e-discovery 2.0

We’ve all heard the phrase that “everything is bigger in Texas” and the little “mini-conference” held in Dallas, TX last Friday was no exception.  The Discovery Subcommittee held a small, one-day conference to tackle some big issues related to preservation and sanctions that could ultimately lead to amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).

The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

To join the conversation and receive automatic updates when new information is posted to this blog, please subscribe to e-discovery 2.0.

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[1] A more exhaustive list of participants and sample questions was incorporated into the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum announcing the mini-conference.  Similarly, the events leading up to the mini-conference are described in more detail as part of my previous postings on the same subject.

If you have been following my previous posts regarding possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), then you know I promised a special interview with former United States Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges.  The timing of the discussion is perfect considering that a “mini-conference” is being hosted by a Federal Rules Discovery Subcommittee today (September 9th) in Dallas, TX.  The debate will focus on whether or not the Rules should be amended to address evidence preservation and sanctions.  I am attending the mini-conference and will summarize my observations as part of my next post.  In the meantime, please enjoy reading the dialogue below for a glimpse into Judge Hedges’ perspective regarding possible Rule amendments.

Nelson: You were recently quoted in a Law Technology News (LTN) article written by Evan Koblentz as saying, “I don’t see a need to amend the rules” because these rules haven’t been around long enough to see what happens.  Isn’t almost five years long enough?

Judge Hedges: No.  For the simple reason that both attorneys and judges continue to need education on the 2006 amendments and, more particularly, they need to understand the technologies that create and store electronic information.  The amendments establish a framework within which attorneys and judges make daily decisions on discovery.  I have not seen any objective evidence that the framework is somehow failing and needs further amendment.

Nelson: You also said the “big problem” is that people don’t talk enough.  What did you mean?  Hasn’t the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation made a difference?

Judge Hedges: The centerpiece of the 2006 amendments (at least in my view) is Rule 26(f).  I think it is fair to say that the legal community’s response to 26(f) has been, to say the least, varied. Civil actions with large volumes of ESI that may be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) cry out for extensive 26(f) meet-and-confer discussions that may take a number of meetings and require the presence of party representatives from, for example, IT.  There is an element of trust required between adversary counsel (with the concurrence of the parties they represent) that may be difficult to establish – but some cooperation is necessary to make 26(f) work.  Overlay that reality with our adversary system and the duty of attorneys to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients and you can understand why cooperation isn’t always a top priority for some attorneys.

However, “transparency” in discussing ESI is essential, along with advocacy and the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality. That’s where the Sedona Conference Proclamation can make a big difference. Has the Proclamation done that? It’s too early to reach a conclusion on that question, but the Proclamation is often cited and, as education progresses in eDiscovery, I am confident that the Proclamation will be recognized as a means to realize the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of litigation, as articulated under Rule 1.

Nelson: You also mentioned that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee might be running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.  Can you explain?

Judge Hedges: There is a distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” rules.  The Rules Enabling Act governs the adoption of the former.  Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an example of a substantive rule that was proposed by the Judicial Conference.  However, since Rule 502 is a rule dealing with substantive privilege and waiver issues, it had to be enacted into law through an Act of Congress.  I am concerned that proposals to further amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may cross the line from procedural to substantive.  I am not prepared to suggest at this time, however, that anything I have seen has crossed the line.  Stay tuned.

Nelson: If you had to select one of the three options currently being considered (see page 264), which option would you select and why?

Judge Hedges: To start, I would not choose option 1, which presumes that the Rules can reach pre-litigation conduct consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.  My concern here is also that, in the area of electronic information, a too-specific rule risks “overnight” obsolescence, just as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, enacted in 1986, is considered by a number of commentators to be, at best, obsolescent.  Note also that I did not use the word “stored” when I mentioned electronic information, as courts have already required that so-called ephemeral information be preserved.  Nor would I choose option 2.  Absent seeing more than the brief description of the category on page 264, it seems to me that option 2 is likely to do nothing more than be a restatement of the existing law on when the duty to preserve is “triggered.”

So, by default, I am forced to choose option 3.  I presume a rule would say something like, “sanctions may not be imposed on a party for loss of ESI (or “EI”) if that party acted reasonably in making preservation decisions.”  There are a number of problems here. First, in a jurisdiction which allows the imposition of at least some sanction for negligence, all the rule would likely do is be interpreted to foreclose “serious” sanctions. Isn’t that correct? Or is the rule intended to supersede existing variances in the law of sanctions?  At that point, does the rule become “substantive”?   Second, how will “reasonableness” be defined?  Reasonableness supposes the existence of a duty – in this case, a duty to preserve.  For example, is there a duty to preserve ephemeral data that a party knows is relevant?  We come back full circle to where we began.

Remember, Rule 37(f) (now 37(e)) was intended to provide some level of protection against the imposition of sanctions, just as the categories are intended to.  Right?  And five years later 37(e) remains defined variously to be a “safe harbor” or a “lighthouse” by some lawyers such as Jonathan Redgrave or an “uncharted minefield” by others like me.

Nelson: What about heightened pleading standards after the Iqbal and Twombly decisions?  Do these decisions have any relevance to electronic discovery and the topic at hand?

Judge Hedges: Let me begin by saying that I am no fan of Twombly or Iqbal. The decisions, however well intended, have led to undue cost and delay all too often.  Not only is motion to dismiss practice costly for parties, but it imposes great burdens on the United States Courts and, as often as not, leads to at least one other round of motion practice as plaintiffs are given leave to re-plead.  All the while, parties have preservation obligations to fulfill and, in the hope of saving expense, discovery is often stayed until a motion is “finally” decided.  I would like to see objective evidence of the delay and cost of this motion practice (and I expect that the Administrative Office of the United States has statistical evidence already).  I would also like to see objective evidence from defendants distinguishing between the cost of motion practice and later discovery costs.

Putting all that aside, and if I had to accept one option, I would choose to allow some discovery that is integrated to the motion practice.  First, even without the filing of a responsive pleading, there should be a 26(f) meet-and-confer to discuss, if nothing else, the nature and scope of preservation and the possibility of securing a Rule 502(d) order. Second, while I have serious concerns about “pre-answer discovery” for a number of reasons, I would have the parties make 26(a)(1) disclosures while a motion to dismiss is pending or leave to re-plead has been granted in order to address the likely “asymmetry of information” between a plaintiff and a moving defendant.  Once the disclosures are made, I would allow the plaintiff to secure some information identified in the disclosures to allow re-pleading and perhaps obviate the need for continued motion practice.

All of this would, of course, require active judicial management.  And one would hope that Congress, which seems so interested in conserving resources, would recognize the vital role of the United States Courts in securing justice for everyone and give adequate funding to the Courts.

eDiscovery best practices, particularly practical ones, are hard to come by.  That’s why the Pilot Program of the 7th Circuit has been such a novel (and successful) undertaking.  As part of this program, judges, outside counsel and industry experts collaborated to practically deal with the many vexing eDiscovery challenges in the courtroom. By way of background, the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program Committee was formed in May 2009 and was chartered to conduct a multi-year, multi-phase project to develop, implement, evaluate, and improve pretrial litigation procedures, which ideally would provide fairness and justice to all parties, while seeking to reduce the cost and burden of electronic discovery consistent with Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).

The Committee, comprised of the most talented experts in the 7th Circuit, as well as experts in relevant fields of technology, promulgated “Principles Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information” (“Principles”) and a Proposed Standing Order by which participating judges could implement the Principles in the Pilot Program’s test cases.  Practicing lawyers wrote the Principles under the guidance of federal judges in Chicago, with the end result being a consensus from experts in the field of eDiscovery rather than a prescriptive approach dictated by the courts.  The Committee now has 80 members, including members from all 7 federal districts in the 7th Circuit and around the country, and is chaired by Chief Judge Holderman and Magistrate Judge Nolan of the Northern District of Illinois. The Principles provide a checklist of important considerations for the initial meet and confer conference, as well as even-handed rules regarding preserving and producing electronically stored information (ESI) that provide more granularity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The 7th Circuit has been well-received, and evangelists are jumping on board in other Circuits, including the 9th Circuit.  Art Gollwitzer, a member of the 7th Circuit eDiscovery Pilot Program Committee, practices patent law, was key in the formation of the Principles notably the Preservation Principle 2.04, and now heads the National Outreach Committee for the 7th Circuit Program.  In a recent case, Joao Control & Monitoring Systems of California, LLC v. ACTI Corp., et al., Case No. SA CV10-1909-DOC, in the Central District of California, Art was pleasantly surprised to see language that he helped write in a draft ESI order handed out by the court to the parties for their consideration at the initial status conference.  “I was very happy to see the exact language that our committee drafted after many hours of discussion in the summer of 2009 in the court’s proposed order,” Art explained.  “We worked hard to reduce the cost and burden of electronic discovery and to prevent ESI discovery from turning into a game of ‘gotcha’.”

The goal of the National Outreach Committee is to spread the word about the 7th Circuit’s ESI Program and its benefits.  “We envision spreading the word through articles, speeches, and ‘grass-roots’ or word-of-mouth efforts,” says Gollwitzer. To that end, liaisons in each Circuit or even each district can talk to judges and encourage colleagues to propose that courts adopt the Committee’s principles in Rule 26(f) orders on a case-by-case basis.  “We also can describe the program and its principles at local bar associations and Inns of Court,” he explains.  “Finally, we can volunteer for local rules committees or comment on ESI proposals for local rules.”

With each jurisdiction having its own local rules and each legal community having its own flavor, the exercise of bringing all stakeholders into the process to contribute to the Principles is unprecedented.  Whether each Circuit starts their own Pilot Programs, or initially adopts the 7th Circuit’s Principles and then modifies as necessary, remains to be seen.  Either way, results from the 7th Circuit have been positive thus far, generating supporters nationally.  The hope is that courts and practitioners will start with these Principles in order to avoid a patchwork of ESI rules across the country.

The general consensus of the participating judges in Phase I of the Pilot Program was that the Principles were having a positive effect both on counsel’s cooperation with opposing counsel, and on counsel’s knowledge of procedures to be followed when addressing electronic discovery issues. The judges felt that the involvement of eDiscovery liaisons required by Principle 2.02 contributed to a more efficient and cost effective discovery process. Many of the participating lawyers reported little impact on their cases, presumably mostly because of the limited 6-month duration of Phase I. Those lawyers who did see an effect from the application of the Principles in their cases overwhelmingly reported that the effect was positive in terms of promoting fairness, fostering more amicable dispute resolution, and facilitating their advocacy on behalf of their clients. The Committee intends to present its Final Report on the 2-year Phase II evaluation at the 7th Circuit Bar Association Meeting in May 2012.

While most attorneys are following the guidance of Principle 2.01 (a) and (c), Duty to Meet and Confer on Discovery and to Identify Disputes for Early Resolution, it is barely the majority.  And curiously, a significant minority of attorneys acknowledged they had not familiarized themselves with their client’s information systems or had early discussions with their opponents about ESI preservation issues even though they were applicable in the case.

What does this suggest? For one thing, the landscape is improving – but there is still a long way to go.  Why would even a single attorney with a case in the Pilot Program ignore relevant ESI issues? One of the major problems with the vagueness of the Federal Rules was a lack of clear-cut guidance. Now, even though there is a Standing Order in the case providing guidance and Principle 2.01 (d) outlining sanctions that could be imposed for failure to comply, some lawyers still do not.

Every Circuit should be forming a Committee and bringing practitioners, judges and experts together to weigh in on these important ESI issues.  Fortunately, there is a successful model available with hard data.  The 7th Circuit’s Principles and Standing Order are a good place to start.

On of August 14, 2009, the California Judicial Counsel amended their Rules of Court to augment discussion of electronic discovery issues during the meet and confer process.

Rule of Court 3.724 was amended to require discussion of “Any issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored information” no later than 30 calendar days before the date set for the initial case management conference.  The broad language (i.e., “any”) was augmented by eight specific categories that must be expressly discussed:

(A) Issues relating to the preservation of discoverable electronically stored information;

(B) The form or forms in which information will be produced;

(C) The time within which the information will be produced;

(D) The scope of discovery of the information;

(E) The method for asserting or preserving claims of privilege or attorney work product, including whether such claims may be asserted after production;

(F) The method for asserting or preserving the confidentiality, privacy, trade secrets, or proprietary status of information relating to a party or person not a party to the civil proceedings;

(G) How the cost of production of electronically stored information is to be allocated among the parties;

(H) Any other issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored information, including developing a proposed plan relating to the discovery of the information;

Many of these issues track FRCP language (including forms of production, preservation, privilege issues, etc.).  However, section G seems somewhat novel given the historical “American Rule” where the producing party is required to bear all necessary costs of production.

Curiously missing, in comparison with FRCP 26 B(2)(b), is the need to discuss the handling of “inaccessible” ESI, although this could easily be subsumed in the “any other issues” language of section H.  Also missing is a discussion about proposed searching and/culling protocols (aka “keyword negotiations”) which are often part of the core meet and confer topics in Federal court.

Nevertheless, the scope is broad enough to require *a* discussion of all likely relevant electronic discovery issues, which was often lacking historically.  Once that discussion starts, reasonably savvy counsel should be able to flesh out most of the significant issues.  And, given this broad language a judge would presumably give them a hard time for any material omissions.

Learn More On: Frcp Electronic Discovery.

Many readers write in with questions, which we mostly answer offline. But when there’s one of general interest (and the sender consents), we will post both question and response to the blog and invite others to chime in.

I received one such question from Saurabh on Friday:

Subject: Ediscovery: searching/querying incentives

Hi Aaref,

I am regular reader of your blog. My question is what incentives do the defense litigation consultants/counsels have to employ sophisticated search techniques on e-discoverable documents?

Normally plaintiff and defense counsels agree on the search-terms based on which the defendant will produce documents after checking for privilege documents. In this the defendant is supposed to act in good faith with the searches. But in this the defendant has every incentive to use the most rudimentary search capability and still act in good faith.

But on the contrary we see that in the ediscovery domain the demand for sophisticated search techniques is rising everyday.

Regards,
Saurabh

This is a good question as it addresses two common misperceptions: first, that the process by which opposing counsel agree upon keywords is straight-forward; and second, that defense counsel is often well served by doing rudimentary keyword searches, reviewing for privilege, and handing over the results to the plaintiff. Let’s take each of these in turn.

Keywords are typically negotiated at the “meet-and-confer” conference which, under Rule 16(b) of the FRCP, must occur within the first 99 days of the case. In many cases, This is not a collaborative process as some parties will try to skew the list of keywords in its favor. As a result, defense attorneys spend a considerable amount of time preparing for the keyword negotiation by analyzing their clients’ email and documents to formulate their case strategies. The best way of performing this kind of early case analysis is by employing sophisticated e-discovery software.

Whatever keywords are agreed upon, defense counsel is responsible for much more than just performing privilege review prior to handing over the information to plaintiffs. As one GC at a Fortune 100 company told me, “I want to be responsive, but not overly inclusive”. In other words, he wants to hand over whatever he has to, but not one document more. This process of culling data down to precisely the responsive data set is a complex, iterative process. Given today’s massive data volumes, the only way to do it is to employ e-discovery technology to search, filter, cull, tag, review, and export the relevant information.

So to answer Saurabh’s question, defense counsel has a strong incentive to use e-discovery software to perform early case analyses, and cull data down to the specific set of responsive documents. The more adept they are at doing this, the better they can represent their clients or companies. That’s why, as Saurabh observes, demand for e-discovery software is rising everyday.