e-discovery 2.0

“Large storage vendor buys small electronic discovery software company to round-out broader corporate initiative.” That was the story in December 2007, when Seagate bought e-discovery company Metalincs for its i365 solution; and, it’s the same story today as EMC announced its acquisition of Kazeon for its SourceOne archiving solution. The terms of the EMC-Kazeon deal were not disclosed, but sources with knowledge of the transaction tell me that the acquisition price is approximately $75 million. That’s slightly less than what Seagate paid for Metalincs ($82 million), and less than what FTI Consulting paid for Attenex ($88 million). But it’s well within the usual range of $50-100 million that most acquirers pay for technology that has not yet matured into a business.

The deal will come as a relief to Kazeon’s long-suffering shareholders. The company was founded in 2003 and, over the past 6 years, it raised over $60 million in equity financing, double the amount it usually takes successful software companies to reach profitability. But despite all that investment, revenue has been hard to come by. According to former Kazeon employees, the company’s revenue totaled only $7 million over the past 12 months. Perhaps as a result, there’s been a lot of management turnover, and last year the board retained a recruiter to find a new CEO. In light of all that, selling the company for $75 million, or 10 times trailing revenue, is a great outcome for Kazeon’s shareholders. It also provides some level of job security for Kazeon’s employees, many of whom have been offered retention bonuses to stick around.

On the other side of the coin, the deal also makes sense for EMC, which needed to flesh out SourceOne, its recent re-branding of the Email Extender archive. In launching SourceOne in April 2009, EMC described it as an integrated portfolio of products: SourceOne Email Management for email archiving; Discovery Manager for legal holds of email; Celerra and Centera for storage; and Discovery Collector for identifying and collecting data from desktops and file shares. EMC owned all of those products except one: Discovery Collector, which instead was to come from EMC Select Partner, StoredIQ. It is widely known that EMC tried repeatedly to acquire StoredIQ but was rebuffed. So instead, it purchased Kazeon (i.e., the Kazeon Information Server) so that it now owns all aspects of SourceOne and does not have to rely on partners.

Will this eDiscovery deal be successful? We will have to wait and see, but Seagate’s experience is not encouraging. A year after it acquired Metalincs, Seagate laid off most of the staff and hired UBS to help it sell what was left of the electronic discovery company. There have not been any takers.

Assuming that you can buy each company for the same price, which would you acquire?

Company A has been in business 3 years, has 25 customers, no brand to speak of, and did about $5 million in revenue in the prior year; or,

Company B has been in business 7 years, has over 100 customers, a strong brand in its market, and is doing $25 million in annual revenue?

“No brainer,” you say, “obviously, Company B.” So it is that FTI looks to have got a great deal buying Attenex (Company B) today for $88 million, whereas Seagate looks like it grossly overpaid for Metalincs (Company A) which it bought for $82 million in December 2007. But things are not always as they appear, and there are good reasons why litigation support software company Attenex has sold for a paltry 3.5x revenue, a multiple well below the 16x commanded by Metalincs or even the 5x revenue that Iron Mountain paid for Stratify.

Three forces reduced Attenex’s acquisition price. The first is that FTI accounted for a large proportion of Attenex’s revenue. That gave FTI leverage over Attenex since it could say, “sell to us for $88 million, or we will take our business elsewhere, your revenue will plummet, and the value of your business will be greatly reduced.” This power that FTI had over Attenex made it the only logical acquirer, so there could be no pressure from other bidders to raise the purchase price.

The second force depressing Attenex’s valuation is that its revenue will likely decline post acquisition as Attenex’s partners (who compete with FTI) switch from Attenex to other solutions. Software investors value growth above all else – and are willing to pay up for it. For example, Bladelogic, an unprofitable software company, went public last year at a $500 million valuation with less trailing revenue than Attenex. But it did $62 million in revenue the following year (Bladelogic sold to BMC Software for $800 million in April 2008). Attenex, by contrast, will see declining revenue in the next 12 months.

Finally, acquirers worried that, since Attenex’s revenue comes almost entirely from its hosted offering via service providers, its revenue was more volatile than enterprise-oriented e-discovery software companies. This is due to the fact that customers (typically, law firms) purchase Attenex-powered services on a case-by-case basis and can switch away at any time. Enterprises, in contrast, purchase long-term software contracts that will not vary based on short-term changes in case volume.

Once these factors are taken into account, the price and the multiple start to look a lot better. Attenex’s founders, who are some of the pioneers of the e-discovery industry, get some well-earned liquidity; the venture investors make a decent return; and, employees get to join a professionally-run company that compensates its people well. My congratulations to the Attenex team, and to FTI which has negotiated a great deal.

Of course, all this says nothing about the deal’s impact on the broader e-discovery market. That will be the subject of my next post.

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