e-discovery 2.0

It’s no surprise that the first industry to be heavily regulated regarding social media use was the financial services industry. The predominant factor that drove regulators to address the viral qualities of social media was the fiduciary nature of investing that accompanies securities, coupled with the potential detrimental financial impact these offerings could have on investors.

Although there is no explicit language in FINRA’s Regulatory Notices 10-06 (January 2010) or 11-30 (August 2011) requiring archival, the record keeping component of the notices necessitate social media archiving in most cases due to the sheer volume of data produced on social media sites. Melanie Kalemba, Vice President of Business Development at SocialWare in Austin, Texas states:

“Our clients in the financial industry have led the way, they have paved the road for other industries, making social media usage less daunting. Best practices for monitoring third-party content, record keeping responsibilities, and compliance programs are available and developed for other industries to learn from. The template is made.”

eDiscovery and Privacy Implications. Privacy laws are an important aspect of social media use that impact discoverability. Discovery and privacy represent layers of the Rubik’s cube in the ever-changing and complex social media environment. No longer are social media cases only personal injury suits or HR incidents, although those are plentiful. For example, in Largent v. Reed the court ruled that information posted by a party on their personal Facebook page was discoverable and ordered the plaintiff to provide user name and password to enable the production of the information. In granting the motion to compel the Defendant’s login credentials, Judge Walsh acknowledged that Facebook has privacy settings, and that users must take “affirmative steps” to keep their information private. However, his ruling determined that no social media privacy privilege exists: “No court has recognized such a privilege, and neither will we.” He further reiterated his ruling by adding, “[o]nly the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook is an online lockbox of secrets.”

Then there are the new cases emerging over social media account ownership which affect privacy and discoverability. In the recently filed Phonedog v. Kravitz, 11-03474 (N.D. Cal.; Nov. 8, 2011), the lines between the “professional” versus the “private” user are becoming increasingly blurred. This case also raises questions about proprietary client lists, valuations on followers, and trade secrets  – all of which are further complicated when there is no social media policy in place. The financial services industry has been successful in implementing effective social media policies along with technology to comply with agency mandates – not only because they were forced to by regulation, but because they have developed best practices that essentially incorporate social media into their document retention policies and information governance infrastructures.

Regulatory Framework. Adding another Rubik’s layer are the multitude of regulatory and compliance issues that many industries face. The most active and vocal regulators for guidance in the US on social media have been FINRA, the SEC and the FTC. FINRA initiated guidance to the financial services industry, and earlier this month the SEC issued their alert. The SEC’s exam alert to registered investment advisers issued on January 4, 2012 was not meant to be a comprehensive summary for compliance related to the use of social media. Instead, it lays out staff observations of three major categories: third party content, record keeping and compliance – expounding on FINRA’s notice.

Last year the FTC issued an extremely well done Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers.  Three main components are central to the report. The first is a call for all companies to build privacy and security mechanisms into new products – considering the possible negative ramifications at the outset, avoiding social media and privacy issues as an afterthought. The FTC has cleverly coined the notion, “Privacy by Design.” Second, “Just-In-Time” is a concept about notice and encourages companies to communicate with the public in a simple way that prompts them to make informed decisions about their data in terms that are clear and that require an affirmative action (i.e., checking a box). Finally, the FTC calls for greater transparency around data collection, use and retention. The FTC asserts that consumers have a right to know what kind of data companies collect, and should have access to the sensitivity and intended use of that data. The FTC’s report is intended to inform policymakers, including Congress, as they legislate on privacy – and to motivate companies to self-regulate and develop best practices. 

David Shonka, Principal Deputy General Counsel at the FTC in Washington, D.C., warns, “There is a real tension between the situations where a company needs to collect data about a transaction versus the liabilities associated with keeping unneeded data due to privacy concerns. Generally, archiving everything is a mistake.” Shonka arguably reinforces the case for instituting an intelligent archive, whether a company is regulated or not;  an archive that is selective about what it ingests based on content, and that has an appropriate deletion cycle applied to defined data types/content according to a policy. This will ensure expiry of private consumer information in a timely manner, but retains the benefits of retrieval for a defined period if necessary.

The Non-Regulated Use Case­. When will comprehensive social media policies, retention and monitoring become more prevalent in the non-regulated sectors? In the case of FINRA and the SEC, regulations were issued to the financial industry. In the case of the FTC, guidance had been given to companies regarding how to avoid false advertisement and protect consumer privacy. The two are not dissimilar in effect. Both require a social media policy, monitoring, auditing, technology, and training. While there is no clear mandate to archive social media if you are in a non-regulated industry, this can’t be too far away. This is evidenced by companies that have already implemented social media monitoring systems for reasons like brand promotion/protection, or healthcare companies that deal with highly sensitive information. If social media is replacing email, and social media is essentially another form of electronic evidence, why would social media not be part of the integral document retention/expiry procedures within an organization?

Content-based monitoring and archiving is possible with technology available today, as the financial sector has demonstrated. Debbi Corej, who is a compliance expert for the financial sector and has successfully implemented an intensive social media program, says it perfectly: “How do you get to yes? Yes you can use social media, but in a compliant way.” The answer can be found at LegalTech New York – January 30 @ 2:00pm.

2012 is the Year of the Dragon – which is fitting, since no other Chinese Zodiac sign represents the promise, challenge, and evolution of predictive coding technology more than the Dragon.  The few who have embraced predictive coding technology exemplify symbolic traits of the Dragon that include being unafraid of challenges and willing to take risks.  In the legal profession, taking risks typically isn’t in a lawyer’s DNA, which might explain why predictive coding technology has seen lackluster adoption among lawyers despite the hype.  This blog explores the promise of predictive coding technology, why predictive coding has not been widely adopted in eDiscovery, and explains why 2012 is likely to be remembered as the year of predictive coding.

What is predictive coding?

Predictive coding refers to machine learning technology that can be used to automatically predict how documents should be classified based on limited human input.  In litigation, predictive coding technology can be used to rank and then “code” or “tag” electronic documents based on criteria such as “relevance” and “privilege” so organizations can reduce the amount of time and money spent on traditional page by page attorney document review during discovery.

Generally, the technology works by prioritizing the most important documents for review by ranking them.  In addition to helping attorneys find important documents faster, this prioritization and ranking of documents can even eliminate the need to review documents with the lowest rankings in certain situations. Additionally, since computers don’t get tired or day dream, many believe computers can even predict document relevance better than their human counterparts.

Why hasn’t predictive coding gone mainstream yet?

Given the promise of faster and less expensive document review, combined with higher accuracy rates, many are perplexed as to why predictive coding technology hasn’t been widely adopted in eDiscovery.  The answer really boils down to one simple concept – a lack of transparency.

Difficult to Use

First, early predictive coding tools attempt to apply a complicated new technological approach to a document review process that has traditionally been very simple.  Instead of relying on attorneys to read each and every document to determine relevance, the success of today’s predictive coding technology typically depends on review decisions input into a computer by one or more experienced senior attorneys.  The process commonly involves a complex series of steps that include sampling, testing, reviewing, and measuring results in order to fine tune an algorithm that will eventually be used to predict the relevancy of the remaining documents.

The problem with early predictive coding technologies is that the majority of these complex steps are done in a ‘black box’.  In other words, the methodology and results are not always clear, which increases the risk of human error and makes the integrity of the electronic discovery process difficult to defend.  For example, the methodology for selecting a statistically relevant sample is not always intuitive to the end user.  This fundamental problem could result in improper sampling techniques that could taint the accuracy of the entire process.  Similarly, the process must often be repeated several times in order to improve accuracy rates.  Even if accuracy is improved, it may be difficult or impossible to explain how accuracy thresholds were determined or to explain why coding decisions were applied to some documents and not others.

Accuracy Concerns

Early predictive coding tools also tend to lack transparency in the way the technology evaluates the language contained in each document.  Instead of evaluating both the text and metadata fields within a document, some technologies actually ignore document metadata.  This omission means a privileged email sent by a client to her attorney, Larry Lawyer, might be overlooked by the computer if the name “Larry Lawyer” is only part of the “recipient” metadata field of the document and isn’t part of the document text.  The obvious risk is that this situation could lead to privilege waiver if it is inadvertently produced to the opposing party.

Another practical concern is that some technologies do not allow reviewers to make a distinction between relevant and non-relevant language contained within individual documents.  For example, early predictive coding technologies are not intelligent enough to know that only the second paragraph on page 95 of a 100-page document contains relevant language.  The inability to discern what language  led to the determination that the document is relevant could skew results when the computer tries to identify other documents with the same characteristics.  This lack of precision increases the likelihood that the computer will retrieve an over-inclusive number of irrelevant documents.  This problem is generally referred to as ‘excessive recall,’ and it is important because this lack of precision increases the number of documents requiring manual review which directly impacts eDiscovery cost.

Waiver & Defensibility

Perhaps the biggest concern with early predictive coding technology is the risk of waiver and concerns about defensibility.  Notably, there have been no known judicial decisions that specifically address the defensibility of these new technology tools even though some in the judiciary, including U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck, have opined that this kind of technology should be used in certain cases.

The problem is that today’s predictive coding tools are difficult to use, complicated for the average attorney, and the way they work simply isn’t transparent.  All these limitations increase the risk of human error.  Introducing human error increases the risk of overlooking important documents or unwittingly producing privileged documents.  Similarly, it is difficult to defend a technological process that isn’t always clear in an era where many lawyers are still uncomfortable with keyword searches.  In short, using black box technology that is difficult to use and understand is perceived as risky, and many attorneys have taken a wait-and-see approach because they are unwilling to be the guinea pig.

Why is 2012 likely to be the year of predictive coding?

The word transparency may seem like a vague term, but it is the critical element missing from today’s predictive coding technology offerings.  2012 is likely to be the year of predictive coding because improvements in transparency will shine a light into the black box of predictive coding technology that hasn’t existed until now.  In simple terms, increasing transparency will simplify the user experience and improve accuracy which will reduce longstanding concerns about defensibility and privilege waiver.

Ease of Use

First, transparent predictive coding technology will help minimize the risk of human error by incorporating an intuitive user interface into a complicated solution.  New interfaces will include easy-to-use workflow management consoles to guide the reviewer through a step-by-step process for selecting, reviewing, and testing data samples in a way that minimizes guesswork and confusion.  By automating the sampling and testing process, the risk of human error can be minimized which decreases the risk of waiver or discovery sanctions that could result if documents are improperly coded.  Similarly, automated reporting capabilities make it easier for producing parties to evaluate and understand how key decisions were made throughout the process, thereby making it easier for them to defend the reasonableness of their approach.

Intuitive reports also help the producing party measure and evaluate confidence levels throughout the testing process until appropriate confidence levels are achieved.  Since confidence levels can actually be measured as a percentage, attorneys and judges are in a position to negotiate and debate the desired level of confidence for a production set rather than relying exclusively on the representations or decisions of a single party.  This added transparency allows the type of cooperation between parties called for in the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation and gives judges an objective tool for evaluating each party’s behavior.

Accuracy & Efficiency

2012 is also likely to be the year of transparent predictive coding technology because technical limitations that have impacted the accuracy and efficiency of earlier tools will be addressed.  For example, new technology will analyze both document text and metadata to avoid the risk that responsive or privileged documents are overlooked.  Similarly, smart tagging features will enable reviewers to highlight specific language in documents to determine a document’s relevance or non-relevance so that coding predictions will be more accurate and fewer non-relevant documents will be recalled for review.

Conclusion - Transparency Provides Defensibility

The bottom line is that predictive coding technology has not enjoyed widespread adoption in the eDiscovery process due to concerns about simplicity and accuracy that breed larger concerns about defensibility.  Defending the use of black box technology that is difficult to use and understand is a risk that many attorneys simply are not willing to take, and these concerns have deterred widespread adoption of early predictive coding technology tools.  In 2012, next generation transparent predictive coding technology will usher in a new era of computer-assisted document review that is easy to use, more accurate, and easier to defend. Given these exciting technological advancements, I predict that 2012 will not only be the year of the dragon, it will also be the year of predictive coding.

We’ve all heard the phrase that “everything is bigger in Texas” and the little “mini-conference” held in Dallas, TX last Friday was no exception.  The Discovery Subcommittee held a small, one-day conference to tackle some big issues related to preservation and sanctions that could ultimately lead to amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).

The Subcommittee’s primary purpose was to discuss “preservation and sanctions issues” by using the following topics as guidelines:

• The nature and scope of the current “problem”
• The role of technology
• Possible solutions to the problem

Counsel from large companies like Google, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil participated side by side with outside counsel from both plaintiffs’ and defense bar to discuss what some characterized as a lack of clear direction in the current Rules.  Government lawyers, academics, and federal judges including Judges David Campbell (D. Az.), Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.), Paul Grimm (D. Md.), John Facciola (D.D.C.), Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tx.), Michael Mosman (D. Ore.), and Nan Nolan (N. D. Ill.) helped round out the field to make for a lively discussion with multiple perspectives represented.  The following summary highlights some of the key viewpoints and areas of contention debated throughout the day.[1]

The nature and scope of the problem

An underlying theme throughout the day was whether or not preservation and sanctions challenges warrant amending the Rules.  Not surprisingly, counsel for large organizations that commonly bear the brunt of large and frequent document requests lobbied for rule amendments that provide more certainty around when the duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the scope of that duty, and how sanctions are applied.

In support of this position, some corporate attorneys argued that the lack of certainty in the current Rules unfairly requires organizations to err on the side of preserving evidence early and broadly to avoid the risk of sanctions.  Since preserving evidence can be extremely expensive and the duty may be triggered before litigation even begins, they argue that changes to the Rules are necessary.  One corporate attorney framed the issue by providing specific details about costs associated with preserving data for different cases.  He explained that in one situation, his organization has spent more than $5 million to locate, collect, preserve, and maintain data for an ongoing matter even though a complaint has never been filed.  He went on to explain the dilemma by stating: “not preserving asks us to take a chance with our reputation.”

In response, a few attendees questioned how preservation related expenses could spiral so high even before attorney review.  Others pointed out that if the current Rules were better utilized, specifically the meet-and-confer provisions of Rule 26(f), then many preservation challenges could be minimized.  Supporters of better Rule 26(f) engagement complained that counsel for large organizations often refuse to discuss preservation related issues and thereby fuel problems related to the scope of preservation themselves.   Others suggested that if organizations enforced better information management policies instead of keeping “everything forever”, then the magnitude of the problem could be reduced.

Technology

The Subcommittee members generally agreed that the evolution of technology has led to massive data growth which creates new electronic data challenges.  Electronically stored information (ESI) is often duplicative, typically resides in many different technology systems, and can be difficult to locate on a case by case basis.  There was some thoughtful discussion about how data archiving and cloud computing technology are important tools for helping organizations manage these information problems more effectively.  Another commentator acknowledged that although “predictive coding” may be helpful for “reviewing” data, it requires significant human involvement and simply does not solve the problem at hand.

Surprisingly, aside from the comments above, the technology discussion focused mainly on the issue of what constitutes “possession, custody or control” under Rule 34 in today’s environment of social media, cloud computing, and mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there was no discussion of either the role legal technology solutions play in minimizing risk and cost or of the impact the current Rules have on public policy.  For example, the Subcommittee did not address whether organizations that invest in technology in order to automate their internal data management and electronic discovery process should be afforded more protection under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) (“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost”) than organizations that choose not to invest in technology.  If an organization’s technology investment (or lack thereof) is not a factor, does Rule 26(b)(2)(B) have the unintended effect of stifling meaningful legal technology investment by some organizations?  Similarly, do advancements in legal technology diminish the need for a Rule amendment that, at its core, is geared toward reducing costs?  In my opinion, the manner in which organizations are using technology today is an important factor that warrants deeper discussion and a subject I intend to address in a future publication soon.  Stay tuned.

Possible solutions

Discussion about possible solutions to the problem revealed more about the contrasting viewpoints in the room.  Notably, the Department of Justice representatives and those typically aligned with the plaintiffs’ bar tended to lobby for better adherence to the framework contained in the existing Rules in lieu of drafting new Rules.  These folks generally appeared to fall into the “No New Rule” or “Not Yet” camp, and cited the relative newness of the 2006 Rule Amendments and the fact that only about one percent of federal cases involve sanctions in support of their position that Rule amendments are premature or not needed.  Along the same lines, many called for further study and evaluation of the issues through organizations such as The Sedona Conference and the 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program.  Others referenced the importance of looking to evolving case law for more guidance before moving forward with Rule amendments.

In stark contrast, those on the other side of the aisle that typically represent large organizations, lobbied for bright line rules or at least “guideposts” to provide more certainty regarding preservation.  For example, one participant suggested that the duty to preserve evidence should begin when a complaint is served.  Another suggested that the duty should be triggered when a potential litigant is “reasonably certain to be a party to litigation” – a standard that is arguably narrower than the commonly applied “reasonably anticipates litigation” standard articulated in Judge Scheindlin’s frequently cited Zubulake v. UBS Warburg line of decisions.

Those calling for more certainty regarding triggering events also provided recommendations for addressing the scope of the preservation duty and the application of sanctions.  A suggestion to incorporate language that presumptively limits the number of custodians (10) and documents (by age) met resistance on the grounds that trying to apply a one-size-fits-all rule fails to acknowledge that the facts and circumstances of every case are different and so too are the litigants.  Similarly, recommendations to limit sanctions for evidence spoliation to situations where a litigant’s conduct is “intentional” or “willful” were met with a chilly reception by those favoring better adherence to the current Rules.

Conclusion

Time did not permit comprehensive discussion and analysis of every perspective, but the mini-conference highlighted the complexity surrounding preservation and sanctions issues and revealed some polarized viewpoints about how to solve those issues.  Perhaps one glimmer of consensus was the acknowledgement that “pre-litigation” obligations to preserve evidence before service of a complaint is often challenging for large organizations.  However, whether this and other issues should be addressed through better education, more stringent enforcement of existing rules, or by modifying the existing rules to include more “guideposts” remains unsettled.

What do you think?  Please respond to the poll, above right, to let us know whether you think amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is necessary to address some of the preservation and sanctions issues discussed above.

To join the conversation and receive automatic updates when new information is posted to this blog, please subscribe to e-discovery 2.0.

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[1] A more exhaustive list of participants and sample questions was incorporated into the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s June 29, 2011 memorandum announcing the mini-conference.  Similarly, the events leading up to the mini-conference are described in more detail as part of my previous postings on the same subject.

If you have been following my previous posts regarding possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), then you know I promised a special interview with former United States Magistrate Judge Ron Hedges.  The timing of the discussion is perfect considering that a “mini-conference” is being hosted by a Federal Rules Discovery Subcommittee today (September 9th) in Dallas, TX.  The debate will focus on whether or not the Rules should be amended to address evidence preservation and sanctions.  I am attending the mini-conference and will summarize my observations as part of my next post.  In the meantime, please enjoy reading the dialogue below for a glimpse into Judge Hedges’ perspective regarding possible Rule amendments.

Nelson: You were recently quoted in a Law Technology News (LTN) article written by Evan Koblentz as saying, “I don’t see a need to amend the rules” because these rules haven’t been around long enough to see what happens.  Isn’t almost five years long enough?

Judge Hedges: No.  For the simple reason that both attorneys and judges continue to need education on the 2006 amendments and, more particularly, they need to understand the technologies that create and store electronic information.  The amendments establish a framework within which attorneys and judges make daily decisions on discovery.  I have not seen any objective evidence that the framework is somehow failing and needs further amendment.

Nelson: You also said the “big problem” is that people don’t talk enough.  What did you mean?  Hasn’t the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation made a difference?

Judge Hedges: The centerpiece of the 2006 amendments (at least in my view) is Rule 26(f).  I think it is fair to say that the legal community’s response to 26(f) has been, to say the least, varied. Civil actions with large volumes of ESI that may be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) cry out for extensive 26(f) meet-and-confer discussions that may take a number of meetings and require the presence of party representatives from, for example, IT.  There is an element of trust required between adversary counsel (with the concurrence of the parties they represent) that may be difficult to establish – but some cooperation is necessary to make 26(f) work.  Overlay that reality with our adversary system and the duty of attorneys to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients and you can understand why cooperation isn’t always a top priority for some attorneys.

However, “transparency” in discussing ESI is essential, along with advocacy and the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality. That’s where the Sedona Conference Proclamation can make a big difference. Has the Proclamation done that? It’s too early to reach a conclusion on that question, but the Proclamation is often cited and, as education progresses in eDiscovery, I am confident that the Proclamation will be recognized as a means to realize the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of litigation, as articulated under Rule 1.

Nelson: You also mentioned that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee might be running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.  Can you explain?

Judge Hedges: There is a distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” rules.  The Rules Enabling Act governs the adoption of the former.  Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an example of a substantive rule that was proposed by the Judicial Conference.  However, since Rule 502 is a rule dealing with substantive privilege and waiver issues, it had to be enacted into law through an Act of Congress.  I am concerned that proposals to further amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may cross the line from procedural to substantive.  I am not prepared to suggest at this time, however, that anything I have seen has crossed the line.  Stay tuned.

Nelson: If you had to select one of the three options currently being considered (see page 264), which option would you select and why?

Judge Hedges: To start, I would not choose option 1, which presumes that the Rules can reach pre-litigation conduct consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.  My concern here is also that, in the area of electronic information, a too-specific rule risks “overnight” obsolescence, just as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, enacted in 1986, is considered by a number of commentators to be, at best, obsolescent.  Note also that I did not use the word “stored” when I mentioned electronic information, as courts have already required that so-called ephemeral information be preserved.  Nor would I choose option 2.  Absent seeing more than the brief description of the category on page 264, it seems to me that option 2 is likely to do nothing more than be a restatement of the existing law on when the duty to preserve is “triggered.”

So, by default, I am forced to choose option 3.  I presume a rule would say something like, “sanctions may not be imposed on a party for loss of ESI (or “EI”) if that party acted reasonably in making preservation decisions.”  There are a number of problems here. First, in a jurisdiction which allows the imposition of at least some sanction for negligence, all the rule would likely do is be interpreted to foreclose “serious” sanctions. Isn’t that correct? Or is the rule intended to supersede existing variances in the law of sanctions?  At that point, does the rule become “substantive”?   Second, how will “reasonableness” be defined?  Reasonableness supposes the existence of a duty – in this case, a duty to preserve.  For example, is there a duty to preserve ephemeral data that a party knows is relevant?  We come back full circle to where we began.

Remember, Rule 37(f) (now 37(e)) was intended to provide some level of protection against the imposition of sanctions, just as the categories are intended to.  Right?  And five years later 37(e) remains defined variously to be a “safe harbor” or a “lighthouse” by some lawyers such as Jonathan Redgrave or an “uncharted minefield” by others like me.

Nelson: What about heightened pleading standards after the Iqbal and Twombly decisions?  Do these decisions have any relevance to electronic discovery and the topic at hand?

Judge Hedges: Let me begin by saying that I am no fan of Twombly or Iqbal. The decisions, however well intended, have led to undue cost and delay all too often.  Not only is motion to dismiss practice costly for parties, but it imposes great burdens on the United States Courts and, as often as not, leads to at least one other round of motion practice as plaintiffs are given leave to re-plead.  All the while, parties have preservation obligations to fulfill and, in the hope of saving expense, discovery is often stayed until a motion is “finally” decided.  I would like to see objective evidence of the delay and cost of this motion practice (and I expect that the Administrative Office of the United States has statistical evidence already).  I would also like to see objective evidence from defendants distinguishing between the cost of motion practice and later discovery costs.

Putting all that aside, and if I had to accept one option, I would choose to allow some discovery that is integrated to the motion practice.  First, even without the filing of a responsive pleading, there should be a 26(f) meet-and-confer to discuss, if nothing else, the nature and scope of preservation and the possibility of securing a Rule 502(d) order. Second, while I have serious concerns about “pre-answer discovery” for a number of reasons, I would have the parties make 26(a)(1) disclosures while a motion to dismiss is pending or leave to re-plead has been granted in order to address the likely “asymmetry of information” between a plaintiff and a moving defendant.  Once the disclosures are made, I would allow the plaintiff to secure some information identified in the disclosures to allow re-pleading and perhaps obviate the need for continued motion practice.

All of this would, of course, require active judicial management.  And one would hope that Congress, which seems so interested in conserving resources, would recognize the vital role of the United States Courts in securing justice for everyone and give adequate funding to the Courts.

(Editor’s note: This special guest post was written by Chitrang Shah, Clearwell Principal Product Manager. He is an RIT alum and avid hiker who works with our engineering team and lead customers to optimize the product for large-scale review. – Kurt)

As we’ve previously shared, our product strategy throughout 2009 and 2010 was to expand the product footprint across the EDRM as customers were demanding a single, end-to-end eDiscovery product. During this period we successfully expanded from our roots in processing, search and analysis to review and production (August 2009), identification and collection (September 2010) and legal hold workflow (March 2011). Over the last several months, our focus has been to go deep in each of these modules and provide features that deliver even greater return on investment to our customers.

Today, I am excited to announce significant new features and feature enhancements to the Clearwell Review and Production Module and say a few words about what motivated us to build these features and how they enable our customers to further streamline their legal review workflow.

There are several exciting features in this release, but I would to like to highlight three in particular:

1. Ability to seamlessly import production load files

Most matters require reviewing relevant documents alongside the documents received from third parties, opposing parties, and even previous litigations. With the new load file import feature, users can now streamline the process of importing load files with three simple steps.

In Step 1, a step-by-step wizard-like interface guides users though the selection of formatting information such as field delimiters and nested value delimiters, metadata information such as bates numbers, family relationships, tags, folders and any number of custom attributes, and content information such as images, extracted text and native files. When the load file has both extracted texts and native files, the wizard gives users an option to specify which content should be used for searching.

In Step 2, the system performs a deep validation of the load file and generates a report documenting any inconsistencies such as missing bates numbers or missing values for required fields found in the load file. As a result, customers have the ability to quickly find and fix any issues with the load file before the import begins.

In Step 3, the system imports the documents and builds analytics. Once this step completes, the imported documents, including all metadata and content, are available for viewing and searching.

All the analytics capabilities customers are familiar with, such as discussion threads and concept search, are also available for documents imported from load files. This allows users to quickly discover documents in the load file that are conceptually similar to natively processed documents, for example.

2. Support for large scale reviews and productions

As the volume of electronically stored information (ESI) continues to grow, our customers find themselves reviewing and exporting more and more documents, and they need a solution that can cope with the massive growth in data. At the same time, they don’t want to spend large sums of money building a server farm in anticipation of the growth. They want the flexibility to add capacity when needed and remove it when not needed.

Clearwell’s scale-out architecture enables administrators to easily add appliances and allocate them to a particular matter and to a specific task using a point-and-click interface.

For example, if an administrator needs to increase the number of reviewers from 200 to 400 in order to meet a tight deadline, he or she can easily add 2 appliances to the cluster and assign them for review. Once the review completes, the administrator can now easily re-assign these appliances for production, allowing users to easily meet deadlines while reducing their overall hardware costs.

This flexibility allows our customers to maximize the use of their hardware resources while providing infinite review, export and production scalability.

3. Streamlined management of exports and productions

Clearwell provides powerful export options, and while our customers use them extensively for creating a variety of different production formats, they typically standardize on a few. Clearwell’s new case export and production templates provide a quick and easy way for case administrators to define the export format once and use it across multiple cases. When exporting documents, users can simply select a template from the list of visible templates in that case. This capability significantly reduces the overhead associated with managing export formats and allows our customers to produce documents in a consistent format across multiple matters.

Additionally, new production pre-mediation reports automatically identify problem documents and group them by issue type for quick resolution. This enables users to preemptively identify and resolve document production issues without delaying entire productions.

Says Wendy Butler Curtis, chair of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe’s eDiscovery Working Group, “Legal review is one of the most challenging phases of the eDiscovery process. As electronic data volumes continue to grow, it is increasingly important to leverage technologies that can streamline and improve legal review, ensure defensibility and reduce costs. Solutions like the Clearwell eDiscovery Platform enable legal teams to create an iterative eDiscovery workflow that allows for more efficient and effective large-scale review.”

We will be showcasing the new features at ILTA (Booth 816) this week in Nashville, so come see us and let us know what you think.

(Chitrang Shah is a Principal Product Manager at Clearwell Systems, now a part of Symantec, and the lead Product Manager for Clearwell’s Processing & Analysis and Review & Production Modules)

It seems like just yesterday that I wrote a post discussing Judge Scheindlin’s latest electronic discovery opinion in Nat. Day Laborer Org. Network v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (“NDLON”).  One of the issues that jumped out at me when I read the original opinion was Judge Scheindlin’s application of FRCP principles, rejecting the government’s claim  that “if the requirements of FOIA and the requirements of the Rules conflict, FOIA must trump the Rules.”  Needless to say, she didn’t buy the “trump” argument:

“[T]here is no need to decide this question because FOIA does not conflict with the Rules. FOIA is silent with respect to form of production, requiring only that the record be provided in ‘any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.’… Defendants’ productions to date have failed to comply with Rule 34or with FOIA.”

Now that the government has appealed Judge Scheindlin’s ruling I thought I’d consult with a legal guru (in the form of Ralph Losey) to see how he thinks the chips will fall on both the request for a stay and the appeal.  Here’s what started as an impromptu email exchange, which is now paraphrased for your reading enjoyment:

Dean:  ”Ralph, how likely is the government to get stay in the first place?  After all, if they have to produce the metadata (as ordered) winning a downstream appeal won’t help much in the NDLON case?”

Ralph:  ”An interlocutory appeal to the Circuit Court on a discovery issue is always a long shot. Appeals courts usually do not accept appeals of non-final discovery orders. The appellant has to show irreparable harm. Still, this is an unusual case as production of documents goes to the merits of the case itself. They may well take it. I really don’t know. I might depend on someone’s breakfast.”

Dean:  “So, maybe the government loses this initial battle, but my guess would be that they’re still keenly interested in winning the war, since Judge Scheindlin’s metadata production standards will have far reaching affects across any entity responding to FOIA requests.  As an aside, a given agency may handle a multitude of FOIA requests ranging from dozens on the low end to thousands on the high end – so a change in any production protocol is guaranteed to have a material and long lasting impact.”

Ralph:  “Could be, but then again, maybe some agencies are already producing metadata. If they give actual native copies, then they certainly are. I don’t have statistics on that. Certainly, they should have seen this coming. The states that have looked at this all require reasonable metadata production. I probably don’t appreciate the governments real problems here, since in my world, metadata is produced between private parties all of the time without a fuss. Do the feds really have state secrets stashed away in metadata? I seriously doubt it. In my experience, searching for secrets in metadata is usually a big waste of time. It is a fear based on myth, not fact.”

Dean:  “The Supremes issued a ruling recently in Milner v. Dept. of Navy which effectively reigned in an expansionist construction of FOIA Exemption 2.  Aside from containing my new, favorite quote [“Our construction of the statutory language simply makes clear that Low 2 is all of 2 (and that High 2 is not 2 at all).”] do you think this ruling will have any impact on the NDLON outcome?”

Ralph:  “Honestly I don’t know. I consider myself somewhat educated about metadata and production of various metadata fields in load files, but not meta-foia, and I mean that literally, not “metafoicaly” <ouch!>”

Dean:  “Finally, do you think that the Plaintiff’s argument in NDLON that these very agencies ask producing parties for metadata (sometimes in more onerous fashion) will hamper their cause?  Or, is FOIA a different enough creature to throw out the ’good for the goose’ argument?”

Ralph:  “I am reminded of one of my favorite old sayings, ’hoisted by his own petard.’ Certainly many, if not most federal agencies require metadata production to them in e-discovery. Why should the federal government be any different?”

Just as when Judge Scheindlin penned Pension Committee, her latest opinion is already garnering a ton of buzz.  In Nat. Day Laborer Org. Network v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (“NDLON”), 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011) Judge Scheindlin boldly takes on four governmental agencies (ICE, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Legal Counsel) over metadata production in response to FOIA demands.

In NDLON Plaintiffs submitted identical twenty-one page FOIA requests to each of the four defendant agencies.  And, after some initial missed deadlines and judicial intervention, Plaintiffs sent the defendants a proposed protocol that requested a specific format for the production of electronic records.  Significantly, the proposed protocol was based on the “format demands routinely made by two government entities-the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice Criminal Division” (invoking the old “good for the goose” argument).

Before ruling on the protocol, Judge Scheindlin examined the parties’ efforts to cooperate and she was uniformly underwhelmed:

“As far as I can tell from the record submitted by the parties, the equivalent of a Rule 26(f) conference, at which the parties are required to discuss form of production, was not held and no agreement regarding form of production was ever reached. Nor was a dispute regarding form of production brought to the Court for resolution.”

In evaluating controlling law, the fact that “[n]o federal court has yet recognized that metadata is part of a public record as defined in FOIA” didn’t stop Judge Scheindlin from looking to both state law and the FRCP for guidance.  Next, she relied on Aguilar, which noted that the Sedona Conference abandoned an earlier presumption against the production of metadata in recognition of “‘the need to produce reasonably accessible metadata that will enable the receiving party to have the same ability to access, search, and display the information as the producing party ….’”  She then foreshadowed her subsequent ruling by concluding: “[b]y now, it is well accepted, if not indisputable, that metadata is generally considered to be an integral part of an electronic record.”

The Government, not surprisingly didn’t go down without a fight, arguing that “metadata is substantive information that must be explicitly requested and then reviewed by an agency for possible exemptions.”  In concert they also claimed that “if the requirements of FOIA and the requirements of the Rules conflict, FOIA must trump the Rules.”  Judge Scheindlin wasn’t persuaded, holding that:

“[T]here is no need to decide this question because FOIA does not conflict with the Rules. FOIA is silent with respect to form of production, requiring only that the record be provided in ‘any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.’… Defendants’ productions to date have failed to comply with Rule 34or with FOIA.”

In terms of the remedy for the government’s failure, she did cut them some slack:  “Because no metadata was specifically requested in Plaintiffs’ July 23 e-mail, and because this is an issue of first impression, I will not require Defendants to re-produce all of the records with metadata.”  But for future productions she held that the bulk of the ESI be produced in “TIFF image format but with corresponding load files, Bates stamping, and the preservation of “parent-child” relationships (i.e. the association between an attachment and its parent record)” citing the metadata list below for non-email files.

1. Identifier
2. File Name
3. Custodian
4. Source Device
5. Source Path
6. Production Path
7. Modified Date
8. Modified Time
9. Time Offset Value

So, here’s the rub.  The legal populous, not surprisingly, likes bright line rules.  So, when Judge Scheindlin writes (in Footnote 41):  “[w]hile not necessary to the holding in this case, I believe that these are the minimum fields of metadata that should accompany any production of a significant collection of ESI” it’s easy to see how the above nine fields may become a blunt instrument wielded haphazardly by requesting parties.   Not surprisingly, Judge Scheindlin is aware of her mantle and further tries to caveat her holding (in footnote 44):

“To be clear, my Order requiring the use of this Proposed Protocol for future productions-as amended by the specific metadata fields I have required and by the options I have offered the parties regarding the form of production for spreadsheets-is limited to this case. I am certainly not suggesting that the Proposed Protocol should be used as a standard production protocol in all cases. The production of individual static images on a small scale, where no automated review platform is likely to be used, may be perfectly reasonable depending on the scope and nature of the litigation.

The impact of footnote 44 was top of mind when I recently spoke to Fmr. Judge Ron Hedges who chimed in:

“Attorneys must confer with regard to production requirements, as they should before bringing any dispute before a federal court. Moreover, attorneys should recognize that, as Judge Scheindlin said in footnote 44, that the selection of metadata fields to request are case-dependent.  Any attempt to arrive at a ‘universal’ or ‘bright line’ standard for production of metadata ignores the text of Rule 34(b) and the bargaining that occurs in meets-and-confers, and the unique aspects of individual civil actions.”

Despite agreeing with Judge Hedges’ sentiment, the main question in my mind will be whether footnote 44 is given its due weight going forward.  My concern is that, as is oft discussed with her Pension Committee decision, parties may hone in on the bright line test and miss the nuances.  While it’s easy to argue against the folly of this thinking, it may not stop it from happening in the near term.

Finally, in another shout out to the Cooperation Proclamation, Judge Scheindlin takes a swipe at counsel, who forced her to rule on an “e-discovery issue that could have been avoided had the parties had the good sense to ‘meet and confer,’ ‘cooperate’ and generally make every effort to ‘communicate’ as to the form in which ESI would be produced.”

“The quoted words are found in opinion after opinion and yet lawyers fail to take the necessary steps to fulfill their obligations to each other and to the court. While certainly not rising to the level of a breach of an ethical obligation, such conduct certainly shows that all lawyers-even highly respected private lawyers, Government lawyers, and professors of law-need to make greater efforts to comply with the expectations that courts now demand of counsel with respect to expensive and time-consuming document production. Lawyers are all too ready to point the finger at the courts and the Rules for increasing the expense of litigation, but that expense could be greatly diminished if lawyers met their own obligations to ensure that document production is handled as expeditiously and inexpensively as possible. This can only be achieved through cooperation and communication.”

In the end, NDLON will continue to generate a ton of discussion (as did Zubulake and Pension Committee).  While this decision won’t single-handedly end the metadata discussion it will hopefully serve as a launching point for more clarity down the road.  For this, practitioners on both sides of the debate should be thankful.

The electronic discovery blogosphere is filled with analysis of the recent opinion by Judge Sandra Beckwith of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, on the Moody v. Turner case. What is striking about the case is that it reveals a huge gap in understanding the pitfalls of prolonged discovery disputes in the context of attempts by thought leaders to prevent exactly the issues elicited in this opinion. As the excellent post by Ralph Losey indicates, in this case, it is an affront to have this play out in front of Judge Beckwith, a signatory to The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation.

In reviewing the facts of the case, here are highlights on some of the process missteps:

Lack of Early Data Analysis

It is not obvious to some how important it is to perform an early analysis of the data before agreeing to search  ESI for a certain number of custodians and apply certain keywords. This case illustrates three reasons why early data analysis is critically important .

First, the producing party must identify and communicate the right list of custodians. If there is any change or expansion of scope, that needs to be communicated as well. In this case, the Defense team, at their pre-trial 26(f) conference with the Plaintiffs, agreed to produce ESI for twenty six custodians, but chose to send Preservation Notices to larger number of individuals.  While this act by itself is commendable, the lack of prompt communication to the Plaintiffs is certainly a misstep that the Plaintiff chose to latch on to as incomplete production of ESI.

Second, the producing party must have a handle on scope of searches before committing to “run them”.  In reviewing the document Case: 1:07-cv-00692-SSB Doc #: 43, Exhibit 7, it is apparent that the twenty production requests in that report are not trivial. An early analysis of both the data as well as searches at least on a small sample would have helped the producing party understand the scope and challenges of running those searches.

Third, the producing party must evaluate their collection, search, and production methods to evaluate the feasibility of producing metadata. As evidenced in the Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc-89, Page 19), it is clear that the Defense did not produce TIF images along with searchable text. However as noted in Doc-118, Page 18, footnote 10):

“In any event, parties are generally not required to produce the metadata of their data sets. See Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. 06-222, 2006 WL 3091331 at *2… Turner has produced all ESI in TIFF format, except for Excel spreadsheets which were produced in native format given the substantial size of many of the spreadsheets (which, if in TIFF format, may print across hundreds of pages). Judge Hogan therefore rightfully declined to compel Turner to produce any additional metadata.”

This is a fairly common request and  one that the Plaintiffs could have placed in their pre-trial 26(f) conference.

Out of Control Production Requests

In reviewing the aforementioned court document, Doc #: 43, Exhibit 7, one can glean a wealth of information on the nature of searches requested by the Plaintiffs and the responses by the Defense team. The immediate problem evident in these requests is an issue raised by the Defense team – that the search requests are overly broad. Some of the search terms are “plan”, “method”, “rate” and “account”, which are certain to hit a very large number of documents. See below for one of the requests.

Production 1-Item 2: All documents other than emails that can be electronically or digitally searched as containing one or more terms that concern the Plan in any way or cash balance pension plans and contain the word “accrual,” “benefit,”, “benefit accrual,” “accrual of benefit”, “accrual methods,” … “calculate”, “calculation”.

This goes on and on, for about eighteen pages. Combined, the twenty production requests would clearly hit almost every collected document (a total of 118GB of documents), thus making a follow-on privilege or confidentiality review prohibitively expensive. It is the lack of specificity in these searches that makes the discovery request overly broad. On the other hand, the response from Defense appears to be also poorly constructed. In their response, what we see is the same boiler-plate text, which didn’t escape the notice of the Plaintiffs and the court.

“Defendants object to this Request because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, seeks documents that are neither relevant nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible documents and (because Plaintiffs define “documents” to include electronic or computerized data compilations) seeks electronic documents that are not reasonably accessible due to undue burden and/or cost. Defendants further object to this Request because it implicates documents protected by the attorney-client and/or work-product privilege and any such documents will be withheld from production”

What would have helped the Defense’s case would be actual data supporting their claims. For example, if the defendants were to tabulate that words such as “plan” and “benefit” and provide actual document and/or hit counts, it would have bolstered their claim. As expected, this caused the Plaintiffs to submit a further filing, Doc-89 with a host of complaints, chief among them:

Defendants reported only (1) the total number of unique documents captured by the search of 17 terms and (2) the number of documents that contained the term “cash balance” but none of the Plaintiffs’ other terms. See Doc. 77-10 at 2.

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs appear to be on the right track, recommending:

On October 14, Plaintiffs wrote to Defendants and proposed an “iterative search process” to decide on a final set of search terms.

It seems clear in the on-going discovery disputes, an iterative search process was perceived as contrary to zealous advocacy of their client’s positions and not as a path to resolving further disputes, much as the Cooperation Proclamation suggests. In this context, engaging in a search expert is essential – someone who can modify the search to include more restrictive criteria to limit your search results. Why bother running an open-ended search and produce 29.4GB of useless junk, when you can combine these terms with Boolean, proximity, and other searches? The types of searches, and what each can offer, is a topic that the members of EDRM tackled in formulating their EDRM Search Guide, which is a must-read for anyone attempting to construct e-discovery searches.

Proportionality Arguments Without Strong Basis

An important point to note is that any discovery request that uses inefficient processes and inappropriate technologies will certainly result in undue burdens and cost.  It appears that the Defense team did not offer proper cost estimates (arguments put forth in Doc-77-10 notwithstanding), and just pushed an undue burden/cost argument with the hope that the courts would absolve them of discovery obligations. At the same time, the Plaintiffs did seem to have over-reached a bit on extending their discovery disputes with the hope of reaching a favorable outcome. Two examples of such attempts are:

1. Upon Defense producing the documents (Doc-118),

Turner has produced every responsive, non-privileged document obtained through the email ESI searches that related to the Plan; these comprise 4.1 GB, or more than 40,708 pages of documents.

The Plaintiffs counter with:

“Plaintiffs maintain that Turner should be compelled to produce the metadata for the email ESI it has produced because otherwise they allegedly “cannot know whether Defendants have searched all 33 custodians’ email files” and “cannot confirm whether any email files were electronic in origin (rather than printouts of emails) or determine whose files they came from.”

As noted earlier, request for metadata and the feasibility of producing it must be negotiated specifically in the 26(f) conference.

1. The attempt of the Plaintiffs to expand discovery, to compel any and every third party, including Defense’s former law firms, as well as inspect “shared network drives”, “non-shared drives” etc.

“Judge Hogan recognized that Turner should not be compelled to probe through the recesses of its internal electronic systems for even more ESI on top of the 47,000-plus hard copy documents and the 40,000-plus pages of ESI it has produced – because those additional searches are not likely to lead to the discovery of any evidence relevant to plaintiffs’ claims. Judge Hogan was presented with the gory history of Turner’s efforts to search through “shared network drives” and “non-shared drives,” emails and backups. He found these efforts to be sufficient, and rightly rejected plaintiffs’ demand for additional ESI.”

One can see that Plaintiff’s attempt to drag the electronic discovery efforts into an endless battle was counterproductive.

Final Takeaway

The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation rightfully recommends “Jointly developing automated search and retrieval methodologies to cull relevant information”. As costs for getting to the facts escalate, a comprehensive strategy that uses the best processes, the best technology, and a commitment to the Cooperation Proclamation is essential for the legal system to deliver what people expect – justice based on facts. Gamesmanship as evidenced in Moody v. Turner is detrimental to this cause.

Anyone reading today’s announcement from Kazeon could be forgiven for doing a double-take: did someone misplace the decimal point? Kazeon claims that it can perform “processing of ESI in preparation for eDiscovery matters as low as $4.30 per Gigabyte.” Assuming that’s not simply a typo, it begs an obvious question: If Kazeon really can process information at a tiny fraction of what e-discovery service providers are charging, how come every e-discovery service provider isn’t going out of business? Why wouldn’t everyone take this incredibly good deal?

The answer (in press releases, as in politics) lies in definitions. Exactly what sort of processing would you be getting for your four dollars and change?

You’ll have to ask Kazeon to get the answer to that one, but give a venti latte to a bleary-eyed e-discovery service provider who’s just pulled an all-nighter preparing for a meet-and-confer, and they’ll tell you all about the nuances, complexities, and risks inherent in e-discovery processing that may be difficult for enterprise search/information lifecycle management vendors to grasp. Quite likely, they will refer you to EDRM’s processing node overview, which outlines the basic goals of robust processing:

• Capture and preserve the body of electronic documents;
• Associate document collections with particular users (custodians);
• Capture and preserving the metadata associated with the electronic files within the collections;
• Establish the parent-child relationship between the various source data files;
• Automate the identification and elimination of redundant, duplicate data with the given dataset;
• Provide a means to programmatically suppress material that is not relevant to the review based on criteria such as keywords, date ranges or other available metadata;
• Unprotect and reveal information within files; and
• Accomplish all of these goals in a manner that is both defensible with respect to clients’ legal obligations and appropriately cost-effective and expedient in the context of the matter.

And that’s just the high-level overview. After the caffeine from the latte starts to kick in, they’ll tell you it’s also absolutely critical to:

• Provide statistical count tie-outs that reconcile every incoming email, loose file, and attachment with the processed document set
• Automatically scan critical large container files (such as PSTs) for errors and problems prior to processing
• Automatically perform custodian mapping to track ownership of all documents
• Maintain detailed reports on every anomaly encountered during processing, down to the individual email, loose file, and attachment
• Automatically handle common metadata anomalies (with logging) so that the maximum number of documents are made available for review
• Provide robust and thorough handling for container files regardless of container format
• Support non-email content types such as contacts, calendar entries, tasks, and notes
• Robustly handle embedded objects
• Provide full visibility into exceptions encountered during processing, along with an integrated exception handling process to allow repaired/decrypted data to be easily added back into the document set

All that for under five bucks? That’s quite a deal! But remember, if you drive by your corner gas station tomorrow morning and they’re advertising regular unleaded for 20 cents a gallon: It may be cheap, but it’s probably not gas you’re getting.

In a time before e-discovery, I toiled away alongside a partner at Chapin, Fleming and Winet – Larry Shea. While not reducing his legal sagacity to one pithy catch phrase, his “no ask-y, no get-y” line is nevertheless a truism I often ponder.⁽ⁱ⁾

As a green associate, fresh out of law school, I had a number of idealistic (read: naïve) assumptions about how litigators wrangled over discovery disputes. One day, while dealing with a particularly thorny electronic discovery problem, I came to Larry and told him what I thought we wanted and why we needed it in a specific format. I knew that the opposition wasn’t likely to grant our e-discovery request, partially because they’d surely intuit how badly we needed it. Larry simply responded with his truism and explained that if we didn’t express our wishes we’d (a) likely not get what we wanted and (b) would not have established our position if push came to shove with the judge.

Well, I just read a recent case (Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., 2008 WL 902957 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2008)) and it showed me that no matter how evolved the legal discovery process has become, the basic “no ask-y, no get-y” notion still applies.

In Autotech, the issue surrounded the production of electronically stored information (ESI) per Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(2)(E) which basically says that court documents must be produced as they are kept in the “usual course of business” or in a “reasonably usable form.” Significantly, section (iii) also states that a party need not produce the same ESI in more than one form.

Unfortunately, the requesting party (ADC) didn’t specify a form for the production of the document at issue, so “Autotech had the option of producing it in the form in which it was ordinarily maintained, or in a reasonably usable form.” Similarly, ADC did not specify that it wanted metadata as a part of the responsive document production. The court was not sympathetic to ADC’s requests: “It seems a little late to ask for metadata after documents responsive to a request have been produced in both paper and electronic format.” The court ultimately found that “ADC was the master of its production requests; it must be satisfied with what it asked for.”

In other words, “no ask-y, no get-y.”

Yes, this all seems so simple, but parties still are routinely stepping in this same pothole. Useful e-discovery best practices to avoid this predicament follow along these lines:

1. Determine what format of ESI production you’re going to require. This sometimes isn’t as easy as it sounds since there are a number of permutations of review environments, even for common platforms such as Concordance [s1]and Summation Work backwards with the attorney review team and their litigation support personnel to figure out what you’ll need and the type of “load files” that are required.
2. Determine if you’ll likely want metadata. In lieu of any specific guidance, it’s fair to assume you’ll want metadata for spreadsheets (to calculate formulas), in cases involving computer forensics and for matters involving granular document authenticity/chain of custody, to name a popular few. The challenge is that you may not know about some of these issues at the time of the early Meet and Confer conferences. This is particularly important since there is a “modest legal presumption in most cases that the producing party need not take special efforts to preserve or produce metadata.” Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 651 (quoting The Sedona Principles, Comment 12a). So, the opposition may be on pretty solid footing if they claim that they had no duty to keep the metadata if you don’t make your needs known early on.
3. Ask for what you want. Here, you’ll want to get specific, especially if you’re wisely carving out certain data types for different handling. Documenting your requests is a good practice too.
4. Prepare to substantiate your needs for #1 & #2. Courts aren’t very willing to entertain overly broad requests for metadata if there isn’t a showing of need. So, be prepared to be challenged and have a solid rationale for the e-discovery request.

⁽ⁱ⁾ His saying, “if ‘its’ and ‘buts’ were candy and nuts it would be Christmas all year long” is another great pearl, but I couldn’t find a good case law tie-in.