e-discovery 2.0

Every car dealer knows he should focus customers on the monthly payment, not the total cost of the car. Every credit card solicitation (or sub-prime mortgage, for that matter) starts with the offer of 0% interest, not the actual interest rate or fees the customer will pay after the first 6 months. The reason is simple: once you lease the car or put a balance on the credit card, it’s very hard to switch away when – as often happens – you find yourself paying much more than you should later on.

I was reminded of these examples when reading about Kroll Ontrack’s offer of “free ECA” and Stratify’s recent press release announcing “free early stage filtering” for electronic discovery. Taking each in turn:

Kroll Ontrack Advanceview

Based on feedback from several customers in Washington DC, New York, and the Mid-West, Kroll Ontrack often provides Advanceview at no charge. That means customers can get “custodian de-duplication” and “1 keyword and date filter pass” for free, although Kroll still charges $200-250/hour for doing the work. The resulting data set is then processed and loaded into its review platform for $1,500-$1,800 per gigabyte.

Is this a good deal? For the vast majority of customers, the answer is “no” for three reasons.

First, customers typically end up paying more than they would using alternative products. For example, in the chart below, we compare the cost of using Kroll Ontrack to that of Clearwell for a 100 gigabyte project. In both cases, we assume customers are doing de-duplication, filtering, keyword searching, first pass review, and load file creation. As with any comparison of this sort, you have to make some simplifying assumptions. For example, we excluded data hosting fees and professional services fees from the analysis.

Whether customers are better off with Kroll depends entirely on how much data is culled out for free before customers incur the high, back-end charges. Given that all Kroll is doing for free is custodian de-duplication and running one set of keywords and date filters, the typical cull rate is likely be anywhere from 20% to 50% — nowhere near the 80% cull rate required for Kroll to be more cost effective than Clearwell.

The second reason why this is not a good deal is that it gives customers no certainty about costs. Culling rates from de-duplication and blind keyword searches are unpredictable and vary widely, meaning that some projects will cost more than expected while others will cost less. But every project has budget that’s determined up front and, as any litigation support manager will tell you, you get much less credit for being under budget than you get pain for going over budget. That’s why cost certainty is one of the leading requests from anyone involved in electronic discovery.

Finally, excluding data based on a single round of keyword searches and date filters is not in line with The Sedona Conference best practices. Rather, Sedona recommends that customers iterate their keywords and culling strategies to hone them appropriately.

Iron Mountain Stratify OnPoint

It is not yet possible to do the same detailed analysis on Stratify’s OnPoint which offers “free early stage filtering”, because it’s impossible to tell exactly what that means. In its artfully-worded press release and data sheet, Stratify promises to provide “free processing and loading of unlimited data for early stage filtering”. Does that include de-duplication? Does that include any keyword searching? My guess is “no”, in which case all they are really doing for free is offering to load data into their review platform so that they can then charge you – not a very compelling offer. But if anyone does know the answer to these questions, or if Stratify would like to clarify exactly what’s being offered for free, then please let me know and I’ll post an update.

Once data is in Stratify’s system, it charges a “one-time fee starting at $500 per gigabyte” for “reviewable data”. But it does not say if that’s the only fee. What about monthly hosting charges? Fees for additional reviewers? Again, it’s not yet clear what the downstream cost of review really is using Stratify, so it’s impossible to know whether this is a good deal.

If there’s one lesson from all of this, it’s “buyer beware”. Just as when you buy a car, sign up for a credit card, or click on that offer to get more corn on Farmville, you need to look beyond the “free offer” and understand what it’s really going to cost you.

Jason R. Baron was a keynote speaker at a recent electronic discovery summit and he mentioned an electronic data discovery topic that “ought to be blogged about.”  So, with that kind of softball I had to take a swing, particularly because it’s been a topic we (at e-discovery 2.0) have been discussing lately.

The genesis of this blog (per Jason) is the recent “skepticism” evidenced by the bench regarding the defensibility of custodian based collections.  ARMA has a good piece on this very topic, entitled “Is ‘Manual’ Collection of ESI Defensible?”  The core notion is that the tried and true practice of custodian based ESI collection is now under fire by courts, which appear to be looking at this practice with an increasing level of distrust.

“While it is common for companies to use automated data-collection software and hardware, some corporate litigants opt for more informal, “manual” collection methods (i.e., searches performed by individual records custodians) when responding to ESI requests. Companies may choose the manual collection of ESI to reduce costs, particularly if they have limited levels of litigation or lower risk levels posed by the litigation itself.”

While there’s no dispute that the “automated” collection methods available in litigation software referenced above have a number of features that make this approach more efficient, the question is whether a “manual” (i.e., custodian based) collection process is somehow less defensible.  If this is truly the case, then many midsized companies without the budget to purchase such e-discovery applications will inherently be found deficient – which is a daunting notion.

Take the recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418 (D.N.J. 2009) where the dispute arose out of the demolition of a Ford assembly plant in New Jersey.  Ford and Edgewood entered into a contract whereby Ford agreed to provide 50,000 cubic yards of concrete to Edgewood in exchange for Edgewood removing it from the site.  When the concrete turned out to be contaminated, the dispute started in earnest.

The crux of Edgewood’s complaint was that it was unhappy with Ford’s production and somehow suspected that the dearth of documents was due to the electronic data collection process.  Edgewood sought to “’confirm the adequacy of Ford’s manual document collection process’ by using a third-party vendor to perform keyword searches on documents not in the existing repository of ESI, but instead, documents within the possession of certain Ford custodians.”

To reconcile the dispute the court looked to the Sedona Conference’s work in the area:

“In The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, Practice Point 1 states that “[i]n many settings involving electronically stored information, reliance solely on a manual search process for the purpose of finding responsive documents may be infeasible or unwarranted. In such cases, the use of automated search methods should be viewed as reasonable, valuable, and even necessary.”(emphasis added). Once again, the Court confronts this peculiar situation insofar as Edgewood has a point that the document collection method used by Ford is not necessarily contemplated under the Sedona Principles, but that agreement by the parties at the outset as to the mode of collection would have been the proper and efficacious course of action.  However, “[a]bsen[t] agreement, a [responding] party has the presumption, under Sedona Principle 6, that it is in the best position to choose an appropriate method of searching and culling data.”

Accordingly, the court found that the lack of agreement coupled with Ford being in the best position to make a call about the methodology, was a deciding factor in generally upholding Ford’s manual collection process.

“It would be improvident at this juncture to grant Edgewood the relief it seeks when it has not shown any indicia of bad faith on the part of Ford. To countenance such a holding would unreasonably put the shoe on the other foot and require a producing party to go to herculean and costly lengths (especially in a document-heavy case such as this) in the face of mere accusation to rebut a claim of withholding. This scenario is not contemplated by the Federal Rules.”

While Ford wasn’t penalized for its manual collection, this practice has come under fire in several other opinions.  In the highly controversial case of Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Utah 2009) custodian based collection/preservation policies were similarly under fire.

“ASUS’ practices invite the abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data retention needs. ASUS alone bears responsibility for the absence of evidence it would be expected to possess. While Adams has not shown ASUS mounted a destructive effort aimed at evidence affecting Adams or at evidence of ASUS’ wrongful use of intellectual property, it is clear that ASUS’ lack of a retention policy and irresponsible data retention practices are responsible for the loss of significant data.”

Adams was in fact cited by Judge Scheindlin in her latest opus – Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec. LLC, No. 05 Civ. 9016, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010), where she found fault with the Plaintiff’s reliance on manual collections:

“This instruction does not meet the standard for a litigation hold. It does not direct employees to preserve all relevant records–both paper and electronic-nor does it create a mechanism for collecting the preserved records so that they can be searched by someone other than the employee.  Rather, the directive places total reliance on the employee to search and select what that employee believed to be responsive records without any supervision from Counsel.

From the foregoing, it’s probably too early to call the skepticism over manual collection a trend per se.  Certainly, lobbing a preservation notice over the proverbial wall to custodians without the requisite level of supervision is a recipe for disaster.  Education (about the matter and the required tasks), compliance (with the preservation instructions) and ongoing monitoring (to ensure that compliance continues over time) are all critical responsibilities that must be thoughtfully undertaken by counsel for a defensible ediscovery process.

The question then becomes, is the problem here really about the “manual” collection efforts by the custodians or more simply the fact that they aren’t supervised with the requisite degree of care?  If this is the case, which I’d opine that it is, then “properly executed” manual collections should be fine (i.e., defensible).

But, as Ford indicates, if your company is going to rely upon a manual collection modus operandi, then it may be advisable to let the opposition in on the use of this tactic.  This approach may be mandated by local rule or it may just be the type of transparent cooperation that’s all the rage these days.

The New York state court looked in the mirror recently and they didn’t like what they saw.  While it’s hard to imagine the self-dubbed “center of the universe” finding flaws with anything… apparently e-discovery has caused the big apple to take serious stock of the situation.  In a report entitled ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY in the NEW YORK STATE COURTS, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman and Chief Administrative Judge Ann Pfau do an excellent job laying out the nature of the problem in a 24 page report.  Their initial findings in many ways mirror those of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery (”Task Force”) and their survey of the Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers (”ACTL”).

“Electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) has for some time been changing the face of modern litigation. It is a major, if not the predominant, factor behind rising litigation costs and delays and presents serious challenges to the court system’s ability to resolve disputes ranging from commercial matters to personal injury cases, in an efficient, cost-effective manner.”

Fortunately, the Report recognizes the ubiquity of the vexing e-discovery challenges.

“[T]he volume of electronically stored information (“ESI”) has increased exponentially over the last decade, along with the amount of ESI potentially relevant to legal disputes. But while it is inexpensive to store immense quantities of ESI, it can be extremely expensive in the context of litigation to identify, preserve, and collect potentially relevant ESI and to have it reviewed for responsiveness and privilege by attorneys and paralegals prior to production to another party.”

But surprisingly, they’ve taken their shortcomings personally, and the seriousness apparently threatens New York’s standing in the legal community.

“Interviews with leading judges, law clerks, and practicing lawyers from around the state strongly suggest that the New York court system’s standing as a leading forum of both national and international litigation is at stake. … Those same parties and lawyers appear to be turning away from New York State courts for the greater sense of certainty and ability to handle massive e-discovery disputes that the Federal courts, and to a lesser extent, other state courts with more developed e-discovery practices, can provide.”

The report founded upon “extensive research and interviews with experts in electronic discovery”, addresses the problems of electronic discovery, including cost and delay, and provides several recommendations on how “the courts can manage e-discovery in a more expert, efficient and cost-effective manner within the framework of existing law.”

1. Establish an E-Discovery Working Group

This proposed step is one of the more interesting since the goal is to create “a working group of e-discovery experts that would serve as a resource for the court system and support its efforts to improve the management of e-discovery.”  This Working Group would have a very expansive (perhaps too much so) roster:

• Judges, court attorneys, and court clerks drawn from both the Commercial Division and other courts around the state that handle electronic discovery issues (and perhaps one or more judges/court personnel with little or no e-discovery experience);
• Lawyers with extensive experience litigating cases involving large volumes of ESI;
• One or more CPLR Advisory Committee members with an electronic discovery background;
• Medical malpractice, matrimonial, criminal, mass tort, and employment law practitioners, because of the increasing frequency and importance of electronic discovery in these practice areas;
• General counsel familiar with the issues affecting corporate clients who are heavy-ESI producers, particularly in the financial services and health care industries;
• Forensic computer/e-discovery specialists who typically are hired for large electronic discovery productions, but can share their substantive technical knowledge and familiarity with the latest technological/forensic trends;
• A mix of newer and more experienced practitioners, including one or two more experienced practitioners with limited technical proficiency;
• Bar association representatives who have studied and issued reports on electronic discovery;
• Federal practitioners and/or federal magistrates to offer the federal courts’ perspective;
• An academic who has studied and written about electronic discovery;
• Representatives of the Advisory Group to the New York State and Federal Judicial Council, which works to promote awareness about differences and commonalities in law practice between the state and federal judiciaries;
• A member of The Sedona Conference®, a national group of jurists, lawyers, experts and academics considered to be at the cutting edge of electronic discovery issues;
• Representatives of the Attorney General’s and/or District Attorneys’ Offices who are familiar with how electronic discovery is affecting their caseloads.

Assuming they can put together this dream team, the next challenge (beyond finding times to meet) would be to harmonize all the differing perspective, which certainly won’t be easy.

2. Improve the Preliminary Conference

The Preliminary conference was roundly felt to have value, but there were both short term and long term recommendations for change.  In the near term, the Report concludes that new language should be added to Commercial Division Uniform Rule 1 and to Rule 202.12(c)(3) adding in a new language stating that:

“Counsel appearing at the PC should be sufficiently versed in matters relating to their client’s technological systems to competently discuss with the court and opposing counsel all issues relating to e-discovery. Counsel may, in appropriate cases, supplement their ability to address these issues at the PC by bringing a client representative or outside expert with such knowledge.”

Assuming the short term fixes don’t remediate things completely, the Report recommends two additional steps, each to be piloted.  First, one pilot project should require an Initial Disclosure (similar FRCP Procedure 26[a][1]) for all parties relating to electronic discovery issues, which would require the parties to detail the following, in advance of the PC:

• Who the party’s key IT people are;

• Whether, and to what extent, the party has implemented preservation measures to avoid spoliation of the information relevant to this case;

• Which substantive witnesses the party is likely to call who are likely to possess ESI, and the location of that ESI (e.g., laptops, wireless handheld devices);

• What types of computer systems (including e-mail, word processing and spreadsheet software) and other technologies the party uses that may have created documents relevant to the litigation; and

• Whether the party expects to claim that certain ESI relevant to the case is inaccessible due to the form in which it is maintained (e.g., disaster recovery backup tapes, legacy data).

The other pilot program would require an “Affirmation of E-Discovery Compliance” that would be jointly signed and certified by the lawyers for each party, and provide the court with three lists.

“The first list would contain those e-discovery matters, contained in Rule 8(b) or Rule 202.12(c)(3), which the parties were able to meet-and-confer about and resolve. The second list would contain similar matters that, despite meeting and conferring, the parties could not agree upon or resolve and that need the court’s involvement. The third list would be any additional issues that, because of the disagreements described in the second list, the parties could not yet reach and resolve. The document would also chronicle the parties’ attempts to meet-and-confer, and indicate whether, and to what extent, client personnel and IT specialists were involved.

While there are a few other minor suggestions, one of the most interesting is the shout out to the The Sedona Conference®.  The Report concludes that “judges and practitioners applauded the work of The Sedona Conference®, particularly its emphasis on changing the litigation culture and fostering dialogue, cooperation, and transparency in e-discovery.”  The Report recommends an appointment of a representative to The Sedona Conference® which despite the foregoing “should not be interpreted to mean that the court system necessarily endorses that organization’s work and proposals. Rather, the court system’s appointee would bring back materials for consideration here in New York, to be accepted, rejected, or modified, as appropriate.”

All in all, the New York state court appears to have taken a reasoned and measured approach to address their candid shortcomings.  This type of critical analysis should be taken by more jurisdictions to determine where process gaps still exist.  Only then can a better future state be divined.

Recently, I attended the Sedona Conference’s annual meeting in Atlanta and, amongst other interesting topics, was the discussion of local rules developments and in particular the Seventh Circuit’s new Electronic Discovery Pilot Program (“Pilot Program”).  The Pilot Program was launched October 1, 2009 and seems to be a model for collaboration, since it was developed by eliciting input from a number of disparate groups:

“(a) continuing comments by business leaders and practicing attorneys, regarding the need for reform of the civil justice pretrial discovery process in the United States, (b) the release of the March 11, 2009 Final Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery (“Task Force”) and the Institute for the advancement of the American Legal System at the University of Denver (“IAALS”), and (c) The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation.”

The impetus of the Pilot Program was the “broken” nature of the electronic discovery process with the belief that better collaboration and cooperation would certain help remediate the situation.

“The goal of the Principles is to incentivize early and informal information exchange on commonly encountered issues relating to evidence preservation and discovery, paper and electronic, as required by Rule 26(f)(2). Too often these exchanges begin with unhelpful demands for the preservation of all data, which often are followed by exhaustive lists of types of storage devices. Such generic demands lead to generic objections that similarly fail to identify specific issues concerning evidence preservation and discovery that could productively be discussed and resolved early in the case by agreement or order of the court. As a result, the parties often fail to focus on identifying specific sources of evidence that are likely to be sought in discovery but that may be problematic or unduly burdensome or costly to preserve or produce.”

What I really like about the Pilot Program is that it strives to be both prescriptive and practical, which should hopefully avoid the type of ambiguity often exploited by obstreperous counsel.  For example, there is an entire section on early case assessment (ECA) principles, which require discussion of:

• Production issues
• Identification of electronically stored information (ESI)
• The scope of preservation
• The meet & confer process

There’s also the relatively novel requirement that counsel designate an e-discovery “liaison” to work with the parties to coordinate and flesh out germane e-discovery issues.  Regardless of whether the e-discovery liaison is an attorney, a third party consultant, or an employee of the party, the e-discovery liaison(s) must:

“(a) be prepared to participate in e-discovery dispute resolution;

(b) be knowledgeable about the party’s e-discovery efforts;

(c) be, or have reasonable access to those who are, familiar with the party’s electronic systems and capabilities in order to explain those systems and answer relevant questions; and

(d) be, or have reasonable access to those who are, knowledgeable about the technical aspects of e-discovery, including electronic document storage, organization, and format issues, and relevant information retrieval technology, including search methodology.”

Needless to say, this requirement alone should make marked improvements in the e-discovery dialogue, which unfortunately seems like it’s occurring (literally) among participants who both speak different languages and don’t realize it.

Finally, what makes the Pilot Program unique is that its Principles will be subjected to testing during the phases of the Pilot Program, which is scheduled to end on May 1, 2010 (for the first phase).

This project certainly seems like it’s on the right track and pending feedback from the bench and bar, it could serve as a model for local jurisdiction everywhere.

Judge Grimm’s Victor Stanley case was lauded by many as one of the most significant electronic discovery cases of 2008, mainly for its bold proclamation that e-discovery search is a much more complex and technical discipline than has been typically understood by litigators.

“[F]or lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.”

Despite, legions of articles and blogs on the topic, at least certain portions of the bench haven’t taken heed.  In the case In re: Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47636 (June, 5, 2009) (hereinafter “Zurn“), U.S. District Judge Ann Montgomery receives points for understanding some basic e-discovery tenants around recall and precision, but then mysteriously goes where “angels fear to tread” by suggesting her own search terms.

Examining the case facts in more detail,…  Zurn is a class action products liability case where discovery was bifurcated (as is often the case – see Spieker v. Quest Cherokee) to first cover the class “certification” component.  Initially, the Magistrate partially closed the door on broader ESI discovery, stating that “while ESI may prove to be relevant to the first stage of discovery, we cannot meaningfully make that prediction now, and require the parties to engage in what could be vastly more expensive, and yet utterly futile, discovery.”  However, the Magistrate didn’t shut the door entirely, suggesting that “should the parties uncover voids in the information disclosed in hard copy form, they are . . . at liberty to press for further discovery including electronically stored information.”

Despite complying with Sedona’s Cooperation Proclamation (”The parties have worked amicably throughout the discovery process”) opposing counsel still got to loggerheads when plaintiff found “voids” in the initial paper productions via third party discovery.  The plaintiff brought a motion to compel ESI discovery and the defendant objected, stated two primary arguments: (1) the Magistrate earlier ruled out ESI discovery and (2) if they had to perform ESI discovery it would be unduly burdensome/expensive.

Judge Montgomery summary rejected the first argument, but was concerned about the burden surrounding the proposed ESI discovery.  Here, the calculations get a bit confusing, but plaintiff’s request would have resulted in 361 gigabytes of ESI from employee email sources, as well as shared “J” and “K” drives.  The defendant multiplied the gigabyte number by 75,000 pages per gigabyte, which would have required “approximately seventeen weeks and cost $ 1,150,000, exclusive of vendor collection and processing costs, to review and process the data.”  Assuming a rather modest $1,000 per gigabyte for processing and hosting costs, defendants could’ve added another $400,000 for the project.

Ultimately, the court was not persuaded by the supporting affidavits, nor the attorney’s representations about the resulting burden:

“It is unclear whether Zurn’s cost and time numbers are based on a review of 27 million pages of documents, the 3.6 million pages of documents limited to the J Drive and custodians’ emails, or a smaller sample of document pages likely to be flagged as a result of a search for certain relevant terms pro-posed by Plaintiffs. The affidavit of Ms. Freestone, an attorney and not an expert on document search and retrieval, is not compelling evidence that the search will be as burdensome as Zurn avers.”

The 361 gigabytes apparently resulted from “hits” corresponding to plaintiff’s 26 search terms.  The court correctly identified that those terms had precision issues (”many of Plaintiffs’ proposed search terms will likely produce a large number of ‘hits’ that have limited relevance in the case.”)

Unfortunately, in an effort to increase the search precision, the Judge did not take heed of Judge Grimm’s warning and surprisingly took matters into her own hands: “the Court will limit the search to the following fourteen terms based on the likelihood that they will  produce relevant documents without including a vast number of documents that are likely irrelevant to the litigation.”  Here is the Judge’s list of keywords:

(1) AADFW,
(2) Corrosion,
(3) Corrosive,
(4) Corrosive Water,
(5) Crack,
(6) De-zinc,
(7) Dezincification,
(8) DZR,
(9) Fail,
(10) IMR,
(11) Leak,
(12) MES,
(13) SCC,
(14) Stress corrosion cracking

Without looking at the underlying data, it’s clear from the outset that Judge Montgomery didn’t craft a good search strategy (as Judge Grimm might have predicted).  For example, terms 2, 3, 4 and 14 could’ve been captured by a single stemmed search using the term “corros*.” Without such a stemmed search approach, the terms would probably have been run singly in the proposed protocol, meaning that each one would’ve had tremendous duplication, thereby resulting in wasted attorney review time and processing costs.

Judge Montgomery did recognize the potential error of her ways and gave the parties an out:

“The parties may decide on a different set of fourteen terms if they choose to do so. Additionally, if the search, as ordered by the Court, proves to be overly burdensome or costly, Zurn may renew its objection by presenting the Court with specific information including evidence from computer experts on applying the search terms, the number of documents identified, and the cost and time burdens of vetting documents.”

This “specific evidence” language seems to track notions from Sedona’s search best practices protocol, which prescribes sampling and iterative search term refinement.  What is surprising is that knowing this she would nevertheless blindly proffer the 14 term search strategy.  Instead, she should’ve quoted Victor Stanley and required the parties to come up with a data driven approach that met requisite precision and recall metrics.

Maybe this will show my age, but I’ve been around the electronic discovery business since the days when pricing was both simple and very expensive. Terabytes were at the mythical high-end of the spectrum and gigabytes of “e-docs” (not “ESI”) cost $3,000 – $4,000 to process. Understandably (and fortunately for most), pricing models have evolved, thanks in part to more educated consumers and initiatives such as Sedona’s RFP + Vendor Panel.

Leaving the WABAC machine and moving into present times, we’ve starting to see some variance from traditional pricing models that primarily focus on data “into” the processing machine. More and more companies (such as Kroll Ontrack) are moving to models that price on data “out” of the process. Since that’s a bit nebulous, an example might illustrate:

Traditionally, in a somewhat simplified fashion, an electronic discovery project would be priced by the amount of data in the initial corpus (say 100 gigabytes) and processing would be priced at $500 a gigabyte (for round numbers purposes). Leaving out the sometimes significant caveat that the 100 gigabytes would likely increase due to expansion of compressed files, this would mean that the bulk of the project expenses would be $50,000 ($500 x 100), plus relatively nominal costs for monthly hosting and user access rights.

At the end of the day, after elimination of system files, deduplication and application of search terms (reducing the initial corpus by say 70% collectively) there would be 30 gigabytes remaining for hosting and possible production, both of which are most often priced separately.

Given rampant commoditization there’s an arms race underway among certain service providers where they’re now changing the above model to give away initial processing as a loss leader – pricing only on the data that comes out the end of the processing/search step. In this approach the above workflow would largely stay the same, but the vendor would charge a higher rate for what ultimately is hosted on the back-end. If this back-end fee was $2,000 per resulting gigabyte and the same 30 gigabytes was seen out the back end, then the customer would pay $60,000 for the project. But, if the deduplication, searching, culling, etc. was more effective (at say 80%) then the resulting 20 gigabytes would only cost $40,000.

The question then, as Clint Eastwood would put it, is: “Do you feel lucky?” This pricing model forces attorneys and litigation support managers to guesstimate what culling, search, and de-duplication rates they’ll likely get on the data corpus. Guess right and they save the end client money, guess wrong and they’re way over budget.

The dynamics of this purchasing decision are a bit atypical because the buyer (usually counsel) doesn’t pay the bills, so the decision can often be more vexing than most. When a direct consumer gambles on pricing things will ideally balance out over time, with money being saved in some instances and some being overspent in others. But, when the buyer doesn’t pay the bills the motivation is less clear.

Thoughts run to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to determine which pricing model is ultimately more compelling: (a) price certainty/adherence to budget, or (b) cost variability and the opportunity to save money. While it’s never good to understate the upside of saving money (Esteem), I think ultimately there’s a more fundamental need (Safety) to stay within budget and avoid the painful (sometimes client imperiling) call to discuss how a given e-discovery project has gone way over budget.

This calculation is made further vexing because it not only pits the purchasing party against unknown data culling/searching rates, but it also puts the vendor in an ethical bind where they make less money if they’re supremely effective at data reduction, whereas if they’re either intentionally or accidentally beneficiaries of relatively little data reduction then they stand to make a ton of upside.

It’s like you went to Vegas to gamble your kid’s college fund and on top of the already questionable house odds you knew that the dealer stood to profit by your losses. So, as for myself, no, I don’t feel lucky.

The bashing of our judicial system seems to have reached a fevered pitch.  Groups like the American College of Trial Lawyers (”ACTL”) have proclaimed in a recent report that while the “civil justice system is not broken, it is in serious need of repair.”  The blame game seems to have judges and attorneys alike pointing fingers.  The Fellows of the ACTL (perhaps not surprisingly) seems to pin some of the blame on the judiciary:

“Judges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in designing the scope of discovery and the direction and timing of the case all the way to trial. Where abuses occur, judges are perceived not to enforce the rules effectively.”

Groups like the Sedona Conference chalk up many of the ills to the failure to cooperate, so much so that they’ve orchestrated a cooperation proclamation – which has picked up enough support by the bench to have garnered several cites in the case law (see e.g., Mancia).

The bench for its part seems to put some of the onus on litigators and their reticence to get with the times.  William A. Gross. Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 724954 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2009) is the latest example of such a proclamation.  In this construction defect case, Judge Peck (a Sedona devotee) issues what he hopes will be a “wake-up” call to the bar about the need for “careful thought, quality control, testing, and cooperation with opposing counsel in designing search terms or ‘keywords’ to be used to produce emails or other electronically stored information (‘ESI’).”  In Gross, the court had to mediate an e-discovery dispute where the requesting party propounded a blatantly over-inclusive search request crafted by the requesting parties.  Unfortunately, the responding entity was a non-party and they simply dig their heads in the sand.  In order to facilitate a resolution this left the Court in the “uncomfortable position” of having to craft a “keyword search methodology for the parties, without adequate information from the parties (and Hill).”

Judge Peck’s exasperation with these antics was palpable.  Summing up the problem by citing Judge Grimm and Victor Stanley he stated: “This case is just the latest example of lawyers designing keyword searches in the dark, by the seat of the pants, without adequate (indeed, here, apparently without any) discussion with those who wrote the emails.”  He further noted: “[w]hile this message has appeared in several cases from outside this Circuit, it appears that the message has not reached many members of our Bar.”

After noting both Sedona and Judge Facciola (of O’Keefe and Equity Analytics fame) Peck’s opinion reached a crescendo:

“Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI. Moreover, where counsel are using keyword searches for retrieval of ESI, they at a minimum must carefully craft the appropriate keywords, with input from the ESI’s custodians as to the words and abbreviations they use, and the proposed methodology must be quality control tested to assure accuracy in retrieval and elimination of ‘false positives.’ It is time that the Bar-even those lawyers who did not come of age in the computer era-understand this.”

While it’s easy to see who Peck blames in this brouhaha, it takes (at least) two to tango.  Meaning that litigants on both sides of the “v” must move beyond the typical “seat of the pants” electronic discovery wrangling.  And, judges need to be savvy enough to spot the issues to help/force the parties into such an enlightened/cooperative state.  Nothing short will get the job done.

The American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery (”Task Force”) recently came out with their final report based on their survey of the Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers (”ACTL”).  The project was conceived as an “outgrowth of increasing concerns that problems in the civil justice system, especially those relating to discovery, have resulted in unacceptable delays and prohibitive expense.”  After releasing an interim report, the Task Force issued its final say on the topic, which honed in on three major themes borne out by the Survey:

1. Although the civil justice system is not broken, it is in serious need of repair. In many jurisdictions, today’s system takes too long and costs too much. Some deserving cases are not brought because the cost of pursuing them fails a rational cost-benefit test while some other cases of questionable merit and smaller cases are settled rather than tried because it costs too much to litigate them.

2. The existing rules structure does not always lead to early identification of the contested issues to be litigated, which often leads to a lack of focus in discovery. As a result, discovery can cost far too much and can become an end in itself. As one respondent noted: “The discovery rules in particular are impractical in that they promote full discovery as a value above almost everything else.” Electronic discovery, in particular, needs a serious overhaul.

3. Judges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in designing the scope of discovery and the direction and timing of the case all the way to trial. Where abuses occur, judges are perceived not to enforce the rules effectively. According to one Fellow, “Judges need to actively manage each case from the outset to contain costs; nothing else will work.”

In short, the Survey revealed widely-held opinions that there are serious problems in the civil justice system and that the discovery process, though not broken, is “badly in need of attention.”  While not cited specifically, a recent case highlights many of the Survey’s observations.  In Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009) the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) responded to a third party subpoena and in the process incurred $6M in electronic discovery expenses.  While this case had a number of procedural nuances that fortunately make its holding fairly limited to the facts, this electonic discovery fiasco certainly is a poster child for a discovery process that is bursting at the seams.

The $6M problem started for the OFHEO when the individual defendants became skeptical of a limited production and obtained a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, which confirmed that OFHEO had failed to search all of its off-site disaster-recovery backup tapes.  This inquiry led the OFHEO to enter into a stipulated order to avoid further contempt hearings.  As part of the stipulated order, the individual defendants submitted over 400 search terms, which covered over 600,000 documents.  Overwhelmed with the burden of conducting such a search and the need to hire 50 contract attorneys, the OFHEO objected that the list of search terms was “tantamount to a request for the dictionary,” since it resulted in a “retrieval of approximately 80 percent of the office’s emails.”  Unfortunately, the court ultimately held that the OFHEO needed to comply with the terms of the stipulated order even though the cost was a staggering “9 percent of the agency’s entire annual budget.” To add insult to injury, and despite their efforts, the OFHEO was found in contempt and sanctioned for not meeting the agreed upon discovery deadlines.

This $6M example brings us back to the Survey and the findings of the Task Force.  They proposed a set of Principles (modeling and citing the Sedona Working Group) that would “shape solutions to the problems they have identified.”  Several relating to e-discovery stand out…

• Promptly after litigation is commenced, the parties should discuss the preservation of electronic documents and attempt to reach agreement about preservation. The parties should discuss the manner in which electronic documents are stored and preserved. If the parties cannot agree, the court should make an order governing electronic discovery as soon as possible. That order should specify which electronic information should be preserved and should address the scope of allowable proportional electronic discovery and the allocation of its cost among the parties.
• Electronic discovery should be limited by proportionality, taking into account the nature and scope of the case, relevance, importance to the court’s adjudication, expense and burdens.
• The obligation to preserve electronically-stored information requires reasonable and good faith efforts to retain information that may be relevant to pending or threatened litigation; however, it is unreasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve all potentially relevant electronically stored information.
• Absent a showing of need and relevance, a party should not be required to restore deleted or residual electronically-stored information, including backup tapes.
• Sanctions should be imposed for failure to make electronic discovery only upon a showing of intent to destroy evidence or recklessness.
• The cost of preserving, collecting and reviewing electronically-stored material should generally be borne by the party producing it but courts should not hesitate to arrive at a different allocation of expenses in appropriate cases.
• In order to contain the expense of electronic discovery and to carry out the Principle of Proportionality, judges should have access to, and attorneys practicing civil litigation should be encouraged to attend, technical workshops where they can obtain a full understanding of the complexity of the electronic storage and retrieval of documents.

As Oscar Goldman said about Steve Austin, the legendary $6M man:  “Gentlemen, we can rebuild him. We have the technology…” The electronic discovery “quagmire” appears to need the same type of radical makeover.  Data is proliferating at a rate far greater than the e-discovery competency of litigators and judges alike.  Tools are out there that can help tackle the proliferation problem, but the need for, and ultimate use of, such tools must be appreciated by counsel on both sides of the “v.”  Until notions of proportionality and cooperation start becoming common parlance for both litigators and judges we will unfortunately continue to see more $6M examples like Fannie Mae.

As Tiger Woods is to golf, the honorable Shira A. Scheindlin is to electronic discovery.  She has unquestionably been the most dominant/visible/outspoken jurist in the electronic discovery realm over the past decade, penning amongst others, the Zubulake opinion, which is commonly referred to as the gold standard in electronic discovery.

But, like Woods, who recently took a sabbatical to mend his surgically repaired knee, Judge Scheindlin has recently been eclipsed by several other notable electronic discovery jurists, namely Judge Grimm (of Victor Stanley and Mancia fame) and Judge Facciola (aka “the Italian Stallion“) both of whom made numerous “best of the year” electronic discovery case law lists.

With Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 2009 WL 94311 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 13, 2009) Judge Scheindlin serves notice that the sheriff is back in town.  She not only tackles a number of thorny electronic discovery topics, but ambitiously takes on the US government in the process.  It’s fairly lengthy opinion, well worth the read, so I’ll just excerpt out a few of the notable takeaways.

As a bit of background…  the Collins case centered around a securities fraud complaint brought by the SEC against the Collins & Aikman Corp. and its former CEO David A. Stockman.  The crux of the dispute surrounded questions concerning the government’s discovery obligations in civil discovery (versus in a purely SEC investigation per se).

There were four distinct but interrelated disputes, namely:

“(1) Whether identifying responsive documents that have been organized by the producing party invades the protection accorded to attorney work-product and how a government agency-acting in its investigative capacity-must respond to a request for the production of documents. (2) Whether a government agency may unilaterally restrict the scope of its search based on an assertion of an “undue burden” on limited public resources. (3) How much information the Government must disclose in order to allow an adversary-and the court-to assess an objection based on the deliberative process privilege. (4) Whether a government agency may unilaterally exclude its own e-mail from document production on the ground that most-but not all-will be privileged.”

Addressing the work product claims, the court found against the government, again reinforcing several recent opinions about electronic discovery search:

“The SEC contends that Stockman can search through the ten million pages and find substantially the same documents identified by the SEC without impinging on the thought processes of the SEC attorneys. Indeed-at significant expense and delay-Stockman could search the document databases using appropriate search terms, but the inaccuracy of such searches is by now relatively well known.  A page-by-page manual review of ten million pages of records is strikingly expensive in both monetary and human terms and constitutes “undue hardship” by any definition.” [Citing, George L. Paul and Jason R. Baron's article: Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?

After losing the first battle, the SEC argued that even if the compilations were not protected as work product, it could produce the "complete, unfiltered, and unorganized investigatory file" since this was how the documents were "maintained in the usual course of its business."  This second attempt was similarly unpersuasive as Judge Scheindlin held that the "usual course of business" exemption did not apply:

"[C]onducting an investigation-which is by its very nature not routine or repetitive-cannot fall within the scope of the “usual course of business.” While the SEC routinely collects and maintains regulatory submissions such 10-K reports, in its investigative capacity the agency conducts tailored probes of a company or an industry, requiring the gathering of records from diverse sources. Many if not most of the 1.7 million documents in the SEC production here were likely collected in the agency’s investigatory role. Thus it is no surprise that the complete collection is maintained as it was collected-in large disorderly databases. The documents can only be provided in a useful manner if the agency organizes or labels them to correspond to each demand.”

Next, Judge Scheindlin addressed the SEC’s decision to “unilaterally” limit its search to “centralized compilations” which ultimately “turned up nothing.”  She found that the SEC’s “blanket refusal to negotiate a workable search protocol” was “patently unreasonable” citing both Mancia and the Sedona Conference’s Cooperation Proclamation:

“Rule 26(f) requires the parties to hold a conference and prepare a discovery plan. … Had this been accomplished, the Court might not now be required to intervene in this particular dispute. I also draw the parties’ attention to the recently issued Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, which urges parties to work in a cooperative rather than an adversarial manner to resolve discovery issues in order to stem the ‘rising monetary costs’ of discovery disputes.”

As the coup de gras, Judge Scheindlin addressed and rejected out of hand the SEC’s most untenable claim that it would not produce e-mail “generated or received by the Commission itself” because “nearly all responsive e-mails will be privileged, protected, or non-substantive.”

“Because e-mails are inherently searchable, the SEC’s blanket refusal to produce any in-coming or outgoing e-mails is unacceptable. Without even an attempt to negotiate search terms that would weed out privileged, protected, or irrelevant e-mails, the SEC cannot reasonably assert that a routine aspect of modern discovery-search and review of a party’s e-mail-is beyond its capability. Essentially, the SEC’s position is that the cost of such a search is simply too high, but it has made no effort to document the cost or the likelihood that it would produce relevant, nonprivileged material. The concept of sampling to test both the cost and the yield is now part of the mainstream approach to electronic discovery.”

At the end of the day, the Collins opinion seems to make statement the Judge Scheindlin is back with a vengeance and she’s serving notice that the government isn’t above the law:

“Like any ordinary litigant, the Government must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Besides knocking the government down a peg, Judge Scheindlin throws her judicial weight behind a number of important but nascent trends, including the Sedona Cooperation Proclamation, the related need to meet & confer, the use of sampling and the challenges of electronic discovery search. While none of these notions are groundbreaking, her substantial backing means increasing clarity for lawyers and litigation support practitioners everywhere.  And, that’s certainly welcome.

Picking five out of the sea of electronic discovery cases isn’t as easy as it sounds.  Sure, a few, like our “Case of the Year” will be no-brainers, but others aren’t as clear cut.  And, they’re certainly open to debate.  But, in my humble opinion here’s THE list, counting down David Letterman style:

5) Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 2008 WL 4595175 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2008)

If there ever was an opinion written by a judge to make a larger societal point, Mancia was certainly it.  Judge Paul Grimm, who’ll appear on this list in another slot as well, has clearly taken the mantle from Judge Scheindlin as the leading electronic discovery jurist.  He’d heretofore authored a number of significant opinions in this area, including Hobson and Thompson. Now, in Mancia he used a garden variety discovery dispute, which was typically rife with boilerplate objections and other obstreperous tactics, to highlight the Sedona Conference’s Cooperation Proclamation.

The lasting takeaway from the opinion is the notion that “[c]ourts repeatedly have noted the need for attorneys to work cooperatively to conduct electronic discovery, and sanctioned lawyers and parties for failing to do so.” To support this notion he cites the Sedona Conference Proclamation and the little used FRCP 26(g).  This opinion is noteworthy because it gives precedent to bolster the Sedona initiative and should provide a ready citation for all those counsel who aren’t getting the level of cooperation they need from the opposition.  It remains to be seen if other judges will follow suit, but this could be the beachhead for a more cooperative electronic discovery process in 2009 and beyond.

4) Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008)

Flagg highlights the growing need to reconcile the electronic discovery landscape, which typically focuses somewhat myopically on email, with the larger informational trends which are now categorized by the use of blogs, social networking sites, instant messaging, and text messaging.  Flagg was one of the first to determine text messages (e.g., messages exchanged among certain officials and employees of the City of Detroit via city-issued text messaging devices) were discoverable under the standards of FRCP 26(b)(1).  The holding further demonstrated the challenges of conducting electronic discovery across information systems that mix personal information with business communications.  This type of information commingling will continue to escalate, causing significant long term electronic discovery challenges due to thorny privacy, privilege and policy implications.

3) Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 2008 WL 4916026 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2008)

Rhoads is one of the first cases post Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 502, which recently created a national standard (versus the previous split in jurisdictions) and now states a “middle ground” for the determining of inadvertent disclosure during electronic discovery.  The key provision is (b)(2) which provides protection only if “the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.”  So, Rhoads took that “reasonableness” question head on in a scenario where the plaintiff Rhoads admittedly (yet inadvertently) produced over eight hundred privileged, electronic documents.  The decision is significant because it used the five-factor test stated in Fidelity, but put an undue weighting on the final test which was: “whether the overriding interests of justice would be served by relieving the party of its errors.”   This approach potentially threatens the development of sound case law that will be necessary to help the deployment of FRE 502 into practice because it casts too much uncertainty with its weighting of “fairness” (a problematically vague notion) in the analysis.  It will be interesting to see if/how this approach is subsequently adopted as we enter the New Year.

2) Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008)

This for many was the case of the year given it’s far reaching implications for the legal community.  Some have argued that this isn’t an e-discovery abuse case per se, but more of an example of discovery abuses that just so happened to be centered around ESI.  In either case, the fraud, resulting cover-up, sanctions, ethical issues and privilege discussions made for insightful and thought provoking reading throughout 2008.  The lasting takeaway from Qualcomm appears to be the implications of not just committing discovery abuses, but the failure of having a well thought out e-discovery plan that is actively executed/monitored by outside counsel.  The resulting tension between outside counsel, inside counsel and the internal IT department may continue to escalate if more cases like this make the headlines in 2009.

1)  E-Discovery Case of the Year: Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 2008 WL 2221841 (D. Md. May 29, 2008)

Judge Grimm’s hallmark opinion has had the legal community buzzing over the past several months and the reason appears pretty straight forward.  In Victor Stanley Grimm builds on the holdings in Seroquel, O’Keefe and Equity Analytics, to boldly cast doubt on a practice so routine that it’s literally shocked the legal community into reevaluation:

(”[D]etermining whether a particular search methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) . . . .”

The notion that electronic discovery search is beyond the ability of most attorneys has caused tremors within the litigation support community who had a long history of blindly receiving keywords from counsel, running them and turning back over the results – often blissfully unaware of the extent to which those keyword searches actually located relevant information.  Victor Stanley’s analysis of the “reasonableness” of search protocols also has impact on the FRE 502 and therefore cements its place alongside other e-discovery “must reads” such as Zubulake and Morgan Stanley.

The cases above are my Top 5.  What additional cases do you think were important?  Please let me know by commenting on the cases you think shaped electronic discovery in 2008 and why.