e-discovery 2.0

The New Year has now dawned and with it, the certainty that 2012 will bring new developments to the world of eDiscovery.  Last month, we spotlighted some eDiscovery trends for 2012 that we feel certain will occur in the near term.  To understand how these trends will play out, it is instructive to review some of the top eDiscovery cases from 2011.  These decisions provide a roadmap of best practices that the courts promulgated last year.  They also spotlight the expectations that courts will likely have for organizations in 2012 and beyond.

Issuing a Timely and Comprehensive Litigation Hold

Case: E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Kolon Industries (E.D. Va. July 21, 2011)

Summary: The court issued a stiff rebuke against defendant Kolon Industries for failing to issue a timely and proper litigation hold.  That rebuke came in the form of an instruction to the jury that Kolon executives and employees destroyed key evidence after the company’s preservation duty was triggered.  The jury responded by returning a stunning $919 million verdict for DuPont.

The spoliation at issue occurred when several Kolon executives and employees deleted thousands emails and other records relevant to DuPont’s trade secret claims.  The court laid the blame for this destruction on the company’s attorneys and executives, reasoning they could have prevented the spoliation through an effective litigation hold process.  At issue were three hold notices circulated to the key players and data sources.  The notices were all deficient in some manner.  They were either too limited in their distribution, ineffective since they were prepared in English for Korean-speaking employees, or too late to prevent or otherwise ameliorate the spoliation.

The Lessons for 2012: The DuPont case underscores the importance of issuing a timely and comprehensive litigation hold notice.  As DuPont teaches, organizations should identify what key players and data sources may have relevant information.  A comprehensive notice should then be prepared to communicate the precise hold instructions in an intelligible fashion.  Finally, the hold should be circulated immediately to prevent data loss.

Organizations should also consider deploying the latest technologies to help effectuate this process.  This includes an eDiscovery platform that enables automated legal hold acknowledgements.  Such technology will allow custodians to be promptly and properly apprised of litigation and thereby retain information that might otherwise have been discarded.

Another Must-Read Case: Haraburda v. Arcelor Mittal U.S.A., Inc. (D. Ind. June 28, 2011)

Suspending Document Retention Policies

Case: Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011)

Summary: The defendant bank defeated a sanctions motion because it modified aspects of its email retention policy once it was aware litigation was reasonably foreseeable.  The bank implemented a retention policy that kept emails for 90 days, after which the emails were overwritten and destroyed.  The bank also promulgated a course of action whereby the retention policy would be promptly suspended on the occurrence of litigation or other triggering event.  This way, the bank could establish the reasonableness of its policy in litigation.  Because the bank followed that procedure in good faith, it was protected from court sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(e) “safe harbor.”

The Lesson for 2012: As Viramontes shows, an organization can be prepared for eDiscovery disputes by timely suspending aspects of its document retention policies.  By modifying retention policies when so required, an organization can develop a defensible retention procedure and be protected from court sanctions under Rule 37(e).

Coupling those procedures with archiving software will only enhance an organization’s eDiscovery preparations.  Effective archiving software will have a litigation hold mechanism, which enables an organization to suspend automated retention rules.  This will better ensure that data subject to a preservation duty is actually retained.

Another Must-Read Case: Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

Managing the Document Collection Process

Case: Northington v. H & M International (N.D.Ill. Jan. 12, 2011)

Summary: The court issued an adverse inference jury instruction against a company that destroyed relevant emails and other data.  The spoliation occurred in large part because legal and IT were not involved in the collection process.  For example, counsel was not actively engaged in the critical steps of preservation, identification or collection of electronically stored information (ESI).  Nor was IT brought into the picture until 15 months after the preservation duty was triggered. By that time, rank and file employees – some of whom were accused by the plaintiff of harassment – stepped into this vacuum and conducted the collection process without meaningful oversight.  Predictably, key documents were never found and the court had little choice but to promise to inform the jury that the company destroyed evidence.

The Lesson for 2012: An organization does not have to suffer the same fate as the company in the Northington case.  It can take charge of its data during litigation through cooperative governance between legal and IT.  After issuing a timely and effective litigation hold, legal should typically involve IT in the collection process.  Legal should rely on IT to help identify all data sources – servers, systems and custodians – that likely contain relevant information.  IT will also be instrumental in preserving and collecting that data for subsequent review and analysis by legal.  By working together in a top-down fashion, organizations can better ensure that their eDiscovery process is defensible and not fatally flawed.

Another Must-Read Case: Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc. (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011)

Using Proportionality to Dictate the Scope of Permissible Discovery

Case: DCG Systems v. Checkpoint Technologies (N.D. Ca. Nov. 2, 2011)

The court adopted the new Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases recently promulgated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The model order incorporates principles of proportionality to reduce the production of email in patent litigation.  In adopting the order, the court explained that email productions should be scaled back since email is infrequently introduced as evidence at trial.  As a result, email production requests will be restricted to five search terms and may only span a defined set of five custodians.  Furthermore, email discovery in DCG Systems will wait until after the parties complete discovery on the “core documentation” concerning the patent, the accused product and prior art.

The Lesson for 2012: Courts seem to be slowly moving toward a system that incorporates proportionality as the touchstone for eDiscovery.  This is occurring beyond the field of patent litigation, as evidenced by other recent cases.  Even the State of Utah has gotten in on the act, revising its version of Rule 26 to require that all discovery meet the standards of proportionality.  While there are undoubtedly deviations from this trend (e.g., Pippins v. KPMG (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011)), the clear lesson is that discovery should comply with the cost cutting mandate of Federal Rule 1.

Another Must-Read Case: Omni Laboratories Inc. v. Eden Energy Ltd [2011] EWHC 2169 (TCC) (29 July 2011)

Leveraging eDiscovery Technologies for Search and Review

Case: Oracle America v. Google (N.D. Ca. Oct. 20, 2011)

The court ordered Google to produce an email that it previously withheld on attorney client privilege grounds.  While the email’s focus on business negotiations vitiated Google’s claim of privilege, that claim was also undermined by Google’s production of eight earlier drafts of the email.  The drafts were produced because they did not contain addressees or the heading “attorney client privilege,” which the sender later inserted into the final email draft.  Because those details were absent from the earlier drafts, Google’s “electronic scanning mechanisms did not catch those drafts before production.”

The Lesson for 2012: Organizations need to leverage next generation, robust technology to support the document production process in discovery.  Tools such as email analytical software, which can isolate drafts and offer to remove them from production, are needed to address complex production issues.  Other technological capabilities, such as Near Duplicate Identification, can also help identify draft materials and marry them up with finals that have been marked as privileged.  Last but not least, technology assisted review has the potential of enabling one lawyer to efficiently complete the work that previously took thousands of hours.  Finding the budget and doing the research to obtain the right tools for the enterprise should be a priority for organizations in 2012.

Another Must-Read Case: J-M Manufacturing v. McDermott, Will & Emery (CA Super. Jun. 2, 2011)

Conclusion

There were any number of other significant cases from 2011 that could have made this list.  We invite you to share your favorites in the comments section or contact us directly with your feedback.

For more on the cases discussed above, watch this video:

The legal battles during the discovery phase of the Oracle v. Google Java licensing and patent infringement complaint are now well documented. Just search for “Lindholm email” and you’ll find pages and pages of opinions and blog posts on the case. Why so much fuss over a piece of email? Well, as Judge Alsup aptly describes, this is the type of smoking gun email that has the potential to “turn the case on its head.”  More importantly, this inadvertent email never needed to happen, if the parties had better leveraged existing eDiscovery technologies.

The eDiscovery battle over admissibility of this email, as well as whether it can be a public record, is natural and to be expected, especially in such a high profile dispute. Google has already made five attempts to either claw back these documents or protect them under seal. Besides the question of whether privilege waiver is in fact granted simply by adding an “Attorney Work Product” annotation to email, which Judge Alsup has eloquently addressed in the filing here, there is another interesting question to be considered. In addition to the two email copies that had the above designation, there were nine other sequential drafts, created within a five minute period. These drafts were generated by the “auto save” capability of the email software, possibly as a way to prevent the author of the email from losing partial work. Don’t we all love that feature, since despite all the technological advances computers crash, networks fail, and software freezes, and in those times we’re thankful that our work was indeed automatically saved? However, if these are indeed present, are these drafts discoverable, especially if they have not been shared with anyone?

Although in this instance the intent of these drafts is made evident by the final email, which included the recipients, none of the nine drafts of the email have a TO:, CC: or BCC: address field filled in. So technically, the drafts in their “pre-final” form were never communicated to anyone else. If so, should they even be considered electronically stored information (ESI) that needs to be produced? Let’s say that these emails were never sent and merely existed as drafts, perhaps capturing a person’s train of thought. Are they discoverable?

Of course, determining whether such partial and non-evidentiary ESI exists among your millions and millions of documents to be examined for production becomes increasingly the purview of powerful search and analysis software. In this instance, Google and their legal team would have been well-served by email analytical software that can isolate drafts and offer them for removal from production. Also, using a capability such as Near Duplicate Identification would have identified these drafts as similar to the final ones that were marked as privileged. After all, if the legal team had known of their existence prior to production, they would not have been surprised by the opposing team producing them as key documents.

I invite your comments, especially on the notion that partially completed drafts are admissible as evidence.

In the world of technology we live in, a huge amount of benefit is created when people apply certain well-known techniques to solve problems and create value to the broader community. Such techniques are often the result of painstakingly long and laborious research, driven primarily by academic institutions with private industry either funding such research directly or by co-opting them in their own work. When the industry as a whole recognizes a certain methodology, it gains popular usage.

In information retrieval, searching and retrieving relevant content from unstructured text has been a vexing problem, and we’ve had decades of the brightest minds applying their collective intelligence and the rigors of peer review to validate and establish the most effective way to solve a retrieval problem. And, research forums such as TREC, SIGIR and other information retrieval conferences establish a venue for advancing the state of the art. So, when Recommind announced that they have been issued a patent on Predictive Coding, I took notice, especially since it touches a nerve with those who believe research should be openly shared.

The patent lists six claims that describe a workflow whereby humans review and code a document and the coding decisions applied to the document sample are projected or applied to the larger collection of documents. Anyone who has even the slightest exposure to information retrieval research will recognize this as a very common interactive relevance feedback mechanism. Relevance feedback as a way to perform information retrieval has been studied for well over forty years, with a paper as early as 1968 by Rocchio J.J., titled Relevance Feedback in Information Retrieval. It falls under a category of methods broadly known as machine learning.

Any supervised machine learning system involves creating a training sample and using that sample to project into a larger population. The fact that one could claim patentable ideas on something that is so widely known and used is puzzling.  Any workflow that employs machine learning would include the steps of creating an initial control set, coding that by human review, and applying the learned tags to a larger population.  In fact, the Wiki article Learning to rank describes precisely the workflow that is claimed in the patent and as part of our participation in the TREC Legal Track 2009, Clearwell submitted a paper with iterative sampling based evaluation and automatic expansion of initial query.  In that paper, we describe exactly the workflow postulated by the six claims of the patent.

In terms of other prior art that would potentially invalidate the patent, the list is long. Let’s start with Text Classification. Text Classification using Support Vector Machines (SVM) was first published by Thorsten Joachims in 1998, in the Proceedings of Sixteenth International Conference on Machine Learning, as well as his book Learning to Classify Text Using Support Vector Machines: Methods, Theory and Algorithms, published by The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science.  Now a well-recognized Professor of Computer Science at Cornell University, that work is widely cited as a seminal work on the area of machine learning and text classification. Interestingly, this work was cited by the Patent Examiner as prior art, but the inventors missed listing it. Nevertheless, that work and further work by several academics such as Leopold and Kindermann has already established the use of Support Vector Machines as a useful technique for machine learning. To claim the novelty of its use in automatically coding documents is, in my opinion, a hollow claim.

Another technology mentioned in passing is Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI). This is proposed as a retrieval technique by Deerwester, S., Dumais, S.T., Furnas, G.W.,Landauer, T.K., Harshman R. in their paper, Indexing by Latent Semantic Analysis, in Journal of the ASIS, 41(6):391-407, 1990. The use of LSI for semantic analysis, concept searching and text classification is also very widespread, and once again, it seems ridiculous to claim that it is something novel or innovative.

Next, let’s examine the use of sampling to validate the initial control set. Use of sampling for validation of a control set of documents is in fact such a widely known technique that most e-discovery productions employ sampling. In fact, the Sedona Commentary on Achieving Quality and the EDRM Search Guide recommend use of sampling to validate automated searches. Furthermore, several E-discovery opinions such as Judge Grimm’s opinion in Victor Stanley [Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. , 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md., May 29, 2008)]  suggests that any technique that reduces the universe of documents produced must employ sampling to validate automated searches.

In short, we think the claims issued in the patent and the associated workflow are so commonly used that the workflow is neither novel nor non-obvious to a trained practitioner, and there is enough prior art on each of the individual technologies to warrant a re-examination and eventual invalidation of the patent. In any event, it is fairly easy for anyone to pick up existing prior art and devise a similar workflow that achieves the same or better outcome, and attempt to enforce the patent will likely be challenged.

But there is an even bigger issue at stake here beyond the status of Recommind’s patent: namely, shouldn’t the e-discovery vendor community continue to work, as it has for years, toward what is in the best interest of the legal community and, more broadly, the justice system? Recommind’s thinly veiled threats about requiring industry participants to license their technology are an affront to those who have invested years developing the technology and practicing the approach in real-world e-discovery cases. Spend a few minutes trolling (no pun intended) around on archive.org and you’ll see that early predictive coding companies like H5 were practicing machine learning and predictive workflows in e-discovery over two years before Recommind announced their first version of Axcelerate.

Wouldn’t a better outcome be for corporations and law firms to benefit from the innovation that comes from free competition in the marketplace, while still honoring the sort of novel, non-obvious innovation that warrants patent protection? Legitimate patents that actually encourage and protect investments by an organization are fine, but process patents that attempt to patent a workflow are bad for business. With such an approach, the full promise of automated document review (which, as any truly honest vendor should admit, still has much more room to grow and develop) can be fully realized in a way that both provides vendors with the fair and just economic rewards they deserve while helping the legal system become radically more efficient.

Much of the business and personal productivity that comes in the digital world  is from email and its unique abilities. Email allows us to communicate in a way that helps us associate context to our discussions, namely in its ability to be chained into a sequential thread when email users reply to or forward emails they previously received. This accomplishes two important tasks: 1) it allows the person sending the reply or forward to get an understanding of the issues so he/she can craft a meaningful response, and 2) it allows the person receiving the response to understand that response in the context of other on-going discussions. Email programs such as Microsoft Outlook, Eudora, and Gmail help by automatically including content from prior emails, thus producing a long chain of reference.

It is no coincidence that emails thus constitute key evidentiary value in the context of litigation. The inherent value captured in emails is what makes email productions central to pre-trial disclosures and the electronic discovery that precedes it. Courts have long recognized that emails are a business record and subject to discovery. Establishing who said what in the context of a matter in dispute is greatly facilitated by examining the thread of emails recorded in email repositories. With respect to electronic discovery, however, email threading presents several unique challenges. The area of greatest confusion and uncertainty has been the determination of privilege when emails are exchanged with in-house counsel and attorneys and whether such emails are protected by attorney-client privilege or not. A central issue is the composition of privilege logs under these circumstances.

There are several legal opinions on the matter of intermingling privileged and non-privileged communications in an email chain. These opinions have left the matter with little clarity, especially regarding whether the entire email thread is privileged or whether individual emails must be separated out and classified as privileged, with a privilege log listing them. Typically, the most recent email in a thread contains all other emails in that thread. Separating out individual emails (i.e., the contained emails) from the containing email would allow for treatment of just the portions of the email thread that may have privilege. When such separation is permitted, some contained emails may be assessed as privileged while others may not. However, it is entirely possible that the contained email is also present as an independent email under possession of the same custodian or another custodian. When it is present, one could argue that the contained email can just be ignored, and if the corresponding email is responsive, one can ignore the contained email. But rarely does a collection include a complete set of custodians, so the question of whether the privilege log should include the contained item in question still remains. In terms of management of review, and for constructing a privilege log, treating the most recent email and all its contained emails as a single entity is less expensive and cleaner than separating and determining privilege status of each contained email.

Another complicating factor is simply a determination of privilege. Does the mere fact that an attorney was listed as a courtesy CC recipient make the entire email privileged? And, when such emails are then forwarded only to an attorney involved in the case, with a legal strategy discussed in the containing email, is only the new content added to the containing email privileged, or does the privilege determination extend to the other contained emails?  Let’s examine a few opinions for guidance.

With respect to privilege there is a significant body of opinions that would suggest that only communications that explicitly seek legal advice are privileged.

“With respect to internal communications involving in-house counsel, a party “must make a ‘clear showing’ that the ‘speaker’ made the communications for the express purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice”, Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. supp 2d) at 1076 (quoting In Re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). If the legal and business advice are inextricably intertwined, “the legal advice must predominate over the business advice, and not be merely incidental, for the communications to be protected under attorney client privilege.” Evidently, attempts to include an incidental attorney in a thread would not offer privilege protections. However, the issue is complicated if the most recent containing email is indeed a genuine attempt to seek such guidance. Here again, there are two opinions. In United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. supp. 2d 1065, 1074 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2002), we note that:

“With respect to each series of emails for which Chevron asserts protection under privilege, Chevron breaks the series into each discrete message. In our view, such a representation of the document is misleading. Each email/communication consists of the text of the sender’s message as well as all of the prior emails attached to it. Therefore, Chevron’s assertion that each separate email stands as an independent communication is inaccurate.”The above would have you prepare a single entity with the most recent containing email and all other quoted emails treated as a single unit. On the other hand, we see the opposite opinion in Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation, 232 F.R.D. 669, 674 (D. Kan. 2005) where “the court strongly encourages counsel, in the preparation of future privilege logs, to list each email within a strand as a separate entry”. In a related ruling, the court notes: “Obviously, a sufficient (i.e., reasonably detailed) privilege log is vital if litigants and judges are to determine whether documents have been properly withheld from discovery.” As mentioned earlier, this can be much more expensive from a review and production standpoint.

In Chemtech Royalty Assoc., L.P. v. United States, Nos. 05-cv-00944, 06-cv-00258, 07-cv-00405, at (M.D. La. Mar. 30, 2009), we get another perspective: “Asserting privilege for an entire email thread in the privilege log, but only describing the last message in the thread is deficient.”

In Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Fresenius Med. Care Holding, Inc., No. 07-cv-01359, 2008 BL 229777 at (N.D. Cal. Oct 10, 2008), the defendants are ordered to produce a privilege log that “separately identifies the author, recipient(s), copyee(s), and blind carbon copyee(s) for each logged email communication regardless of whether the communication is part of an email string”. The court directive is: “Each email is a separate communication, for which a privilege may or may not be applicable. Defendants cannot justify aggregating authors and recipients for all emails in a string and then claiming privilege for the aggregated emails.”

Thus, the contained emails must be treated as separate privilege log entries.

In Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 812 (E.D. La 2007) the court notes:

“Email threads in which attorneys are ultimately involved were usually listed on the privilege log as one message.”  Further, “Simply because technology has made it possible to physically link these separate communications (which in the past would have been separate memoranda) does not justify treating them as one communication and denying party a fair opportunity to evaluate privilege claims raised by the producing party.”

Again, the preference has been to separate out individual contained emails as independent emails with corresponding privilege log.

In C.T.  v.  Liberal School District, Nos. 06-cv-02093, 06-cv-02360, 06-cv-02359, 2007 BL 21826 at (D. Kan. May 24, 2007), the court orders the plaintiff to submit an amended privilege log that listed email in a string as a separate entry.

In Se. Pa. Transport Authority v. Caremark PCS Health, L.P., 254 F.R.D., 253, 264-65 (E.D., Pa 2008) court recommends “analyzing emails in chain separately to rule on defendant’s privilege claims”.

Another significant opinion is found in Muro v. Target Corp., 250 F.R.D. 350 (N.D. Ill. 2007). In addition to at least four motions, an in camera review  was requested for identifying the privilege status of eighty nine documents. Here, the court ruled that FRCP Rule 26(b)(5)(A)  does not require that all contained emails be separated out. However, the court sustains Target’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling that its privilege log was inadequate for failure to separately itemize each individual email quoted in an email string. In Muro, though, you are allowed to treat an entire email as a single entity only if the non-privileged communications in that chain are otherwise disclosed. Hence, if you wish to treat an email as a single unit, you are required to either disclose the individual contained emails from other custodians, or to list them as Derived Emails (see below).

Another important case is the Rhoads Industries Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of America et al 2008, WL 5082993 (E.D. Pa Nov. 26, 2008), where the court rendered the opposite opinion:

“Each version of an email string (i.e., a forward or reply of a previous email message) must be considered a separate, unique document, and therefore each message of the string which is privileged must be separately logged in order to claim privilege in that particular document.”

Of course, the context of the Rhoades opinion is the statement: “In the world of electronic communications, a series of email messages, among people employed by the client, but working in different locations, can replace the meeting with an attorney and subsequent letter.” However, this opinion is very debatable.

An entirely different approach is suggested in Apsley v. Boeing Co., No. 05-cv-01368, 2008 BL 12035 at (D. Kan. Jan 22, 2008), with the opinion “Although Boeing listed on its privilege log entire email strings, it redacted only the portion of the string that contained legal communications.” While this seems to be a perfectly reasonable approach, wouldn’t this compromise case strategy since the very fact that certain portions of the non-privileged, unredacted emails were being exchanged with in-house counsel and is therefore part of an attorney communication can be damaging?

Suffice it to say, the courts differ in their opinions on how to handle email threads and their privileged logs. It is in this context that the Clearwell E-Discovery Platform’s treatment of email threads is extremely helpful for preparing your litigation response. In fact, Clearwell has received two patents related to email threading, one for constructing email threads and its ranking and another for determining derived emails from other containing emails and de-duplication in the context of original emails. Clearwell has advanced email meta-data and content analytics to piece together all emails of a thread. Furthermore, its Derived Email feature separates out contained emails as complete emails, which are then de-duplicated against other emails that are not derived from a contained email. In situations where such a duplicate is not identified, the derived email is maintained in a special state. Also, the containing email’s thread is separated out in such a way that each individual email’s privilege status can be determined. One can apply either a single- or multiple-record policy satisfying whatever the prevailing opinion is from the bench. Also, Clearwell’s redaction capabilities and its ability to produce the same set of documents for multiple parties allow the case team to provide a quick turnaround if there is a motion to produce either a privilege log or the non-privileged snippets of emails. Such technology can be a lifesaver when it comes to meeting electronic discovery obligations.

We’ve devoted a number of posts to the topic of ECA, ranging from a quest to define the acronym, all the way to the cost savings benefits of the ECA approach.  And, while there seems to be relative unanimity around the beneficial aspects of ECA, there still seem to be a number of myths and misconceptions.  So, ala the Mythbusters, we’ll run these myths through the gauntlet to see which survive scrutiny.

Myth #1: ECA Is Only Valuable if Performed “Early”

Certainly, ECA is best leveraged and will be most valuable when performed at the outset of litigation.  As has been stated before, it has value on two primary fronts, the first being the ability to scope electronic discovery (both in terms of cost and timelines).  The next is the more traditional value proposition where ECA is used to get an understanding of the case facts to enable the strategic decision making process.

As such, there are scenarios where an ECA methodology would still generate value even if performed “later” in the mater.  For instance, with bifurcated, class action litigation initial discovery about the class may occur months before discovery on the merits.  In this instance using a later ECA approach would still make sense since discovery about the case facts may not have been possible earlier on.  Similarly, “late” ECA may still hold value when new parties or claims are added to an existing lawsuit, or when there’s a substantial change in case direction, data, or custodians.

Myth #2: ECA Is Only Performed With Technology

Sure, enterprise grade ECA products  are an important part of the mix, but the products won’t perform an ECA by themselves.  There’s just too much subjective decision making involved in the assessment process.   Therefore, the right people are critically important — not only in terms of experience performing this analytical work, but also in their ability to capably testify about the underlying decision making process.  It’s also important to be able to follow a repeatable and defensible processes to show that the “recipe” used was aligned with industry best practices and wasn’t ginned up for a particular engagement.

Myth #3: ECA Only Works With Large ESI Volumes

Yes, ECA methodologies makes a lot of sense for large, bet-the-company matters because even modest savings when processing, analyzing and reviewing terabytes will easily approach six to seven figures.  However, smaller matters will still benefit from better budgetary insights that facilitate informed matter management.  And, in a way there’s almost more benefit from being able to quickly evaluate (fight/settle) smaller suits since the transactional costs are so high relative to the amount in controversy.  In both scenarios it’s important to view objective case data to prepare for meet & confer conferences.

Myth #4: Clients Don’t Want To Pay for ECAs

Many end clients (corporate counsel typically) have a similar litigation mindset:  i.e., the desire to avoid costs for as long as possible.  While avoiding early costs makes some sense on its face, the fact is that spending a small amount of money early on (for budgetary and case assessment purposes) will in most instances reduce the overall litigation budget.  It’s the classic, “you can pay me now, or pay me later” situation.

Counsel must understand that while some costs are incurred early in the process the benefits are crystal clear: i.e., determining customized case strategies early in the matter to decide whether to fight or settle.  Similarly, corporate clients must recognize that the benefits outweigh the costs and require their litigation counsel to include this process in every significant matter.

This illustration highlights how an initial ECA investment actually pays for itself over the life of the litigation.

Myth #5: ECAs Begin when the Complaint is Filed

Many newbie ECA practitioners may think that the timing for an ECA approach would start when the complaint is filed.  And, while this isn’t patently ridiculous, I think the better approach is to begin the clock at the time litigation becomes “reasonably likely” — versus later dates such as when the complaint is filed or when discovery is propounded.  This trigger is also the same for trigger preservation obligations and a host of interrelated activities such as ESI “identification,” which makes the matter kick-off more synchronized.

For more information about ECA, watch a recording of our recent webinar — E-Discovery MythBusters: Debunking Common Myths About Early Case Assessment.

I was at the Sedona Conference Working Group’s Mid Year meeting last week where 80 or so electronic discovery practitioners and judges met to discuss hot topics in bucolic Denver, Colorado.  Without getting into the particulars of any discussion, several themes continue to stay on the front burner, including the progress of the cooperation proclamation and the relatively newer issue of proportionality (as highlighted recently by The American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery).

Aside from those overarching themes I was struck by how polarizing the discussion was around one recent case in particular.  While many notable commentators have already made this the most talked about cases of the year, Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 2009 WL 910801 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2009) continues to stimulate discussion.   Adams v. Dell is a patent infringement case where the plaintiff, alleged that one of the defendants (ASUS) destroyed critical pieces of evidence and should be sanctioned accordingly.

The underlying facts and timelines are fairly complex, but in summary the dispute centered around the alleged infringement of several patents developed to resolve defects in floppy disks during in the late 80′s.  What makes this decision so vexing is that it starts out as a preservation case, but quickly confuses that concept with data retention and information management practices/policies.

So, starting with the preservation angle…  Both sides fortunately agreed about the definition for the duty to preserve evidence, which in the 10^th circuit begins when a party “knows or should know [it] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation.”  The triggering of the preservation duty was not surprisingly much more complicated and ASUS (the responding party) claimed that its duty to preserve wasn’t triggered until early 2005, when they received a letter warning it of potential litigation because of the alleged patent infringement.  But, the Magistrate held that “counsel’s letter is not the inviolable benchmark” and the duty to preserve was triggered much earlier (in the 1999-2000 time frame) because similar litigation was rampant in the industry, highlighted by a late 1999 suit where Toshiba paid billions of dollars in a class action settlement related to similar floppy disk issues.

Leaving the murky preservation issue by the wayside for a bit, the Magistrate then moved into ASUS’ claims that FRCP 37(e) provided a safe harbor for its alleged destruction.

“ASUS claims it can find a safe harbor against sanctions because of the recently adopted rule that sanctions may not be generally imposed for ‘failing to provide electronically stored information lost’ if a party can show the loss was ‘a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.’”

Nice try, but strike two for ASUS…

“ASUS provided an extensive declaration from an experienced consultant in e-discovery. While he stated the reasons for and history of ASUS’ ‘distributed information architecture,’ he did not state any opinion as to the reasonableness or good-faith in the system’s operation. And while he says ‘ASUSTeK’s data architecture relies predominantly on storage on individual user’s workstations,’ his 31-page declaration does not show he is familiar with the precise practices pointed out in the declarations of employees. Those employees’ declarations describe the practice of ASUS’ email system to overwrite old data regardless of its significance; ASUS’ reliance on employees for all email and data archiving; and the process of replacement of computers, which also relies on employees to transfer data from their old to their new computers. Neither the expert nor ASUS speak of archiving ‘policies;’ they speak of archiving ‘practices.’

The court’s distinction between “policies” and “practices” seems like a convenient (perhaps “Deus ex machina”) way to discount ASUS’ data retention activities and prevent the use of the FRCP 37(e) safe harbor.  Since in most instances, “bona fide, consistent and reasonable” document retention “policies” have been found to be presumptively valid by everyone ranging from Sedona (Guideline 3) to Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp. and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005).  It’s not clear how he draws the important “practices” distinction and why said practices are exponentially different from presumptively valid “policies.”

It’s precisely this line of thinking that confuses the alleged failure of the duty to preserve (discussed at the outset of the opinion) with the duty to retain information.  The court seems to think it’s an “unreasonable” practice to have custodians responsible for compliance with data retention and this deficiency made the safe harbor unavailable.

“ASUS has explained that it has no centralized storage of electronic documents, email or otherwise, and relies on individual employees to archive email (which will be deleted if left on the server) and electronic documents (which reside only on individual workstations).”

Not only is this custodian-based retention practice, in and of itself, reasonable; it’s probably the most common form of data retention practices seen at corporations today.  While a number of vendors have promised intelligent retention systems that work without any significant human intervention, for the most part those solutions are still in their infancy.  Additionally, there are significant technical challenges to have an application manage *all* ESI (Electronically Stored Information) that exist for a given custodian (including desktop files, instant messaging, text messaging, social media, etc.) As such, most companies must inherently rely upon their custodians to both retain and preserve data pursuant to company policies.  The court not only seems to miss this point, but also attempts to impose an obligation that corporations must prevent the “loss of data” above and beyond specific preservation obligations.

“ASUS’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs. ASUS alone bears responsibility for the absence of evidence it would be expected to possess. While Adams has not shown ASUS mounted a destructive effort aimed at evidence affecting Adams or at evidence of ASUS’ wrongful use of intellectual property, it is clear that ASUS’ lack of a retention policy and irresponsible data retention practices are responsible for the loss of significant data.”

Although the exact rationale was unclear, the court held that ASUS violated their duty to preserve and that the loss of evidence could not be excused as a “routine, good faith operation of electronic information systems.” While the court ruled that sanctions were appropriate, it reserved final sanctions pending the close of discovery.   Depending on what those ultimate sanctions look like, it seems pretty likely that this decision will be subject to appellate review.  Until then, it’s probably too soon to treat this questionable holding as gospel.  Wary corporations however should continue to bolster the “reasonableness” of their information management/retention/destruction policies and practices so that in hindsight a court won’t be able to take away the FRCP electronic discovery 37(e) safe harbor by casting those “practices” as being unreasonable.