attorneys to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients and you can understand why cooperation isn’t always a top priority for some attorneys.

However, “transparency” in discussing ESI is essential, along with advocacy and the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality. That’s where the Sedona Conference Proclamation can make a big difference. Has the Proclamation done that? It’s too early to reach a conclusion on that question, but the Proclamation is often cited and, as education progresses in eDiscovery, I am confident that the Proclamation will be recognized as a means to realize the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of litigation, as articulated under Rule 1.

Nelson: You also mentioned that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee might be running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.  Can you explain?

Judge Hedges: There is a distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” rules.  The Rules Enabling Act governs the adoption of the former.  Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an example of a substantive rule that was proposed by the Judicial Conference.  However, since Rule 502 is a rule dealing with substantive privilege and waiver issues, it had to be enacted into law through an Act of Congress.  I am concerned that proposals to further amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may cross the line from procedural to substantive.  I am not prepared to suggest at this time, however, that anything I have seen has crossed the line.  Stay tuned.

Nelson: If you had to select one of the three options currently being considered (see page 264), which option would you select and why?

Judge Hedges: To start, I would not choose option 1, which presumes that the Rules can reach pre-litigation conduct consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.  My concern here is also that, in the area of electronic information, a too-specific rule risks “overnight” obsolescence, just as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, enacted in 1986, is considered by a number of commentators to be, at best, obsolescent.  Note also that I did not use the word “stored” when I mentioned electronic information, as courts have already required that so-called ephemeral information be preserved.  Nor would I choose option 2.  Absent seeing more than the brief description of the category on page 264, it seems to me that option 2 is likely to do nothing more than be a restatement of the existing law on when the duty to preserve is “triggered.”

So, by default, I am forced to choose option 3.  I presume a rule would say something like, “sanctions may not be imposed on a party for loss of ESI (or “EI”) if that party acted reasonably in making preservation decisions.”  There are a number of problems here. First, in a jurisdiction which allows the imposition of at least some sanction for negligence, all the rule would likely do is be interpreted to foreclose “serious” sanctions. Isn’t that correct? Or is the rule intended to supersede existing variances in the law of sanctions?  At that point, does the rule become “substantive”?   Second, how will “reasonableness” be defined?  Reasonableness supposes the existence of a duty – in this case, a duty to preserve.  For example, is there a duty to preserve ephemeral data that a party knows is relevant?  We come back full circle to where we began.

Remember, Rule 37(f) (now 37(e)) was intended to provide some level of protection against the imposition of sanctions, just as the categories are intended to.  Right?  And five years later 37(e) remains defined variously to be a “safe harbor” or a “lighthouse” by some lawyers such as Jonathan Redgrave or an “uncharted minefield” by others like me.

Nelson: What about heightened pleading standards after the Iqbal and Twombly decisions?  Do these decisions have any relevance to electronic discovery and the topic at hand?

Judge Hedges: Let me begin by saying that I am no fan of Twombly or Iqbal. The decisions, however well intended, have led to undue cost and delay all too often.  Not only is motion to dismiss practice costly for parties, but it imposes great burdens on the United States Courts and, as often as not, leads to at least one other round of motion practice as plaintiffs are given leave to re-plead.  All the while, parties have preservation obligations to fulfill and, in the hope of saving expense, discovery is often stayed until a motion is “finally” decided.  I would like to see objective evidence of the delay and cost of this motion practice (and I expect that the Administrative Office of the United States has statistical evidence already).  I would also like to see objective evidence from defendants distinguishing between the cost of motion practice and later discovery costs.

Putting all that aside, and if I had to accept one option, I would choose to allow some discovery that is integrated to the motion practice.  First, even without the filing of a responsive pleading, there should be a 26(f) meet-and-confer to discuss, if nothing else, the nature and scope of preservation and the possibility of securing a Rule 502(d) order. Second, while I have serious concerns about “pre-answer discovery” for a number of reasons, I would have the parties make 26(a)(1) disclosures while a motion to dismiss is pending or leave to re-plead has been granted in order to address the likely “asymmetry of information” between a plaintiff and a moving defendant.  Once the disclosures are made, I would allow the plaintiff to secure some information identified in the disclosures to allow re-pleading and perhaps obviate the need for continued motion practice.

All of this would, of course, require active judicial management.  And one would hope that Congress, which seems so interested in conserving resources, would recognize the vital role of the United States Courts in securing justice for everyone and give adequate funding to the Courts.

A famous quote from intellectual George Santayana provides an appropriate backdrop for organizations to better understand why they should deploy technology to strengthen their litigation response effort.  As Santayana explained in The Life of Reason: Reason in Common Sense, “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

The “past” can be a powerful playbook in the game of eDiscovery.  Fortunately for organizations, the lessons of eDiscovery history abound.  Indeed, the decisions that courts issue every day across the United States and in other countries provide substantial guidance on what organizations should and should not do to properly prepare for the discovery phase of litigation.

One of the principal lessons that can be gleaned from American court cases in 2011 is that technology can help organizations address the demands of eDiscovery in litigation.  Technology has assumed such a significant role because it facilitates the oversight process that lawyers must engage in to ensure that pertinent documents are preserved for discovery.  This year alone, the failure to exercise that oversight has in many instances culminated in evidence destruction and sanctions.

That message was emphasized this summer by a Virginia based federal court in a hotly contested trade secret dispute.  In E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Kolon Industries (E.D. Va. July 21, 2011), the court determined that it would issue an adverse inference jury instruction against defendant Kolon Industries as a sanction for its evidence spoliation.  The spoliation at issue occurred when Kolon deleted emails and other records relevant to DuPont’s trade secret claims.  After being apprised of the lawsuit and then receiving multiple litigation hold notices, several Kolon executives and employees met together and identified emails and other documents that should be deleted.  The ensuing destruction was staggering.  Nearly 18,000 files and emails were deleted.  Furthermore, many of these materials went right to the heart of DuPont’s claim that key aspects of its Kevlar© formula were allegedly misappropriated to improve Kolon’s competing product line.

Surprisingly, however, the court did not finger the Kolon employees as the principal culprits for spoliation.  Instead, the court laid the blame on Kolon’s attorneys and executives, reasoning they could have prevented the destruction of information through better oversight.  The hold process was particularly flawed.  The notices were either too limited in their distribution, ineffective since they were prepared in English for Korean-speaking employees, or too late to prevent or otherwise alleviate the spoliation.  Given the logistical challenges of implementing a hold in this instance, perhaps only the automated functions of technology such as archiving software might have strengthened the oversight process and obviated the spoliation that took place.

The lack of attorney oversight also factored into another pertinent sanctions order this year, this time from a federal court in Chicago.  In Northington v. H & M International (N.D.Ill. Jan. 12, 2011), the court issued an adverse inference jury instruction against a company that destroyed relevant emails and other data.  The spoliation occurred in large part because the company neglected to establish a global litigation response effort.  For example, there was no process for issuing or ensuring compliance with a litigation hold.  Nor was counsel engaged in the critical steps of preservation, identification or collection of electronically stored information (ESI).  Into this vacuum stepped rank and file employees – some of whom were accused by the plaintiff of harassment – who were tasked with identifying and collecting discoverable emails from their workstations.  Predictably, key documents were never found and the court had little choice but to promise to inform the jury that the company destroyed evidence.

The problems associated with the lack of oversight in DuPont and Northington are compelling reasons why organizations should consider using technology tools as part of their overall litigation response strategy.  One of the most helpful tools in this regard is archiving software.  Indeed, having the right archiving solution in place might have preserved the spoliated records in these actions.

For example, archiving software can be programmed to prevent employees from deleting emails and other electronically stored information.  By ingesting data into a central repository and leaving copies of the materials on local computers, employees could have access to their archived records.  They would not, however, be able to delete those documents from the software archive.  In addition, a litigation hold could have been placed on archived data to prevent automated retention rules from overwriting information.  Either of these features might have prevented much of the spoliation – and the resulting sanctions – that occurred in both the DuPont and Northington cases.

The automated functions of archiving technology can benefit a company’s litigation response in other ways.  For example, such a tool may limit the amount of potentially relevant information available for follow-on litigation.  Absent a legal hold, retention rules that are programmed into the software will ensure that ESI is expired once it reaches the end of a designated period.  In DuPont, such a feature could arguably have eliminated entire categories of older documents before a duty to preserve those materials ever ripened.  This facet not only has the potential to reduce legal exposure, but also the attendant costs associated with reviewing those documents in litigation.

DuPont, Northington and other cases from the recent past delineate the steps companies can take to address the challenges of eDiscovery.  Organizations do not have to “repeat” past mistakes that victimized clients and counsel alike.  Instead, they can implement the right technology tools as part of a thoughtful, proactive approach to litigation.  By so doing, organizations will avoid Santayana’s judgment by “remembering” the lessons of eDiscovery history.

In my last post I announced that discussions are taking place that could change the way preservation and sanctions issues are handled within the federal court system.  The next round of discussions about possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is scheduled to take place on September 9th in Dallas, Texas as part of a “mini-conference” led by the Discovery Subcommittee – a committee appointed by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  This post discusses three different rule amendment approaches that attendees have been asked to consider in order to help them prepare for the mini-conference.  A complete list of attendees, preparation materials, and questions the group will consider are included in the Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum to the participants.

The debate about whether or not rule amendments are even required is far from over.  A 452-page document located on the U.S. Courts’ website chronicles many of the meetings, notes, and submissions driving the current discussion.  Page 265 of the document contains a memorandum prepared by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee earlier this year, stating that:

“the Subcommittee has reached no conclusion on whether rule amendments would be a productive way of dealing with preservation/sanctions concerns, much less what amendment proposals would be useful.”

Despite concerns that amending the current rules now would amount to jumping the gun, there is an undeniable desire for more clarity around when the duty to preserve electronically stored information (ESI) is triggered, what must be preserved, and when the duty expires.  This momentum has resulted in the crafting of draft proposals that are likely to help frame the discussion on September 9th. The “proposals” are really draft approaches that have been broken down into three general categories described in the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s memorandum, titled: “PRESERVATION/SANCTIONS ISSUES” (see page 263).  The Category 1 approach can best be described as providing a higher degree of specificity than the other approaches.  For example, the Category 1 approach provides a fairly detailed explanation of the duty to preserve evidence (Rule 26.1(a)) and details possible triggers (26.1(b)), the scope of the duty to preserve (26.1(c)), and sanctions (Rule 37).  Category 2 proposes a more general preservation rule, while Category 3 only addresses sanctions as a tool for influencing behavior.  The three categories are discussed in more detail below.

Category 1: Specific Rule

This draft includes many different exemplary lists, alternative approaches, and footnotes that highlight the fact that one of the key challenges with drafting a specific rule is trying to foresee all of the challenges that might lie in the road ahead.  For example, the draft rule provides a long list of events that could trigger the duty to preserve evidence, including everything from serving a pleading to taking “any other action” in anticipation of litigation.   The rule also provides a list of information types that are “presumptively excluded” from the preservation duty, such as deleted data on hard drives, temporary internet files, and physically damaged media.

The lists are helpful in that they provide guidance.  However, each list also includes a “catch-all” provision to address scenarios that might not be foreseeable.  The inclusion of catch-all provisions highlights the inherent challenge of providing more clarity and certainty without creating rules that are so inflexible that they are difficult to apply to unforeseen factual scenarios or technological developments.  Some might argue that trying to provide a laundry list of examples will make passage of new rules difficult because each item on the list will stir debate.  Others contend that the lists add little value because the catch-all provisions will still require litigators to pass the sniff test of “reasonableness.”

Despite the inherent challenges related to drafting rules with specificity, most practitioners would likely support the inclusion of lists or examples that provide at least some direction.  What is likely to be far more controversial with respect to Category 1 is the use of alternative language proposing fixed limits around custodians and litigation holds.  For example, one alternative would limit data preservation requirements to a fixed number of custodians and the duty to preserve evidence would similarly expire after a fixed number of years.  Bright line rules like these may be easier to understand, but they also tend to be controversial since they lack the flexibility necessary to fairly address every conceivable situation.

Category 2: General Rule

Like the Category 1 proposal, the Category 2 proposal uses lists and outlines several alternative approaches throughout the rule.  However, the Category 2 proposal fundamentally differs from Category 1 by outlining a more general approach.  For example, one of the alternatives essentially states that the duty to preserve evidence is triggered whenever a “reasonable person” would expect to be a party to an action.  Similarly, the ongoing duty to preserve information after the duty has been triggered would be evaluated based on what is described as a “reasonable period” under the circumstances.

The beauty of this more general approach lies in its simplicity and flexibility.  The idea is that evaluating conduct based on the “reasonableness” of a person’s actions is much easier than attempting to draft bright line legal guidelines that account for every possible factual scenario.  The flip side is that reasonable minds could differ and results could be inconsistent if there are no bright line rules.  What this means in the context of the federal rule discussion is that one judge might find a party’s conduct with respect to data preservation efforts reasonable, while another judge might issue sanctions based on the same set of facts.  In large part, it is this lack of certainty and guidance in the current rules that sparked the current debate in the first place.

Category 3: Sanctions-Based Rule

Unlike the first two categories, the Category 3 approach focuses only on sanctions and would act like more of a “back-end” rule.  In other words, the rule would not contain any specific directives about preservation, but it would provide direction in the areas of when and how sanctions might be applied.

Despite the draconian image a “sanctions” based rule might conjure up, the Category 3 rule may seem surprisingly lenient to some.  For example, absent extraordinary circumstances, the court would be prohibited from imposing any of the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b)(2) or from giving an adverse-inference instruction unless:

“the party’s failure to preserve discoverable information was willful or in bad faith and caused [substantial] prejudice in the litigation.”

The sanctions based approach would almost certainly have an impact on how parties handle upstream preservation related issues.  However, the key ingredients that will impact what kind of behavior this rule drives are the severity of the threatened sanction as well as the applicable standard.  For example, a party facing severe sanctions for conduct that is either negligent, willful or in bad faith is likely to take their preservation obligations seriously.  On the other hand, if the realm of possible sanctions is trivial, parties are less likely to take their preservation related obligations seriously.

Conclusion

The three rule approaches represent very early attempts at framing possible approaches to amending the FRCP.  If the Discovery Subcommittee chooses to recommend rule amendments following the September 9th mini-conference in Dallas, the proposed language is likely to be closer to final form and easier to assess than the current proposals.  I will continue to monitor the rule making discussion and provide commentary in future posts.  Stay tuned for my next post where former US Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges explains why he thinks the rule changes are unnecessary and why the current proposals might run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.

eDiscovery best practices, particularly practical ones, are hard to come by.  That’s why the Pilot Program of the 7th Circuit has been such a novel (and successful) undertaking.  As part of this program, judges, outside counsel and industry experts collaborated to practically deal with the many vexing eDiscovery challenges in the courtroom. By way of background, the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program Committee was formed in May 2009 and was chartered to conduct a multi-year, multi-phase project to develop, implement, evaluate, and improve pretrial litigation procedures, which ideally would provide fairness and justice to all parties, while seeking to reduce the cost and burden of electronic discovery consistent with Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).

The Committee, comprised of the most talented experts in the 7th Circuit, as well as experts in relevant fields of technology, promulgated “Principles Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information” (“Principles”) and a Proposed Standing Order by which participating judges could implement the Principles in the Pilot Program’s test cases.  Practicing lawyers wrote the Principles under the guidance of federal judges in Chicago, with the end result being a consensus from experts in the field of eDiscovery rather than a prescriptive approach dictated by the courts.  The Committee now has 80 members, including members from all 7 federal districts in the 7th Circuit and around the country, and is chaired by Chief Judge Holderman and Magistrate Judge Nolan of the Northern District of Illinois. The Principles provide a checklist of important considerations for the initial meet and confer conference, as well as even-handed rules regarding preserving and producing electronically stored information (ESI) that provide more granularity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The 7th Circuit has been well-received, and evangelists are jumping on board in other Circuits, including the 9th Circuit.  Art Gollwitzer, a member of the 7th Circuit eDiscovery Pilot Program Committee, practices patent law, was key in the formation of the Principles notably the Preservation Principle 2.04, and now heads the National Outreach Committee for the 7th Circuit Program.  In a recent case, Joao Control & Monitoring Systems of California, LLC v. ACTI Corp., et al., Case No. SA CV10-1909-DOC, in the Central District of California, Art was pleasantly surprised to see language that he helped write in a draft ESI order handed out by the court to the parties for their consideration at the initial status conference.  “I was very happy to see the exact language that our committee drafted after many hours of discussion in the summer of 2009 in the court’s proposed order,” Art explained.  “We worked hard to reduce the cost and burden of electronic discovery and to prevent ESI discovery from turning into a game of ‘gotcha’.”

The goal of the National Outreach Committee is to spread the word about the 7th Circuit’s ESI Program and its benefits.  “We envision spreading the word through articles, speeches, and ‘grass-roots’ or word-of-mouth efforts,” says Gollwitzer. To that end, liaisons in each Circuit or even each district can talk to judges and encourage colleagues to propose that courts adopt the Committee’s principles in Rule 26(f) orders on a case-by-case basis.  “We also can describe the program and its principles at local bar associations and Inns of Court,” he explains.  “Finally, we can volunteer for local rules committees or comment on ESI proposals for local rules.”

With each jurisdiction having its own local rules and each legal community having its own flavor, the exercise of bringing all stakeholders into the process to contribute to the Principles is unprecedented.  Whether each Circuit starts their own Pilot Programs, or initially adopts the 7th Circuit’s Principles and then modifies as necessary, remains to be seen.  Either way, results from the 7th Circuit have been positive thus far, generating supporters nationally.  The hope is that courts and practitioners will start with these Principles in order to avoid a patchwork of ESI rules across the country.

The general consensus of the participating judges in Phase I of the Pilot Program was that the Principles were having a positive effect both on counsel’s cooperation with opposing counsel, and on counsel’s knowledge of procedures to be followed when addressing electronic discovery issues. The judges felt that the involvement of eDiscovery liaisons required by Principle 2.02 contributed to a more efficient and cost effective discovery process. Many of the participating lawyers reported little impact on their cases, presumably mostly because of the limited 6-month duration of Phase I. Those lawyers who did see an effect from the application of the Principles in their cases overwhelmingly reported that the effect was positive in terms of promoting fairness, fostering more amicable dispute resolution, and facilitating their advocacy on behalf of their clients. The Committee intends to present its Final Report on the 2-year Phase II evaluation at the 7th Circuit Bar Association Meeting in May 2012.

While most attorneys are following the guidance of Principle 2.01 (a) and (c), Duty to Meet and Confer on Discovery and to Identify Disputes for Early Resolution, it is barely the majority.  And curiously, a significant minority of attorneys acknowledged they had not familiarized themselves with their client’s information systems or had early discussions with their opponents about ESI preservation issues even though they were applicable in the case.

What does this suggest? For one thing, the landscape is improving – but there is still a long way to go.  Why would even a single attorney with a case in the Pilot Program ignore relevant ESI issues? One of the major problems with the vagueness of the Federal Rules was a lack of clear-cut guidance. Now, even though there is a Standing Order in the case providing guidance and Principle 2.01 (d) outlining sanctions that could be imposed for failure to comply, some lawyers still do not.

Every Circuit should be forming a Committee and bringing practitioners, judges and experts together to weigh in on these important ESI issues.  Fortunately, there is a successful model available with hard data.  The 7th Circuit’s Principles and Standing Order are a good place to start.

Is your organization among those that have jumped with both feet into the world of social media?

Recent survey results confirm that social media use is on the rise for almost all organizations across the globe.  This is particularly the case in the financial services industry.  A recent industry survey confirms that nearly two-thirds of all asset managers are actively using social media for marketing purposes.

Despite its increasing popularity and ubiquity, the securities industry is experiencing growing pains with social media.  Just like other industries, financial services providers are struggling with applying notions of information governance to these non-traditional forms of communication.  Indeed, with social media becoming an increasingly important data source for both business and legal purposes, it behooves enterprises to develop an information governance strategy with respect to this data.  The best practices being followed in this regard by financial services companies should be paradigmatic for organizations across the board.

Social Media Challenges for Financial Services Companies

Many financial services companies are experiencing difficulty supervising or retaining social media communications as required by FINRA Regulatory Notice 10-06.  A landmark regulation, FINRA 10-06 was promulgated last year to protect investors from false or misleading claims made on social networking sites.  To comply with this regulation, securities firms must develop protocols that enable them to supervise and retain social media content and ensure conformity by their representatives.

It is no secret that social media communications continue to bedevil securities firms.  Indeed, 63% of surveyed asset managers reported that “regulatory recordkeeping” remains their greatest challenge with respect to social media.  And as more firms move toward social media marketing, the number of financial services companies experiencing difficulty with retention is also likely to increase.

The challenges firms are experiencing with social media are not limited to retention.  They also include the need to properly supervise social media communications.  This was acknowledged by FINRA chairman and chief executive Richard Ketchum at an industry event this past June.  Among other social media issues, Ketchum explained that firms have questioned how they can most effectively supervise their employees’ use of smart phones and tablet computers that can access company sites.  In response to these matters, FINRA just issued Regulatory Notice 11-39 to help clarify several lingering questions regarding retention and supervision.

Best Practices for Addressing the Challenges of Social Media

Given the complexity of these issues, regulated enterprises need to know what best practices can be followed to ensure compliance with pertinent FINRA and SEC regulations.  While there are perhaps many steps that could be implemented, three stand out as indispensable for firms.

The first is that firms should develop a global plan for how they will engage in social media marketing.  This initial step is particularly important for groups that are just now exploring the use of social media to communicate with investors.  Having a plan in place that maps out investor contact and communication strategy, provides for required supervision of firm representatives, and accounts for compliance with regulatory requirements is essential for securities firms.  Failing to take these steps could result in fines, suspensions or worse.

The next step involves educating and training employees regarding the firm’s social media plan.  This should include instruction regarding what content may be posted to social networking sites and the internal process for doing so.  Policies that describe the consequences for deviating from the firm’s social media plan should also be clearly delineated.  Those policies should detail the legal repercussions – civil and criminal – for both the employee and the firm for social media missteps.

Third, firms can employ technology to ensure compliance with their social media plan.  Indeed, FINRA 10-06 specifically emphasizes the importance of deploying technological “systems” to facilitate conformity with the regulation’s “Recordkeeping Responsibilities” requirement.  Those “systems” include archiving software and other technology tools.  With the right tools in place, firms can perform a cost-effective supervisory review of content to help ensure compliance with corporate policy and regulatory bodies.  Moreover, an effective “system” will implement legal holds and efficiently retrieve archived social media content in response to legal and regulatory requests.  All of this enables a company to establish the reasonableness of its retention and eDiscovery processes and demonstrate compliance with relevant SEC and FINRA regulations.

By following these steps and other best practices, financial services companies can begin to reasonably address the challenges of social media.  Knowing that those challenges are being dealt with in an effective manner will enable firms to confidently engage in social media marketing – and reap the financial benefits of doing so.

In past years we’ve covered Gibson Dunn’s Mid-Year E-Discovery Report which is always a good read, chock full of take-aways about the eDiscovery market.  In my mind, they do an excellent job of synthesizing the ever-expanding volume of case law and comparing those trends with historical averages.  This year’s report is no exception, and for those who don’t get to read all the cases, this is a stellar way to keep up on eDiscovery trends.  Without trying to summarize the entire 23 page document, there were a number of findings that stood out and should be perused by anyone with even a passing interest in the space.

Legal Holds/Preservation. As we all know, eDiscovery sanctions (at least here in the US) are critical business/legal drivers, particularly with regard to the legal hold area (which is the riskiest part of the EDRM).  As the Gibson report points out, the actual award of sanctions has remained relatively flat (56% in the first half of 2011 versus 55% for the full year in 2010) –  but, more important than this relatively stable metric, it’s very clear that the plaintiff’s bar has caught on to the ability to win cases by revealing shoddy (or just undocumented) legal hold procedures, even in some instances where data isn’t lost.  This is why the report notes a dramatic increase in the seeking of eDiscovery sanctions – 68 at mid-year 2011 versus 31 at mid-year 2010.  This doubling of attempts to pierce an entity’s legal hold regime should be a wake-up call to in-house practitioners and chief legal officers, since the attempt and success rates will likely only increase over time.

While there is still some considerable debate, at least for those following Judge Scheindlin’s Pension Committee logic, anything less than a formal, written legal hold policy is per se negligent.  Although it’s conceivable that  a reviewing court won’t use this rigorous standard, anything less formal will strike most organizations as simply too risky.  Ongoing compliance with the legal hold process is also another difficult task for many organizations, one which is considerably easier with an automated solution that is able to track acknowledgements and send reminders over time.  It’s all too easy for companies to think that once they’ve discharged their initial legal hold duty they’re in the clear – but as these obligations morph (with more custodians/data types) and elongate (from months to years) over time, keeping on top of the legal hold processes becomes that much more important.

Sanctions. The Gibson report also importantly points out that there’s currently a split in jurisdictions where some courts can levy sanctions for bad faith, while others can merely require proof of negligence.  Here, the important take-away is that a defendant entity doesn’t typically get to forum shop and therefore they can’t really tell which type of jurisdiction they’ll end up in as a litigant.  So, they need to build their eDiscovery processes to meet the high water (i.e., most rigorous) standard.  In most cases, it’s therefore prudent to be prepared to be sanctioned for merely negligent conduct – anything less can potentially be safe but that risk calculation needs to be considered carefully.

The other perilous part of the equation is that once sanctions are deemed warranted, the court has almost unlimited discretion to levy whatever blend of sanctions it thinks is appropriate.  In Green v. Blitz, for example, the court ordered a laundry list of sanctions, some of which were pretty unfathomable:

1. Defendant had to pay plaintiff $250,000

2. Defendant had to provide a copy of the court’s order to plaintiffs “in every lawsuit proceeding against it” for the past two years

3. Defendant had to file the court’s order in every case that it is involved in for the next 5 years

The bottom line is that sanctions, despite the fear factor, can be used to drive positive proactive conduct – namely in the shape of eDiscovery best practices.

Outside Counsel Duties. Here, the Gibson report notes that outside counsel’s Zubulake duties continue to increase over time, with a number of cases continuing the trend of holding attorneys responsible for ensuring that their clients properly implement legal holds, institute sound sampling protocols and conduct sufficient quality control steps.  This line of discussion can be useful when talking to outside counsel where we’re starting to see how their increasing responsibilities can lead to malpractice exposure, as seen in the recent McDermott case.

Search/Analysis. Lately there’s been a ton of buzz about predictive coding, but (despite the hype) it still doesn’t appear ready for prime time yet.  The Gibson report noted that there were no reported cases that addressed the use of predictive coding or other advanced search technologies.  My sense is that without some semblance of judicial approval or strong client backing, outside counsel (who are concerned about their malpractice exposure, per above) aren’t quickly going to be the first ones into the pool.  Unless an enterprise client demands that they use this type of technology, most will wait for judicial approval and that’s probably still a way off.  While next generation search technologies are more promise than reality right now, there is still a mandate to implement a defensible search methodology.  These are needed initially to demonstrate transparency in the eDiscovery process and to then withstand the challenges levied by counsel in the case of an inadvertent production.

In sum, the Gibson report shows the ongoing maturation of the eDiscovery space.  But, any niche market led by case law and/or attorneys deciding to adopt new technologies won’t be quick to change.  In many instances, therefore, the best practices will be decided a combination of standards bodies and vendors who are being pushed by their more forward thinking clients to get and stay on the cutting edge.

Is there a place in eDiscovery today for hard drive imaging and bit by bit copies, which collect deleted items or slack/unused hard disk space?  The answer is yes with some important limitations.  For the vast majority of matters, ESI can be collected without imaging drives or utilizing proprietary container files.  However, I occasionally still encounter folks who are victims of the dated and costly misconception that eDiscovery always requires the bit-level imaging of hard drives.

There are situations, though, where the existence of data (as opposed to its content) is central to the matter – when companies suspect employees of stealing proprietary information or when employees leave a company under suspicious circumstances.  In these and other similar situations, it may make sense to have the employee’s workstation hard drive imaged for full forensic analysis.  Even in these scenarios, I find that companies are more likely to hire an external investigator to perform this task to allay suspicions of tampering or bias, and the company generally would prefer that this investigator be the one to testify about this sensitive data acquisition.  Then, for ESI beyond the target employee’s hard drive, other collection methods may be used.  As we’re now midway through 2011 – a year in which I expect to see eDiscovery fully embraced by many corporations as a true business process – I wanted to analyze why the forensic disk image myth still exists, where it came from, and what the law really requires of an eDiscovery collections process.

Traditionally, cases that mentioned full forensic imaging of hard drives began their captions with United States v. or State v. because they were criminal matters.  In traditional civil litigation – even the behemoth eDiscovery cases that get all the bloggers blogging – forensic imaging simply is not required or needed.  In fact, in most cases, it will dramatically increase the cost associated with electronic discovery – this process adds unnecessary complexity in downstream phases of eDiscovery and leads to vast over-collection.  Why collect the Microsoft Office suite 50 times when what you are really required to preserve and collect are the files created with those programs?  When using disk imaging, program files are collected which drives up storage costs and requires the post-collection step of deNISTing (removing system files based on the NIST list).  Why not leave those system files behind and perform a targeted collection of only user-created content?    In addition, the primary rules governing civil litigation – the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence – simply do not require exact duplication of electronic files.  I am amazed that there are so many experts who are still pushing full forensic imaging and duplication in every case.  In fact, this goes against best practices published by The Sedona Conference, EDRM, and in the E-Discovery textbook co-authored by Judge Shira A. Sheindlin.

In comment 8c of the Sedona Principles, the authors call making forensic image backups of computers “the first step of an expensive, complex, and difficult process of data analysis that can divert litigation into side issues and satellite disputes involving the interpretation of potentially ambiguous forensic evidence.”  The comment goes on to say that “it should not be required unless exceptional circumstances warrant the extraordinary cost and burden.”  In a whitepaper authored for EDRM by three eDiscovery experts from KPMG, LLC, the authors discussed the high cost of forensic bit-level imaging and, instead, suggested that targeted collection of ESI would be sufficient in the vast majority of non-criminal matters.  They state, “[t]he challenge of Smart EDM [Evidence and Discovery Management] is to obtain targeted files in a forensically sound manner – chain-of-custody established, proven provenance, and metadata intact – without having to resort to drive imaging.”

In Electronic Discovery and Digital Evidence: Cases and Materials, written by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, Daniel J. Capra, and The Sedona Conference, the authors state that,

“because imaging software is commonly available, and because the vast majority of training programs in the field of electronic discovery revolve around forensics, there is a growing tendency to want to ‘image everything.’  But unless an argument can be made that the matter at hand will benefit from a forensic collection and additional examination, there is no reason to do a forensic collection just because the technology exists to do it.”

So, with the top experts in the field saying the days of “image everything” should be over, why does it still happen?  Why are the victims of this antiquated workflow still paying the exorbitant costs of a solution that does not really meet their requirements?  Perhaps a historical perspective will be helpful in explaining.

Why Drive Imaging and Proprietary Containers?

I do not think there is any debate on the benefit of having a bit-level image of a hard drive in a criminal investigation.  However, traditionally, the investigators using these methods needed a way to get the imaged drive safely back to a lab for further analysis.  Companies or law enforcement agencies that hired third-party investigators to image drives had to transport the data, maintaining chain of custody, and preserving all contents in an un-alterable state through several phases of the investigation.  And, in criminal matters, it was especially important to maintain the integrity of the evidence when the electronic evidence was central to the government’s case.  Remember, the burden of proof in a criminal matter is “beyond a reasonable doubt” (along with a host of constitutional considerations).  Alteration of key evidence could certainly create reasonable doubt and hose the prosecution’s case (or, worse, the evidence gets tossed by the Court before the trial even begins).  The container file ensures that no matter who handles the evidence, checksums can prove that the contents were not altered since the initial imaging.

Many vendors now offer logical image containers as an alternative to doing a full bit-level image of the drive.  However, in corporate eDiscovery, this is still overkill because the tools and solutions being used downstream still have to unpack or parse these proprietary container formats for processing and analysis.  In fact, even software from the vendors who created these container formats must “crack them open” to get to the contents within.  This seems to add a layer of complexity that has not been needed since the days of the external examiner coming in with her forensic toolkit to do drive images. The format was created to solve a very specific problem, and little thought was given to the use of this format in a holistic process like what is typically seen in civil eDiscovery.   There is no longer a need for a container for portability of evidence because it is most likely going to be processed in place after collection while residing on a secure evidence store on the company’s network.  I have heard “what if our collections methods are challenged?”  And to that, I would respond that we are not in criminal court and that the requirement in civil court is reasonableness, not perfection.  Now, if an employee is suspected of wrongdoing and the potential deletion of files will dramatically alter the case, then by all means, hire a forensic investigator and follow all of the protocols established over the last several decades in computer forensic science.

Fast forward to the 21^st century

Corporations are bringing eDiscovery in-house; they are building a business process around it to minimize risk and drive enormous cost savings, and in today’s world of civil litigation, there simply is not a need for these drive images or proprietary containers.  First of all, the burden of proof in a civil matter is “by a preponderance of the evidence.”  What this means is that the burden is satisfied if there is greater than 50% chance that a proposition is true.  This is a much lower standard than in criminal cases.  But, burden of proof goes more to the weight evidence is given by the court or jury.  Before that is even considered, evidence must pass several hurdles of admissibility.  As we will explore, these standards of admissibility have also been the recipients of significant bolstering from vendors over the years.

The Path to Admissibility

There are several hurdles to admissibility for any type of evidence, and because they are not within the scope of this post, I will forego any discussion of relevance, FRE 403, or the hearsay rules.  I will focus on the issues that tend to be associated with electronic evidence: authentication and the “best evidence rule”.  There are some examiners and perhaps even vendors that would argue electronic evidence is simply not admissible if not collected using bit-level imaging (and sometimes 2 copies – one that is referred to by examiners as the “best evidence” copy and another “working copy” to be analyzed).  This is simply not true.  What we will find is that the collection method will go more to the weight of the evidence rather than the minimum showing needed for admissibility (hence, the discussion of burden of proof above).

All evidence must be authenticated pursuant to FRE 901.  This is a “don’t pass Go” threshold requirement for admissibility.  FRE 901 is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  Notwithstanding a “self-authenticating” piece of evidence pursuant to FRE 902, the proponent must establish the identity of the exhibit by stipulation, circumstantial evidence, or the testimony of a witness with knowledge of its identity and authorship.  Typically, objections to this process would tend to go toward whether the exhibit is an original, was altered, or the witness with whom the proponent is attempting to authenticate the exhibit is not able to so based on lack of personal knowledge or some other defect.  Mostly these objections deal with the authenticity of the contents of the exhibit, and the rules in Article X of the FRE are helpful here.  Rule 1001 defines an “original” with respect to data stored in a computer or similar device as “any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately.”  This is a far cry from a bit-by-bit forensic image!  Rule 1002 – often referred to as the “Best Evidence Rule” – requires that “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.”  Not only do these rules not require exact duplication of the electronic files, but they do not require imaging the entire 80GB hard drive to collect the 100MB of files that are potentially relevant to the case.  What they do require, though, is the ability to show that a document being proffered is the same document that was originally created.  In Re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 444 (B.A.P. 9th 2005). Also, Judge Grimm sets out an extremely comprehensive analysis of what is required for the admissibility of electronic evidence in civil litigation in Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company, 241 F.R.D. 534 (D.Md. May 4, 2007).  In Lorraine, he notes that In Re Vee Vinhee may set out the most demanding test for admissibility of ESI.

Maintaining Forensic Integrity

So, how do I combat the claims that “they must have altered that document” or “Your, honor, I swear that line about ‘acceptable losses’ was not in the safety memo when I created it”?  This is where hash value becomes a wonderful thing.  Computing the hash of an electronic file, or computing a hexadecimal checksum based on analysis of the contents of an electronic document, is essentially like recording the DNA of an electronic file.  If the file is altered, its hash value would be different.  So, by computing the hash value at the source, in transit, and at the destination, I can ensure that the electronic file is in exactly the same state as it was at the source (or, that the collected document is the same as the document originally created).  Now, add the ability to report on that information and those container files and full forensic disk images really do become extreme overkill.

The important distinction here is that the term “forensic” does not refer to a type of technology or the products of a specific vendor – despite claims and propaganda to the contrary.  Forensic refers to the methodology used by the person collecting the evidence – whether it is finger prints from a weapon or electronic files from an employee’s laptop.  Forensic imaging, however, refers to the process by which an entire hard disk is copied bit by bit to create an exact duplicate of that hard drive in a forensic manner.  It is entirely possible for a collection of ESI to be “forensically sound” by simply employing the technique described above of taking hash values at each stage of the process to be able to prove that the files were not altered during collection.  As long as chain of custody is also maintained (much easier to do now that we are not using multiple tools, vendors, locations, and people to do the job), then the process should meet the threshold admissibility requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Opponents will still bring up claims that the evidence must have been altered, or the expert familiar only with forensic imaging technologies will try to use the argument that only vendor X’s technology is “court vetted,” so any other method is not acceptable.  But, to these opponents, I would argue two points:

1. No technology is “court vetted”.  The operator’s use of the technology in the specific case (in a specific jurisdiction) was acceptable to the court to meet the threshold showings required by FRE 901, 1001, and 1002 – as well as any rules of procedure governing the production of discovery in either a civil or criminal matter.  Wow – that would be a very long footnote on a marketing slide…probably why it is not usually mentioned.
2. The process is forensically sound, and you can prove that the documents were not altered from collection through production by referencing the hash value and maintaining copies of the original native files analyzed on a secured preservation store.  This would exceed the requirements of FRE 901, 1001, and 1002 – but would provide protection against claims going to the “weight” of the evidence by opponents who would cry foul.

What Now?

So, where does all of this leave us?  First, in the vast majority of civil litigation matters where electronic discovery is being performed, forensic bit by bit imaging of computer hard drives is simply not required.  Vendors have promoted this practice over the years, but all this has done is over-complicate the eDiscovery process for many unsuspecting litigants and dramatically increase costs because the model simply does not scale.  Moreover, the effort and cost required to deal with these full drive images downstream in the process is often overlooked by these vendors and overzealous consultants.  Next, we now know there is a better way – targeted, forensically-sound collection of ESI using streamlined and automated solutions that maintain custodian relationship – even for shared data sources – throughout the eDiscovery lifecycle, preventing form of production disputes and other calamities that have plagued this industry for the last decade.  There is a better way to collect ESI that will provide exponential cost savings all the way to production.

Today, I am delighted to report that Clearwell Systems has become part of Symantec. We have, of course, been working closely together since obtaining regulatory approval for the acquisition last month, but this makes it official: Symantec can now offer customers Clearwell’s market-leading eDiscovery platform as well as its market-leading Symantec Enterprise Vault archiving solution. We are excited to be part of the Symantec team, and to work alongside so many talented people to create the next generation of eDiscovery and information governance solutions.

There are already a large number of joint customers using the Clearwell and Symantec solutions as part of an integrated eDiscovery and archiving workflow, and we are well underway towards building more robust integration between Clearwell and Symantec Enterprise Vault. In updating our product roadmaps, all our decisions are guided by feedback from customers who have told us over and over again that they want to:

• Reduce costs across all phases represented in the Electronic Discovery Reference Model, from information management through review and production
• Reduce risk by improving the defensibility and repeatability of their archiving and eDiscovery processes
• Streamline their end to end archiving and eDiscovery lifecycle to meet legal and regulatory deadlines
• Start managing information and conducting eDiscovery in as little as one day; whether on-premise, as a hosted solution or in the cloud
• Meet their enterprise-wide archiving and eDiscovery needs, whether they have less than 25 to more than one million users

As we’ve discussed before, our plan as part of Symantec is to deliver a seamless, integrated archiving and eDiscovery management workflow that benefits all our customers. To keep everyone in the loop, we will continue to post updates and answer questions on the integrated product portfolio here and on the Symantec eDiscovery blog.

For more on the acquisition, and the response from our customers, partners and the industry at large, visit: http://www.symantec.com/clearwell.