e-discovery 2.0

We’ve devoted a number of posts to the topic of ECA, ranging from a quest to define the acronym, all the way to the cost savings benefits of the ECA approach.  And, while there seems to be relative unanimity around the beneficial aspects of ECA, there still seem to be a number of myths and misconceptions.  So, ala the Mythbusters, we’ll run these myths through the gauntlet to see which survive scrutiny.

Myth #1: ECA Is Only Valuable if Performed “Early”

Certainly, ECA is best leveraged and will be most valuable when performed at the outset of litigation.  As has been stated before, it has value on two primary fronts, the first being the ability to scope electronic discovery (both in terms of cost and timelines).  The next is the more traditional value proposition where ECA is used to get an understanding of the case facts to enable the strategic decision making process.

As such, there are scenarios where an ECA methodology would still generate value even if performed “later” in the mater.  For instance, with bifurcated, class action litigation initial discovery about the class may occur months before discovery on the merits.  In this instance using a later ECA approach would still make sense since discovery about the case facts may not have been possible earlier on.  Similarly, “late” ECA may still hold value when new parties or claims are added to an existing lawsuit, or when there’s a substantial change in case direction, data, or custodians.

Myth #2: ECA Is Only Performed With Technology

Sure, enterprise grade ECA products  are an important part of the mix, but the products won’t perform an ECA by themselves.  There’s just too much subjective decision making involved in the assessment process.   Therefore, the right people are critically important — not only in terms of experience performing this analytical work, but also in their ability to capably testify about the underlying decision making process.  It’s also important to be able to follow a repeatable and defensible processes to show that the “recipe” used was aligned with industry best practices and wasn’t ginned up for a particular engagement.

Myth #3: ECA Only Works With Large ESI Volumes

Yes, ECA methodologies makes a lot of sense for large, bet-the-company matters because even modest savings when processing, analyzing and reviewing terabytes will easily approach six to seven figures.  However, smaller matters will still benefit from better budgetary insights that facilitate informed matter management.  And, in a way there’s almost more benefit from being able to quickly evaluate (fight/settle) smaller suits since the transactional costs are so high relative to the amount in controversy.  In both scenarios it’s important to view objective case data to prepare for meet & confer conferences.

Myth #4: Clients Don’t Want To Pay for ECAs

Many end clients (corporate counsel typically) have a similar litigation mindset:  i.e., the desire to avoid costs for as long as possible.  While avoiding early costs makes some sense on its face, the fact is that spending a small amount of money early on (for budgetary and case assessment purposes) will in most instances reduce the overall litigation budget.  It’s the classic, “you can pay me now, or pay me later” situation.

Counsel must understand that while some costs are incurred early in the process the benefits are crystal clear: i.e., determining customized case strategies early in the matter to decide whether to fight or settle.  Similarly, corporate clients must recognize that the benefits outweigh the costs and require their litigation counsel to include this process in every significant matter.

This illustration highlights how an initial ECA investment actually pays for itself over the life of the litigation.

Myth #5: ECAs Begin when the Complaint is Filed

Many newbie ECA practitioners may think that the timing for an ECA approach would start when the complaint is filed.  And, while this isn’t patently ridiculous, I think the better approach is to begin the clock at the time litigation becomes “reasonably likely” — versus later dates such as when the complaint is filed or when discovery is propounded.  This trigger is also the same for trigger preservation obligations and a host of interrelated activities such as ESI “identification,” which makes the matter kick-off more synchronized.

For more information about ECA, watch a recording of our recent webinar — E-Discovery MythBusters: Debunking Common Myths About Early Case Assessment.

I was at the Sedona Conference Working Group’s Mid Year meeting last week where 80 or so electronic discovery practitioners and judges met to discuss hot topics in bucolic Denver, Colorado.  Without getting into the particulars of any discussion, several themes continue to stay on the front burner, including the progress of the cooperation proclamation and the relatively newer issue of proportionality (as highlighted recently by The American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery).

Aside from those overarching themes I was struck by how polarizing the discussion was around one recent case in particular.  While many notable commentators have already made this the most talked about cases of the year, Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 910801 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2009) continues to stimulate discussion.   Adams v. Dell is a patent infringement case where the plaintiff, alleged that one of the defendants (ASUS) destroyed critical pieces of evidence and should be sanctioned accordingly.

The underlying facts and timelines are fairly complex, but in summary the dispute centered around the alleged infringement of several patents developed to resolve defects in floppy disks during in the late 80’s.  What makes this decision so vexing is that it starts out as a preservation case, but quickly confuses that concept with data retention and information management practices/policies.

So, starting with the preservation angle…  Both sides fortunately agreed about the definition for the duty to preserve evidence, which in the 10^th circuit begins when a party “knows or should know [it] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.”  The triggering of the preservation duty was not surprisingly much more complicated and ASUS (the responding party) claimed that its duty to preserve wasn’t triggered until early 2005, when they received a letter warning it of potential litigation because of the alleged patent infringement.  But, the Magistrate held that “counsel’s letter is not the inviolable benchmark” and the duty to preserve was triggered much earlier (in the 1999-2000 time frame) because similar litigation was rampant in the industry, highlighted by a late 1999 suit where Toshiba paid billions of dollars in a class action settlement related to similar floppy disk issues.

Leaving the murky preservation issue by the wayside for a bit, the Magistrate then moved into ASUS’ claims that FRCP 37(e) provided a safe harbor for its alleged destruction.

“ASUS claims it can find a safe harbor against sanctions because of the recently adopted rule that sanctions may not be generally imposed for ‘failing to provide electronically stored information lost’ if a party can show the loss was ‘a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.’”

Nice try, but strike two for ASUS…

“ASUS provided an extensive declaration from an experienced consultant in e-discovery. While he stated the reasons for and history of ASUS’ ‘distributed information architecture,’ he did not state any opinion as to the reasonableness or good-faith in the system’s operation. And while he says ‘ASUSTeK’s data architecture relies predominantly on storage on individual user’s workstations,’ his 31-page declaration does not show he is familiar with the precise practices pointed out in the declarations of employees. Those employees’ declarations describe the practice of ASUS’ email system to overwrite old data regardless of its significance; ASUS’ reliance on employees for all email and data archiving; and the process of replacement of computers, which also relies on employees to transfer data from their old to their new computers. Neither the expert nor ASUS speak of archiving ‘policies;’ they speak of archiving ‘practices.’

The court’s distinction between “policies” and “practices” seems like a convenient (perhaps “Deus ex machina”) way to discount ASUS’ data retention activities and prevent the use of the FRCP 37(e) safe harbor.  Since in most instances, “bona fide, consistent and reasonable” document retention “policies” have been found to be presumptively valid by everyone ranging from Sedona (Guideline 3) to Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp. and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005).  It’s not clear how he draws the important “practices” distinction and why said practices are exponentially different from presumptively valid “policies.”

It’s precisely this line of thinking that confuses the alleged failure of the duty to preserve (discussed at the outset of the opinion) with the duty to retain information.  The court seems to think it’s an “unreasonable” practice to have custodians responsible for compliance with data retention and this deficiency made the safe harbor unavailable.

“ASUS has explained that it has no centralized storage of electronic documents, email or otherwise, and relies on individual employees to archive email (which will be deleted if left on the server) and electronic documents (which reside only on individual workstations).”

Not only is this custodian-based retention practice, in and of itself, reasonable; it’s probably the most common form of data retention practices seen at corporations today.  While a number of vendors have promised intelligent retention systems that work without any significant human intervention, for the most part those solutions are still in their infancy.  Additionally, there are significant technical challenges to have an application manage *all* ESI (Electronically Stored Information) that exist for a given custodian (including desktop files, instant messaging, text messaging, social media, etc.) As such, most companies must inherently rely upon their custodians to both retain and preserve data pursuant to company policies.  The court not only seems to miss this point, but also attempts to impose an obligation that corporations must prevent the “loss of data” above and beyond specific preservation obligations.

“ASUS’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs. ASUS alone bears responsibility for the absence of evidence it would be expected to possess. While Adams has not shown ASUS mounted a destructive effort aimed at evidence affecting Adams or at evidence of ASUS’ wrongful use of intellectual property, it is clear that ASUS’ lack of a retention policy and irresponsible data retention practices are responsible for the loss of significant data.”

Although the exact rationale was unclear, the court held that ASUS violated their duty to preserve and that the loss of evidence could not be excused as a “routine, good faith operation of electronic information systems.” While the court ruled that sanctions were appropriate, it reserved final sanctions pending the close of discovery.   Depending on what those ultimate sanctions look like, it seems pretty likely that this decision will be subject to appellate review.  Until then, it’s probably too soon to treat this questionable holding as gospel.  Wary corporations however should continue to bolster the “reasonableness” of their information management/retention/destruction policies and practices so that in hindsight a court won’t be able to take away the FRCP 37(e) safe harbor by casting those “practices” as being unreasonable.